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1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	Case No. 09-50026(REG)
4	x
5	In the Matter of:
6	
7	MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY,
8	
9	Debtor.
10	x
11	
12	U.S. Bankruptcy Court
13	One Bowling Green
14	New York, New York
15	
16	May 7, 2015
17	9:47 AM
18	
19	
20	BEFORE:
21	HON ROBERT E. GERBER
22	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
23	
24	
25	

Page 2 Hearing re: Motion Filed by Doris Phillips for Relief from August 9, 2010 Stipulation and Settlement Resolving Claim No. 44614, or Alternatively, Motion to Set Aside Transcribed by: Dawn South and Sherri L. Breach

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	Page 6
1	PROCEEDINGS
2	THE COURT: Good morning, have seats, please.
3	Okay, we're here on General Motor's Liquidation
4	Company. I'd like to get appearances, please, and then
5	thereafter ask you all to sit down. First for Mrs. Phillips
6	and Ms. Powledge?
7	MR. DAVIS: Josh Davis, Your Honor, along with
8	William Weintraub.
9	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Davis and Mr. Weintraub, of
10	course.
11	MR. STEINBERG: Arthur Steinberg and Scott
12	Davidson from King & Spalding on behalf of New General
13	Motors.
14	THE COURT: Okay, thank you, Mr. Steinberg.
15	MS. RUBIN: Good morning, Your Honor, Lisa Rubin
16	of Gibson Dunn for the Motors Liquidation Company.
17	THE COURT: Right, Ms. Rubin.
18	MR. GOLDEN: Good morning, Your Honor, Dan Golden,
19	Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld on behalf of the unit
20	holders.
21	THE COURT: Okay, thank you, folks.
22	Mr. Davis, I feel very, very badly for
23	Mrs. Phillips, especially with the loss of the kids, but
24	obviously I'm a court of law and required to comply with the
25	requirements of law.

I've read your papers four times, and I still don't understand the basis of your claims -- or your claims for relief from me.

Mrs. Phillips and the kids had prepetition claims, they were sold to a hedge fund, the family got the money for it, and unless I'm missing something you're looking to recover again on the same claims that were sold away to somebody else and that were released.

As I see it the matters before me today don't involve the matters that Mr. Weintraub argued back in February and as to which I ruled about three weeks ago.

You haven't stated in your papers that those rulings are wrong, and of course I assume that Mr. Weintraub would take them up the street and the appellate courts, the Second Circuit if it chooses to, or decide whether I was mistaken in that regard or not.

But your opponents raise much more fundamental issues, starting with whether you have a standing, and at least one of them, if not both -- I certainly saw it in Ms. Rubin's brief, points out -- and if I flip-flop the parties forgive me -- I'm trying to understand the order you're asking me to vacate under 60(b).

I would like you to explain for me in terms that I can understand how you have standing to assert a claim that you're assigned away, that you've sold to someone else, and

how you can get a second recovery on that claim. And I use the claim in the singular, although it's my understanding that the Longacre Fund, or Dover Fund, which I guess was managed by the Longacre, which I understand to be a hedge fund manager, how you have standing to assert rights under a claim or claims that were assigned away.

Also I need you to help me, what is the order you need me to vacate or modify under 60(b)? I entered an order before that authorized Old GM to settle claims in various amounts with varying levels of Court involvement. Claims below a certain amount without anybody's approval, those (indiscernible) amount, which this claim having been settled for so much falls within (indiscernible) without Court approval but with the consent of the creditors' committee.

Unless I totally missed something in lieu of the briefs there is no Court involvement in the ultimate settlement approval -- or the settlement agreement, there wasn't any judicial approval, and I don't understand you to be saying that I acted wrongly when I authorized Old GM to settle claims with the creditors' committee consent.

So that causes me to scratch my head and say what am I asked to do under 60(b) even before I (indiscernible) focus on whether your 60(b) request is timely or whether there's a fraud on the Court that would make the timing inapplicable. And then of course if there is a claim of

fraud on the Court you have to help me understand why there's a fraud on my court, on me, and nobody ever came to me.

So -- usually when I have questions of this character I aim it at both sides, in this case frankly it seems to me kind of one sided, so help if you can.

Come on up first, please, Mr. Davis.

MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor, good morning.

And I will just probably spend most of my time talking about assignment for now, but I think when we talk about assignment the timeline leading up to the sale of the claim is most important.

The Powledge/Phillips plaintiffs had a lawsuit that was ongoing for almost two years prior to the petition of bankruptcy. During the course of that litigation Powledge had submitted numerous discovery requests seeking documents that we now know exist that it's our position should have been produced, but they were not. Of course bankruptcy petition is filed, and we appreciate any discovery and any ongoing litigation is abated at that time, but given the length of time leading up to the petition the fact that certain documents were not provided to Powledge as they then move into bankruptcy become a claimant file before the bar date and then attempt to value their claim in the bankruptcy court, we're saying that those -- the failure to

Page 10 1 provide those documents substantially prejudiced her ability 2 to value her claim. And what is the claim? It is a lawsuit first. 3 Ιt is an unsecured contested claim based on a tort. 4 5 So the Court mentioned the order concerning the 6 ADR procedures and that was in February of 2010, and as part 7 of that order -- and I've got a copy, but I'm sure the Court 8 is aware of it -- claimants with wrongful death and other 9 torts were required to provide a capping letter to the -- at 10 that time it was just the debtor -- within 30 days of the 11 order. Powledge plaintiffs did that and agreed to cap their 12 \$250 million claim that was filed to -- in Ms. Powledge's 13 case, now Ms. Phillips' case -- \$55 million. 14 THE COURT: And I think they were 250 million 15 bucks each weren't they? 16 MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor, but --17 THE COURT: For an aggregate \$250 million times four. 18 19 MR. DAVIS: I think the --20 THE COURT: That's a billion? 21 MR. DAVIS: One billion, correct. 22 THE COURT: Okay. MR. DAVIS: So Ms. Phillips' particular claim was 23 250 million and she agreed to cap it at 55 million and sent 24 25 a letter to that effect in accordance with the Court's order

Page 11 1 to ADR. 2 That capping letter triggered the ADR procedures. As part of those procedures the parties agreed to attend 3 mediation and they went to mediation and obtained a 4 settlement for their lawsuit. And the settlement is dated 5 6 August 9th, 2010. The settlement is between the debtor and 7 Ms. Phillips, her stepchildren, and the mother of the 8 deceased husband, Adam Powledge. 9 THE COURT: By the way there were four kids, if 10 I'm not mistaken, and not three? 11 MR. DAVIS: There were four kids in the car. Two 12 of Mr. Powledge's children from another woman were not in 13 the car and survived, and they were older children, and so he had the four children that were in the car and he had two 14 15 other children that were not in the car. 16 THE COURT: So when they computed the aggregate 17 claim to billion I should have said 1,250,000? 18 MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor --THE COURT: Well 1,250,000? 19 20 MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor, you were correct, it's 21 one billion in the aggregate. 22 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 23 MR. DAVIS: Ms. Powledge, the two children, and 24 then the mom, four times 250-, you were correct. 25 THE COURT: Okay.

Page 12 1 MR. DAVIS: Now the settlement, and it's in the 2 record, but I brought a copy of it and highlighted a couple 3 portions for discussion purposes. If I may approach? THE COURT: I'll take yours. I have my own, but 4 5 if you have highlighted it just show it to your opponents, 6 and if they have no objection I'll take what you hand up to 7 It's Exhibit D to somebody's filing? me. 8 MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor. 9 MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, I don't have any 10 objections to the highlight. Obviously there are things in 11 the stipulation that we would have highlighted that are not 12 highlighted. 13 THE COURT: Somehow I think you know how to bring 14 it to my attention when it's your turn. 15 Come on up, Mr. Davis. 16 MR. DAVIS: I'm just going to turn to the second 17 page, Your Honor. We've identified the effective date of the settlement which is August 9th, 2010. Now --18 19 THE COURT: Bear with me a second. 20 MR. DAVIS: Okay. 21 THE COURT: Should I be looking at something you 22 highlighted or something in the remainder of the document? MR. DAVIS: If you look on page 2 you'll see the 23 24 \$55 million cap and the resolution, and the resolution is on 25 page 3, and the settlement for --

Page 13 1 THE COURT: Just a shade under four million bucks. 2 MR. DAVIS: In the aggregate. 3 THE COURT: Four million, nine hundred seventyfive thousand? 4 5 MR. DAVIS: In the aggregate. 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 MR. DAVIS: For Ms. Powledge individually it's 2.7 million rough and change. She's at the top and you'll 8 9 see that figure, there's a scratch out and it's off to the 10 side. 11 And what the claim becomes is rather than a contested unsecured it becomes an allowed unsecured but with 12 13 that cap of two six nine nine and seventy-four dollars 14 (sic). The -- and of course it's signed on August 9th, 15 2010. 16 It's our position that when Ms. Powledge attended 17 the settlement conference she was attending to resolve a contested claim without the kind of information that we now 18 19 have that she should have had as a litigant. 20 Imagine if you will, Your Honor, Ms. Powledge just 21 filing the claim before the petition in bankruptcy in which 22 no discovery had been conducted outside of the bankruptcy 23 court. She then gets to the bankruptcy court, I would hope 24 that some discovery would have been allowed both for the 25 benefit of the debtor as well as the litigant -- the

plaintiff, and that discovery would have need to have led to in this particular case the very documents that we know GM was not producing related to other prior defects that are certainly applicable to the claim, the underlying litigation that Powledge was bringing for two years prior to the bankruptcy.

THE COURT: Forgive me, Mr. Davis, I'm not called upon to decide today what I would do if there had been a judicial proceeding before me and I had entered an order.

I'm not called upon today to decide what I would do if your clients owned the claim. And I'm not called upon today if you had alleged that Old GM's lawyers lied to me in bringing something to my attention or spirited away a witness or did any of the things that would pass muster under my April 15th decision.

I'm prepared to assume for the purpose of this discussion that there may well have been or even were discovery violations, but your opponents aren't arguing that. They're saying you don't own the claim, there wasn't a judicial order, and that your position now isn't timely. That's what I need you to focus on, that's where I need your help.

MR. DAVIS: And I guess I certainly am, Your

Honor, I'm trying to do that, and I'm just I guess taking a

path to that discussion that may be a little bit more

Pg 15 of 142 Page 15 1 cumbersome than what the Court would like. 2 But if -- the important point for your 60(b) 3 question is down at the bottom of page 3. "This stipulation and settlement may not be 4 5 modified other than my signed writing executed by the 6 parties hereto or by or the of the Court." 7 And we cited in our briefing Second Circuit 8 opinions that establish that settlement agreements are 9 suggest to attack under 60(b), and that's -- and I can 10 provide the cite if --11 THE COURT: Whether or not they've been previously 12 approved by the court? 13 MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor, that's correct, that 14 was what the holding was in that opinion. 15 And in this particular case, given that the Court 16 was ordering ADR in the bankruptcy, and this settlement 17 agreement is the result of that order, I would say that even 18 if we're going to limit the ability to attack a settlement agreement on 60(b) grounds that that is sufficient to meet 19 20 that standard of Court involvement in the parties' 21 settlement of a claim. 22 I think the other thing I would point out to the Court is on page 2 it says, "Where after, after good faith 23 arms length negotiations." I mean I know it's a preamble, 24

but certainly -- and we've discussed this -- Powledge takes

Page 16 1 issue with the good faith nature leading up to the 2 settlement agreement concerning her ability to value what was being settled, to provide the consideration, the release 3 of her lawsuit of her claim in litigation for consideration. 4 How can that be valued if the defendant is undermining that 5 6 position for a variety of reasons while not giving documents 7 that would tend to support that claim, that argument? 8 THE COURT: The contention is that she sold it to 9 the Dover firm for too little money? 10 MR. DAVIS: She settled for too little money. 11 has nothing to do -- because -- and I'm getting to the 12 assignment, Your Honor, I've got it right here -- if you 13 look at the assignment -- and again, I brought a copy and it 14 has much less highlighted portions, I've got copies for you 15 as well if you just don't have it. 16 MR. STEINBERG: It's attached to our paper. 17 the assignment. 18 THE COURT: You're talking about the assignment itself and not the evidence of the transfer of claims. 19 20 MR. DAVIS: The claim sale agreement, the 21 assignment. I have copies. 22 MS. RUBIN: Your Honor, I just want to point out 23 that this particular -- Your Honor --24 THE COURT: To a microphone, please, Ms. Rubin. 25 MS. RUBIN: Sure, I'd be happy to, Your Honor.

Page 17 1 Give me one moment, please, to get (indiscernible). 2 The document that Mr. Davis, Your Honor, is 3 presenting the Court with now is not a document that was 4 previously attached to any of the parties' submissions on 5 this motion. There is an evidence of the transfer of claim 6 that was filed publicly on this docket, it's also I believe 7 an exhibit to at least New GM's brief here and cited in the 8 GUC Trust's brief. 9 But to the extent that Mr. Davis now wants to submit to the Court a highlighted version of a transfer 10 11 agreement between Longacre and his client I just want to 12 point out to the Court this is not a document that I full on 13 have seen, I can't speak for Mr. Steinberg, I'd like to 14 moment to reflect on it before Mr. Davis continues. 15 THE COURT: All right. Well you're certainly 16 allowed to see it and reflect on it. 17 I would have thought that from what he's described it as it's further evidence of something that supports your 18 19 position that the claimants sold away their claim --20 MS. RUBIN: That (indiscernible). 21 THE COURT: -- but if you want to look at it 22 that's plainly your right. 23 (Pause) 24 THE COURT: Do I have an objection? Oh,

Mr. Steinberg is reading it now.

MS. RUBIN: We're sometimes confused as being one in the same, but I'm sure Mr. Steinberg would say we are not the same party.

THE COURT: I can tell the difference between the two of you and your clients.

MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, I've read it now. I assume that there's a disclosure paragraph and he's gotten the consent of the buyer to actually present this.

THE COURT: Mr. Steinberg, you can lift up that nearby microphone Oprah Winfrey style, but I didn't hear what you have to say.

MR. STEINBERG: The assignment has a disclosure paragraph which basically says it's not to be disclosed to anybody, so I assume he's gotten some kind of approval to do what he's about to do.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, the actual language of the disclosure does not say to anybody, just to any other creditors or debtors for the prospective purchasers of the claim, so -- excuse me -- any other creditors of debtor or prospective purchasers of the claim.

THE COURT: I assume the purpose of a provision of that character is to protect the hedge fund from the loss of the advantage it has when people sell their claims to it and it wants to buy people's claims up as cheaply as possible.

MR. DAVIS: That's --

1 THE COURT: To me do we know if Dover or Longacre 2 or anybody else is still buying up GM claims? MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, I cannot offer any opinion 3 as to that question, but I will say that GM both knew and 4 5 the trust their own pleadings have at this point stated how 6 much money Powledge received in exchange for the settlement 7 amount that we've already talked about. So it seems like 8 the contents of the document concerning the transaction are 9 known in the pleadings. 10 THE COURT: So in other words, Mr. Davis, you're 11 saying that on a most important point in the whole agreement 12 from the perspective of a claims buyer the cats already out of the bag? 13 14 MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor, anybody could do the 15 percentage of, you know, what the claim -- you know, settled 16 for based on the settlement agreement and how much --17 THE COURT: You divide 3,975,000 bucks by the amount of the settlement? 18 19 MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, I don't believe we 20 knew about what the actual converse price was. 21 The only thing I wanted to point out, this is a 22 private agreement between the purchaser and the seller, which has a disclosure provision. If he's now going to hand 23 24 it to Your Honor it does become a public record. I was just 25 pointing out to counsel whether he's violating a private

Page 20 1 disclosure arrangement that his clients have. It doesn't 2 pertain to me, it pertains to him and his obligations under the agreement, and that's all I was trying to say. 3 THE COURT: All right. 4 5 MS. RUBIN: Your Honor, may I --6 THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead, Ms. Rubin. 7 MS. RUBIN: Your Honor, at page 6 of the GUC 8 Trust's brief we cite docket number 12845 at 1, it's 9 actually a letter from Mr. Davis to this Court in 10 anticipation of an August 18th, 2014 hearing in this court. 11 THE COURT: Pull that mic closer to you, please. 12 MS. RUBIN: Sure. It was through that letter that 13 Mr. Davis disclosed to the Court and thereby to counsel 14 associated here what amount Mrs. Powledge or Mrs. Phillips 15 rather received from Dover Master Fund in respect of her 16 claim. Were it not for that letter that information would 17 not have been available to us. 18 MR. DAVIS: And respectfully, Your Honor --THE COURT: 19 Uh-huh. 20 MR. DAVIS: -- that's not accurate. In the 21 Southern District of Texas prior to this case's removal to 22 this case court the GUC Trust filed a 12(b)(6) motion to 23 dismiss in which the amounts were made apparent in those 24 documents, and those pleadings were included in the removal. 25 So my letter was actually at that time doing

nothing but parroting the amounts provided by counsel in response -- or excuse me -- in their 12(b)(6) motion, because frankly, Your Honor, at that point when I wrote that letter other than the motion to dismiss I did not know the figure that my client actually received.

THE COURT: All right, here's what we're going to do ladies and gentlemen. You having presented it to Mr. Steinberg and Ms. Rubin and what you're giving me (indiscernible) after the hearing to give them hard copies of what we're talking about. Can you hand it up to me and what will be deemed to be an in camera submission.

Frankly, I think the only relevant legal issue is that there was an assignment of the claim or claims.

If you want to argue the amount that the claim sold for your opponents may be right that that's a violation of your claims agreement with Dover, but that's an issue between you and Dover, and if you want to argue I will let you at your own risk, and you should understand that if Longacre or Dover sues you for some kind of a (indiscernible) against their trading strategies -- their confidential trading strategies that's a dispute between two (indiscernible) as to which this Court can't protect you because it doesn't have subject matter jurisdiction.

If you want to argue the relevance of the amount that your client sold it for you can do that at your own

risk. Of course if the cat is already out of the bag then this incremental disclosure results in no additional harm to Longacre, and assuming Longacre is the decision maker for the Dover Fund II, (indiscernible) for anybody who's doing a transcript.

So if you want to hand it up to me -- generally what Ms. Rubin said and Mr. Steinberg said to be an objection, which it wasn't quite, but I'll overrule that. If you want to give it to me at your own risk, vis-à-vis, your exposure to Longacre or Dover Fund II I'll permit you to do it. And for the time being I'll take it in camera. Of course anything you say in open court (indiscernible) open court proceeding is going to stay that way is at your own risk.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Your Honor, if I --

THE COURT: Mr. Weintraub, yes, go ahead.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Thank you.

I think, Your Honor, there's a difference between the amount that Mrs. Powledge reduced her claim to, which I don't think is confidential, and the payment rate under the agreement with Longacre, which might be confidential, and I think Mr. Davis could make his point without disclosing the payment rate.

His point is that the claim was liquidated in an amount and then sold to Longacre, and I think that the

purchase rate, which is the percentage times the allowed amount of the claim, is not something that's necessary for Mr. Davis to make his point that Mrs. Powledge reduced her claim from \$55 million to a much lower amount based upon a lack of information.

So I think we can thread this needle by not disclosing the payment rate, because I haven't heard anyone say that the amount to which the claim was reduced is confidential. That's the allot amount of the claim. What somebody paid for the claim is a different question.

THE COURT: I don't follow you, Mr. Weintraub, and
I'm going need either you or Mr. Davis to help me.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Sure.

THE COURT: I thought that the claims were resolved, vis-à-vis, the Old GM estate in the aggregate amount of 3,975,000 bucks. I assume that on account of that Dover Fund II paid Mrs. Phillips some dollar amount that's disclosed in the document that Mr. Davis is about to give me.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Right. And I think, Your Honor, that Mr. Davis does not have to disclose the payment rate that Longacre paid for an allowed claim of \$3.9 million.

His point is that claims that started at a billion dollars and then were reduced to \$55 million and then again were reduced to \$3.9 million, those reductions were done

based upon a lack of information.

THE COURT: I understood that contention from the start and that was why I interrupted Mr. Davis to say that I need him to talk about standing and I need him to talk about timing.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Right, and I think the reason he wants to show you that agreement is not to show you the payment rate that was paid by Longacre, he wants to refer to some of the other provisions in that agreement.

So we can address the confidentiality by not getting into the payment rate and just talking about the highlighted provisions.

THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Weintraub, but can't most of the people in this room if not in my kid's tenth grade class engage in a division exercise and divide two numbers and come up with a percentage?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor, and that's something that they can do with the documents that GM has already filed.

So again, with regard to the actual contents of what Longacre would want to maintain confidentiality on, those figures are already out there and you can certainly do that division to identify that rate.

I think what Mr. Weintraub is saying is that the claim sale agreement and the assignment itself in no way

Page 25 1 assigned my client's right to attack the settlement 2 agreement -- not the claim, the settlement agreement --3 because it was obtained through misrepresentations that were unknown to her at the time that she provided the 4 5 consideration she did for the settlement agreement. 6 And, Your Honor, I think I'll pivot at this point 7 because we're not --8 THE COURT: We spent a lot of time on this 9 discussion. Are you asking for a ruling from me? Are you 10 asking to hand me a document or are you withdrawing that 11 request? 12 MR. DAVIS: I'm fine to withdraw that request at 13 this point, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Move on with your argument. 15 MR. DAVIS: Great. 16 Enron, the court cited it favorably, Judge 17 Gonzales' opinion in footnote 210 of the Court's April 15th 18 order. That case, it basically disallowed the whitewashing of sold claims by claimants that were -- that had unclean 19 20 hands. And the court agreed with that opinion strongly 21 based on the --22 THE COURT: I think the word he used was 23 laundering rather than -- like the Mafia does rather than 24 whitewashing. 25 MR. DAVIS: And -- that's fine, Your Honor.

I think that the opinion stands for the proposition that claimants that are engaged in any sort of fraud or do not have a -- that have essentially a wrongful claim cannot turn around and either assign or transfer their claim to a third party and then have that third party demand that that claim be paid or that that assignment be honored.

And Judge Gonzales' opinion was willing to look back at the underlying transaction, the I understand lying merits of the original claimant and say that I'm not going to allow that sort of purchase of that kind of claim.

THE COURT: Pause please, Mr. Davis. Wasn't the underlying concept of Judge Gonzales' Enron decision that the assignee of a claim can have no greater rights than the assignor? And wasn't that the same principal that when the Third Circuit decided its KB Toys decision to the same effect and it rejected Judge Sheindlin's analyze which had reversed Judge Gonzales with the underpinning of the Third Circuit's view as well?

MR. DAVIS: Well, Your Honor, and of course you talked about that case. I was actually referring to the -not the KB Toys and that Enron decision that was reversed, I
was referring to Judge Gonzales' opinion out of this
Southern District of New York concerning Enron and that the
court cited favorably in that footnote in which those things
are all true and the court agreed with that Third Circuit

opinion, and I appreciate that, but what the court also agreed with was the bankruptcy court's decision in another Enron case, which I think you cited as Enron II, that a claim does not become somehow cleaner for a subsequent purchaser or a subsequent assignee in the event that the underlying claim and the merits of the underlying claimant's claim is wrongful, fraudulent, or if there's some other arguments concerning the merits of that claim.

The assignee cannot avoid those arguments because of the assignment, and they don't get the automatic right to present that claim as assigned and not have the merits of the underlying claim assessed, and certainly any defenses that the debtor may allege concerning that claim that would have applied to the original claimant, they can make those same arguments to the assignee of the claim. Even if --

THE COURT: Yeah, I understand that. That walks and talks and quacks like what I was just talking about.

MR. DAVIS: Okay.

THE COURT: Are you --

MR. DAVIS: And I'm saying --

THE COURT: -- making reference -- give me both cites to both of Judge Gonzales' bankruptcy court Enron decisions and I'll see whether you're bringing anything to the table beyond what I thought you were saying.

MR. DAVIS: I'm sorry, it's footnote 208 of Your

Page 28 1 Honor's April 15th opinion. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. DAVIS: You cite the KB Toys case there, you cite Enron District, and that cite is 379 B.R. 425. 4 5 THE COURT: That's Sheindlin I assume. 6 MR. DAVIS: Correct. And then you cite Judge 7 Gonzales' opinion, and I'm, it wasn't Enron II, but Enron 8 Bankruptcy is how you referred to it subsequently, and 9 that's 340 B.R. 180. And I'm bringing up that case because the Court's 10 11 focus on assignment to Longacre to Dover suggests that 12 somehow Powledge's settlement, which we allege was based on 13 misrepresentation, and can somehow -- and the conduct by GM 14 leading up to that settlement can somehow be whitewashed by 15 the assignment of what became an allowed liquidated claim as 16 opposed to what she had leading up to the settlement 17 agreement which was an unliquidated contested claim. 18 And so those equitable arguments can work in reverse for Powledge because she did not know the value of 19 20 her lawsuit which represents releasing that lawsuit, becomes 21 the consideration for the allowed claim of -- you know, for 22 her, 2.7 million. Now that 2.7 million of course did become -- those 23 24 warrants were assigned to Dover, but Powledge nowhere in her 25 assignment of claim and nowhere in the document I was going

	Page 29
1	to present the Court with does she assign the settlement
2	agreement, she assigns the allowed liquidated claim that
3	became the consideration underlying the settlement
4	agreement.
5	THE COURT: Why isn't the remedy then for her to
6	go to Dover, so give us back the how much did she get for
7	those four claims?
8	MR. DAVIS: Well it's in the record, and if I I
9	mean we've had a long discussion about that.
10	THE COURT: We're not talking about percentages
11	MR. DAVIS: Gotcha.
12	THE COURT: we're talking about how much she
13	got for those claims?
14	MR. WEINTRAUB: Your Honor, that was
15	THE COURT: I thought you said that's already in
16	the record.
17	MR. DAVIS: It is in the record, I just
18	THE COURT: Then tell me.
19	MR. DAVIS: Okay. The total gross consideration
20	for the 3.9 million was \$1,172,625.
21	THE COURT: One million one hundred seventy-two
22	thousand. Okay.
23	MR. DAVIS: So
24	THE COURT: And then my question to you is why
25	doesn't she ask Dover to give her back the 1.17 million

(sic) bucks and then say that I'm willing to waive the earlier allowance of my claim and give me a do over? Kind of like I've said or implied would often be the remedy for a denial of due process in other circumstances.

MR. DAVIS: Well --

THE COURT: It sounds to me like she's trying to keep the 1,172,000 and then go back to the GUC Trust for even more.

MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor, I think we've at some point stated that in the event we obtain relief would be fine to produce that amount for the trust and continue to litigate that.

I would respectfully suggest that in response to Your Honor's decision a person's ability to attack a settlement agreement cannot be dependent upon getting them to agree to reverse an assignment in which the merits of the settlement agreement or the underlying lawsuit that resulted in the settlement agreement were never part of the consideration for the assignment itself.

I mean the Court is essentially suggesting just have this transaction, undo it, certainly if Dover would ever agree to this, which who knows and I doubting that they would, but they would certainly expect some return on that investment in addition to what is the consideration that was provided in August of 2010.

But Dover never obtained the right to the lawsuit that represents the settlement agreement, and the assignment was not about the lawsuit, the assignment was about what the claim became as a result of the settlement, which was an allowed claim for a set liquidated amount. So, I don't know -- and again, I point this out, I mean essentially Powledge had her settlement and all she had was warrants and she sold those warrants, which was just an allowed claim, and investors like they do --THE COURT: The settlement didn't give her stock and warrants like every other -- I mean didn't allowed claims in the Old GM case give prepetition unsecureds stock and warrants? MR. DAVIS: The settlement agreement is silent to that, Your Honor, and frankly I wasn't counsel --THE COURT: Doesn't the settlement agreement provide in rules or substance that in exchange for an allowed claim of this amount the selling party, which is the family, will get the treatment under Old GM's plan? MR. DAVIS: Yes. THE COURT: And didn't Old GM's plan give unsecureds -- general unsecureds a bundle of stock and two types of warrants? MR. DAVIS: Yes. So are you saying something different THE COURT:

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Page 32 1 -- that she got something different than all of other 2 general unsecured claims got? 3 MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: So had she not sold her claim, she 5 would have got on account of allowed claims in the aggregate 6 of just under \$4 million, whatever any other general 7 unsecured creditor who had a claim of just under 4 million 8 bucks would get. 9 MR. DAVIS: Yes. 10 THE COURT: Okay. But now you're trying to tell 11 me something different than that. 12 MR. DAVIS: I'm saying that when she had those 13 allowed unsecured claims like everything else the fact that 14 she turned them into cash so that she didn't have to 15 maintain debt in a company that she believed killed her 16 family is not unreasonable, and that transaction --17 THE COURT: I didn't understand your opponents to 18 be saying that it was unreasonable. 19 MR. DAVIS: Okay. Well --20 THE COURT: All they're saying is that she sold 21 it. 22 MR. DAVIS: Well the -- but the transaction, that is selling that claim, does not in any way implicate the 23 24 settlement agreement and the lead up to the settlement 25 agreement and the valuation of what her claim was prior to

the settlement agreement. And that is where -- you know, what is what we're attacking.

Now, I think that the argument here is it's just very convenient that GM can make the argument that she then turned her settlement and the warrants that were provided as consideration for that settlement for her lawsuit into cash in a secondary market and somehow loses the right to complain about GM's bad acts leading up to the settlement agreement. That is the core of the argument against the assignment issue and certainly what we're saying concerning this standing issue.

Now we've cited in our brief the Court is not required to provide 60(b) relief to say that there were misrepresentations leading up to the settlement agreement and it should be void. The question just becomes how do we resolve the fact that the void settlement agreement was subsequently turned into an assignment to Dover and that those warrants were eventually I'm sure cashed by Dover at some later point or negotiated by Dover at some later point? But the fact that that transaction occurred I'm sure GM -- the Trust doesn't want the cash that was exchanged in 2010 between Powledge and Dover. If this were to happen I would expect that they would want the value of \$2.7 million worth of warrants as best as those can be valued in today's dollars to go back to it -- to go back to the Trust so that

Powledge gets to go on, get the discovery documents she was entitled to so that she can fairly value the claim prior to reaching a settlement. That's the argument.

And the assignment and the nature of the assignment just being a liquidated allowed claim -- and, Your Honor, I was here for the two days of argument and I heard certain the Powledge's case brought up multiple times, but I also heard the Court's concern, and it shows up in the April 15th order, that the plaintiffs were only seeking relief for themselves as opposed to other claimants within the trust, and that was a concern.

This relief that we're seeking it does benefit other claimants. And how does it do that? It insures that when claimants are conducting these transactions that if the claim that they are subsequently selling in the secondary market is the result of fraud or misrepresentation and is significantly unvalued, that they're going to be able to make that case later on down the road and not -- and certainly those purchasers want to be able to know that too, because that's the only way that the --

THE COURT: So there can be double dips in --

MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- claims against the estate? One by the hedge fund and one by the underlying assignor of the claim?

MR. DAVIS: No, so that the risk regarding the value or the lack of value of the underlying consideration remains with the debtor and is not shifted on those conducting the transaction, those providing liquidity.

Because if the Court -- let's say hypothetically that the assignment issue is dispositive for the Court and you say, nope, she assigned her claim, what does that tell future, for example, wrongful death claimants or future litigants that are brought into bankruptcy and subsequently reach some sort of settlement and then settle their claim? It tells them that they should not do that at all. should not negotiate in the secondary market certainly making it easier for this Court to conduct its business as it negotiates claims by having -- you know, by dealing with financial people as opposed to aggrieved families, something that is, you know, going to lead to -- well, I mean imagine if all of the claimants that had wrongful death or tort claims and had those resolved through the ADR process, did not sell their warrants in the secondary market because they felt like I better hold onto this, because if I don't I'm not going to have a right to attack the value of my settlement agreement in the future if I was duped and I don't know it. That holding would undermine the secondary markets, because all of these wrongful death and tort plaintiffs based on that holding will hold their warrants,

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will hold their claims, will not sell them, and will ride out the bankruptcy arguing for the most value that they possibly can and insure that when they do exchange their warrants it's with the trust itself and not on the secondary market.

THE COURT: Mr. Davis, like many people I don't like to see people duped, but couldn't the parade of horrors that you're discussing be addressed by instead of entering into a settlement agreement with the content that we had here say in the clause right after the one that says I am releasing all claims, known or unknown, provided however that if there has been material non-disclosure or false statement of fact that this release will be negatory? MR. DAVIS: And, Your Honor, I certainly wish that

that's what that said.

THE COURT: That isn't what it said does it? MR. DAVIS: It's not, but at the same time the case law doesn't require that to attack a settlement agreement, and in fact in New York it's not just that the misrepresentation must be intentional, an unintentional misrepresentation is sufficient to toss out a settlement agreement, even with the kind of boilerplate language that Your Honor references. And the Court will know that when you issued your ADR procedures and that order you provided as an exhibit a sample settlement agreement and it mirrors

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exactly the settlement agreement that Ms. Powledge was -- did sign.

So when the Court talks about the involvement of Your Honor in terms of how we got here and that particular language you're citing we are talking about a unilateral boilerplate language -- release language regarding that claim that Ms. Powledge had no ability to negotiate over. All she could do was do the very best that at the time she could have done given the lack of documents in valuing her claim.

She valued her claim, she settled her claim, she was given the settlement agreement as it reads just like all of the other, you know, people that had litigation matters that were subject to that ADR order, and she signed it with that boilerplate language.

The State of New York and the Second Circuit do not require that a misrepresentation leading to a settlement agreement must be intentionally misrepresented. Unintended misrepresentations are sufficient to void a settlement agreement.

Sort of continuing on. Since we're talking about the settlement agreement as opposed to the assignment, and I think the equitable mootness arguments I've tried to address by saying, you know, other claimants are benefited if Powledge gets relief because they will know that their

claims are not going to be undermined if GM rides out bankruptcy, not providing documents that would provide evidence of the value of their claim that it will not get off.

THE COURT: Forgive me, Mr. Davis. That was totally upside down. I have tens of thousands of Old GM creditors represented by Ms. Rubin whose claims have already been allowed in fixed amounts, and you're saying that they're going to be benefited by additional claims tapping whatever cash is available for them, or for that matter the traders in GUC Trust units represented by Mr. Golden who invested on the premise that the claims totally allowed against the estate could only go down and not up? And you're saying they would benefit by exactly the opposite?

MR. DAVIS: By insuring fairness for the process,

THE COURT: Go ahead and make your next point,
Mr. Davis, that one is insulting my intelligence.

yes. Because what happens if those other claimants --

MR. DAVIS: Okay. I looked very hard for a case that was very on point for the particular facts of this case regarding the settlement agreement. Spaulding v. Zimmerman is the closest I could find. It's in no way -- it's a Supreme Court case from Minnesota, it's the Supreme Court of Minnesota, certainly not binding on the Court, but the facts are very, very similar to these facts, and I have the cite.

Page 39 1 It's 263 Minn, M-I-N-N 346. 2 In that particular case the plaintiff came back and they made a 60(b) -- excuse me -- a 60.02 argument of 3 their civil rules that that provision of their civil rules 4 5 mimics exactly the language of 60(b) in the federal rules, 6 trying to attack a settlement agreement that was obtained as 7 a result of the plaintiff not being able to fairly value 8 their claim. 9 I have copies for opposing counsel. 10 THE COURT: Were they cited in your briefs? 11 MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor, I found this case as I 12 was preparing for argument. 13 THE COURT: You understand that when guys like me 14 do their jobs they do their preparation based on briefs? 15 MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: And am I also correct that you filed 17 both an original brief and two replies? 18 MR. DAVIS: One was a --THE COURT: One reply affixing the other reply I 19 20 gather or amending it, but --21 MR. DAVIS: That's correct, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: -- you're -- let's not count it as 23 three briefs, you gave me two? 24 MR. DAVIS: An original motion and a reply brief, 25 yes, Your Honor.

Page 40 1 THE COURT: Mr. Steinberg and Ms. Rubin, do you 2 care if he gives me one now that was not submitted earlier 3 and to which you had no earlier opportunity to respond? 4 MS. RUBIN: Subject to our ability to respond. 5 THE COURT: Can't hear you, Ms. Rubin, pull the 6 mic closer to you. 7 MS. RUBIN: Subject to the Trust's ability to respond at a later time if appropriate, no, Your Honor, I 8 9 don't mind. 10 THE COURT: You're on the same page with 11 Ms. Rubin, Mr. Steinberg? 12 MR. STEINBERG: Yes, Your Honor, as long as we 13 have an opportunity to read this case, see whether it's ever 14 been overruled since 1962, and other things like that, then 15 as long as we reserve our rights he can say what he wants to 16 say. 17 THE COURT: All right. I'm going allow you to 18 submit it, Mr. Davis. I'm simultaneously giving anybody else in the case the opportunity to file a written response 19 20 addressing that case, and don't ever do this to me again. 21 MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor. May I approach with 22 the case? THE COURT: Yes. For the record he handed me 23 24 Spaulding versus Zimmerman, 263 Minn 346, a decision of the 25 Minnesota Supreme Court from 1962.

Go ahead, Mr. Davis.

MR. DAVIS: It is a dated case, Your Honor, but it's just very on point, and I've got some highlighted provisions here.

The case concerns a lawsuit in which a minor reached a settlement agreement from a car wreck. The defendant and the defendant's lawyer in that case were provided an opportunity to evaluate that plaintiff and they discovered that the injuries that the plaintiff was suffering was potentially much greater than what the plaintiff was aware of.

The court, in evaluating the plaintiff's 60(b) motion -- and kind of a little bit more factual background -- the plaintiff joined the military or attempted to join the military when he was older and it was at that time that a physician identified the more serious brain injury that could have possibly been the result of the car wreck. And the -- whether or not it was or it was not was not dispositive for the 60(b) motion. And I'm calling it a 60(b) motion even though it's not because it's identical to the federal rule.

But the court essentially said that because of the inability for the minor and the court's involvement in the case to approve the settlement to be aware of the significance or potential significance of the injury and

because the defendants and defense counsel failed to disclose what they knew, which was that it was much more -- potentially much more serious, the court was willing to set aside that settlement agreement and allow the plaintiff to proceed with the claim with his newfound knowledge concerning his aneurysm.

Certain the court relies heavily on the fact that it was a minor and the fact that the settlement agreement itself was -- had to be approved by the court, and when the defendants and the plaintiffs came for the approval the defendants had the duty to disclose that information at that time.

I would say though and respectfully suggest that that involvement is in my view certainly analogous to the Court's ordered ADR, the form of this -- you know, boilerplate language that Your Honor mentioned, and the language concerning the equitable arguments for setting aside the settlement agreement are certainly -- is certainly language that we see in the Second Circuit and Your Honor's aware of it.

I mean the April 15th order demonstrates that the Court is aware that when there is a constitutional due process violation that results in unique prejudice that courts are bound to step in and craft a solution for that litigant.

It's our position that Ms. Powledge, as she was trying to grasp out the value of her claim before the settlement, was doing just that, but she could not because of the lack of documents that would have tended to prove her claim.

Now, I haven't brought it up yet because I don't want to appear aggrandizing, but the -- GM's arguments concerning the wreck were that he did it on purpose, okay? And the only reason why you would make that argument is because the nature of the underlying wreck itself lends to only one of two things. That he did it on purpose or there was a massive failure in the vehicle.

Of course my client would never, never has, and never will believe that her husband did this on purpose, and that's what led her to believe that it was GM, certainly what led her to file a lawsuit. But because of the destruction of the vehicle she had no evidence really to go off of to attempt to value or prove her claim because GM was holding all the documents.

Now whether purposefully or the result of corporate incompetence GM had the documents that if they would have produced them would have allowed her to know the real merit of her underlying lawsuit.

She, you know, filed a claim for 250 million, she agreed in a capping letter to bring that down to 55 million.

Would she have done that if had a bunch of evidence that demonstrated the likelihood that the wreck really was caused by a product defect and she could prove it in court? That's unlikely. Would she have at 55 million gone down to 2.7 million, just for her claim, if she had really great documentation to demonstrate the merits and value of her lawsuit? No, she would not.

And what the Spaulding case says and as we apply it to this case is, of course, she would not, and we know that, and of course this plaintiff, if provided that evidence that the defendants had, would not have settled his case for I think it was \$6,500.

They would require more if they're negotiating based on that knowledge. Certainly, my client would have, in negotiating in accordance with the ADR order, required more than 2.7 million worth of warrants that she then converted for a much lesser amount for the loss of her family.

And so -- and now we're onto the -- you know, talking about the settlement agreement and the merit of the argument that we get the benefit of the settlement agreement. We get to avoid Powlege's attempt to undo the settlement agreement. Well, the Second Circuit says that you do not; that -- I mean, and that is independent of 60(b) and that is also a separate claim that Powlege has made

against the trust; that the settlement agreement was attained through misrepresentation and she gets to avoid it.

Now 60(b) is a vehicle for attacking the settlement agreement and certainly the settlement agreement says that this Court can change it, modify it, upon your order. We are not going to pay back Dover and Dover is probably not going to even want to deal with us. I would expect that even if we did that and the Court provides a relief to Powlege, she wouldn't have to pay back what she got from Dover to the trust. She would have to pay back the value of the warrants as they existed in 2010 to the trust.

So I think -- and for the record and for counsels' benefit, the Spaulding case was cited by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as recently as 1998 for the very -- for the very holdings that are contained within. And so, certainly, at least the New Jersey Supreme Court -- and I've got that cite as 154 NJ 437 and it's Kernan, K-E-R-N-A-N, v. 1 Washington Park, Urban Renewal Associates.

There's plenty of case law that doesn't follow

Spaulding. In fact, there's a very -- there's a long

opinion by the Fifth Circuit that takes issue with Spaulding

for a variety of reasons. But for -- I believe that the

Court's April 15th order and any relief provided to Powlege

can be -- can coexist easily.

The Court is -- has all the authority it wants to

be able to decide the 60(b) motion or to decide it on other grounds, as the Court did in the April 15th order for the economic loss plaintiffs. And certainly Your Honor went into that; that you are entitled to do that.

I think that we do not dispute the assignment or the sale of the claim at all, but the assignment itself -- and I have those documents and we talked about them, and perhaps if the Court would like we could submit them for in camera inspection. There's nothing about the documents that would prohibit me from producing them if I was ordered to by the court.

But nothing in the assignment documents, other than the amount that the allowed claims were for, which is public record, there's nothing in the assignment documents that says we are being assigned your rights under the settlement agreement. We, like as in all rights rather than just the settlement amount for this now allowed claim is X and you are assigning us that claim for that allowed amount.

And, of course, the transfer claim identifies the capping amount, but everyone knew that the claim itself had already been reduced based on the settlements and stipulation agreement that was filed with the Court.

So I think she -- the point of the entire motion and certainly of me being here is that she never got an actual day in court in the sense that she was provided what

we would think of as a litigant's right to due process under our rules of discovery, under our rules of civil procedure. She did not get any documents. I mean -- and I cite to GM's position in their mediation statement. Certainly, I've made the point that GM accused Mr. Powlege of being a murderer of his children because they did. That was their position. And the only reason why they were able to take that position was because they weren't producing the documents that would have demonstrated the merit of her lawsuit in and her product defect case.

I do not have to prove that underlying case today. The GUC Trust in their briefing certainly makes it sound like I do. That's not what is required. All I have to do is prove to you that she was prejudiced by the conduct; that there was some misrepresentations leading to the settlement agreement, and that it needs to be voided for those facts. And when we talk about prejudice we are talking about a constitutional due process violation that specifically prejudices her.

And, frankly, not -- and that's what -- and I'm sorry to have offended Your Honor about the issue of the other claimants, but if any claimant were to be in this position, they should feel comfortable that they could come to Your Honor and say, this is what happened to me and my claim was undervalued because I didn't know this that they

knew. I should be able to get my claim back and to be able to do it over with documents that should have been given to me, but were not.

When we talk about, you know, certainly the
Bankruptcy Code and its provision, certainly a 393 sale,
those are incredibly beneficial provisions for a lot of
reasons. And we -- I mean, I'm not a bankruptcy attorney,
but I understand why they're there. But the tradeoff is
that the debtor must disclose, the debtor must say this is
what I'm coming to the Court with. I need -- I need Chapter
13, I need Chapter 11 help. I need this sale to be
effectuated, but here's all the stuff related to these
people that are going to be put out because they are
accepting lesser of what they would otherwise deserve if I
wasn't seeking bankruptcy protection.

In Ms. Powlege's case, for her claim, that disclosure never occurred. For a lawsuit she never got documents to prove her case. I mean, if it were a contract dispute would she be entitled to --

THE COURT: Mr. Davis, I've let you talk for an hour --

MR. DAVIS: Okay.

THE COURT: -- ten minutes. If you have anything to tell me that you haven't already told me at least once you can say it. But don't repeat things for the third or

Page 49 1 fourth time, please. 2 MR. DAVIS: I don't. Not at this time. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. Who will I hear from next? 4 All right. 5 Ms. Rubin. 6 MS. RUBIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 And given Your Honor's comments earlier this 8 morning about your review of the briefs, I'm going to try 9 and keep my own comments brief, subject to any questions 10 that you have. 11 First, I would be remiss, Your Honor, if I didn't 12 say, as Your Honor has, to Mr. Davis and to Mr. Weintraub 13 how profoundly sorry I am for the tragedy that their client 14 suffered. As a parent, as a lawyer I think the 15 circumstances are unimaginable and certainly she has my 16 sympathies. 17 I will say, Your Honor, however, that that's not what's at issue here. And what I would like to do is to try 18 19 and scale back on the rhetoric and the hyperbole and get 20 down to facts and law, if I may. Your Honor, Mr. Davis was asked by you to talk 21 22 about the settlement and the transfer, and I would like to 23 concentrate most of my energy this morning on both of them. 24 And in particular a statement that Mr. Davis made about what 25 the impact was of the transfer and the impact of the

Page 50 1 settlement, and I would like to look at both documents with 2 Your Honor if we may. The first thing that Mr. Davis said was that the 3 transfer that was made by his client to Dover Master Fund 4 5 was essentially not everything that she had; that she had an 6 unliquidated, contested litigation claim and that what she 7 transferred to Dover Master Fund was just the reduction of 8 that claim to an allowed general unsecured claim. 9 And respectfully, Your Honor, based on my reading 10 of the documents that's simply not the case. So let's look 11 to the documents, Your Honor, if we may. 12 The settlement itself, on page 2 of the settlement 13 THE COURT: Pause for a second. Let me find it 14 15 again. 16 (Pause) 17 THE COURT: This is the stipulation and settlement resolving claim number, and then there are --18 19 MS. RUBIN: A series of --20 THE COURT: -- four separate claims. 21 MS. RUBIN: Yeah. And, Your Honor, let me pause 22 there actually for one moment because I would like to 23 correct the record as to one misapprehension that I believe 24 the Court may have. 25 You see here listed four separate claim numbers.

Those four claims do not correspond to each of the deceased Powlege children. Rather, they correspond to the claimants themselves. Ms. Powlege, or Ms. Phillips, is the holder of claim number 44614, which was filed in the amount of \$250 million and then subject to the agreed upon cap of \$55 million through the ADR procedures that Your Honor referenced earlier.

That claim of \$250 million was in respect of her wrongful death claims for the accident that killed her husband and their four children together. The three remaining claims that are referenced in the settlement here are claims that belong, as Mr. Davis pointed out, to Mr. Powlege's two adult children from a prior relationship and to his mother.

And Your Honor will note that the claim amount caps for those three remaining claims are only \$5 million as compared with Ms. Phillips' claim, 44614, in the amount of \$55 million.

It's my understanding, Your Honor, that Mr. Davis, in coming before the Court with his Rule 60 motion, is seeking to represent Ms. Phillips, but not the other adult Powlege claimants. And I just want to clarify that for the record. If I misunderstand that, certainly I hope Mr. Davis will correct me and the record at a later point in time.

But going back, Your Honor, to the point I was

going to make, which is the whereas clause on page 2 of the settlement agreement says, whereas claimants filed the following proofs of claim, which it defines, therefore, as the claims. And it refers to claim number 44614 in the amount of \$250 million.

In the submissions that have been made to the Court, one of the other parties it was -- it was not the GUC Trust, actually submitted the proof of claim. That proof of claim, 44614, is a reference to Ms. Powlege's lawsuit in Texas. It's her wrongful death lawsuit in respect of the death of her husband and her four minor children.

Your Honor, you know from the briefing and I won't belabor this too much, that although the claims are then settled, the claims meaning the proofs of claim with the filed amounts listed and the claim amount caps listed, would be settled as allowed general unsecured claims in specific amounts that are written on page 3.

Paragraph 3 of the settlement then says -- I'm sorry. Let me read paragraphs 2 and 3 because it will clear up another issue. Your Honor asked Mr. Davis what happened as the impact of the settlement, what distributions his client would have been entitled to receive had he not transferred the claim. And here's the answer, Your Honor. The claimant shall receive distributions on account of the allowed claims in the form set forth in and pursuant to the

terms of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan or plans in these Chapter 11 cases.

So to answer Your Honor's question, had Ms.

Phillips not transferred her claim, yes, she would have been entitled under the plan to become a GUC Trust beneficiary and receive a distribution of new GM securities and to receive GUC Trust units.

Now paragraph 3 of the settlement then says, upon receipt of such distributions on account of the allowed claims as set forth in the plan, the claims, not the allowed claims, but the claims -- again, defined on page 2 as the proofs of claim with the unliquidated final amount of \$250 million and the agreed upon cap of \$55 million in Ms.

Phillips' case, that claim shall be deemed to be satisfied in full.

The briefing, Your Honor, that my client has filed, that Mr. Steinberg's client has filed talks further then about the impact of the release by reference to the language in paragraph 4. I'll just mention that here and move on to the evidence of the transfer of the claim.

Before today I personally had not seen the claim sale agreement that was subject of a colloquy between you and Mr. Davis, and I won't reference it further here except to say that there is, in the public record, the evidence of a transfer of a claim. I understand that document to have

been filed on the record in this case and something that all the parties can refer to openly.

And let's -- let's go to the transfer of that claim because Mr. Davis's contention is that by executing this transfer, his client was somehow transferring away something less than the whole of what she had prior to the bankruptcy of General Motors.

And respectfully, Your Honor, I'll disagree. Ms. Powlege is transferring here all rights, title and interest in and to the claim of seller, including all rights of stoppage and transit replevin (sic) and reclamation in the principal amount of \$55 million defined as the claim. I don't see that language anywhere to limit what is being transferred to the allowed general unsecured claim amount arrived at through the settlement agreement.

Rather, Your Honor, that is a wholesale transfer of the agreed upon claim amount of \$55 million subject to Your Honor's ADR procedures, which Mr. Davis has acknowledged he is not challenging here. Your Honor asked him specifically that question.

Further, in the next paragraph, Your Honor, the seller acknowledges, understands and agrees and hereby stipulates that an order of the Bankruptcy Court may be entered without further notice to seller transferring to buyer -- meaning Dover Master Fund -- the claim, the claim

in the amount of \$55 million, Your Honor, and recognizing the buyer, Dover Master Fund, as the sole owner and holder of the claim.

Now, Your Honor, in his brief, his reply brief in particular, Mr. Davis takes issue with our characterization of two cases and in particular cites the Bunk Arvay (ph) case -- and I apologize if I'm bumbling the pronunciation in the Southern District. He says those cases stand for the proposition that under New York law one has to be specific about the desire to transfer claims in tort, including fraud claims.

Your Honor, the Abudabi (ph) case that's cited in our brief does recite the rule of Fox versus Rothschild, that's the New York case that I believe Mr. Davis is referring to. But right after citing that general principal, goes on to say that language transferring all rights, title and interest to a claim is sufficient to transfer to the assignee claims that lie in tort including fraud.

Similarly, the Bunk Arvay case that Mr. Davis cites, he cites a 1994 decision of the Southern District of New York in which an assignee did not establish standing according to Judge Ward because the language, similar to that in this evidence of transfer of claim and similar to that of the Abudabi case -- it's a Southern District case in

2012. According to Judge Ward in 1994, that was not sufficient to transfer claims that lie in tort.

However, the Second Circuit disagreed a year later. And while it did not find for the assignee on the merits, it reversed the holding that Mr. Davis cited to you on standing principals.

So, Your Honor, to circle back, while I am certainly sympathetic to Mr. Davis's client and her plight, indeed it is an unimaginable one for almost all of us in this courtroom, as purely a matter of standing law, purely on the basis of consultation to the documents and the case law of this circuit and the district, I still fail to understand Mr. Davis's position that his client has retained something that she once had prior to GM's bankruptcy.

Your Honor, if I can continue for a moment. You asked some questions about timing and I'm prepared to rest on our briefs on the question of timing unless Your Honor would like me to address that issue.

THE COURT: No. I don't think you need to, Ms. Rubin.

MS. RUBIN: Okay. Your Honor, the one thing I would say here is Mr. Davis said this morning that he's not saying anything about intent and, respectfully, Your Honor, we would disagree. Throughout his motion papers on this motion, as well as papers he's filed in other courts it's

quite evident to the GUC Trust that Mr. Davis and his client's submissions are all about fraud. You can see paragraph 69 of his moving brief or even the transcript of the October -- I'm sorry -- the August 18th, 2014 hearing before this Court where Mr. Davis came before you and in connection with the no stay pleading that he had filed told the Court that he didn't want a stay so that his client could pursue her fraud claim.

And I -- you know, from our perspective that speaks for itself. The motion that he's making here as a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, the law of the Supreme Court is clear that where one submits a 60 motion -- a Rule 60 motion that's premised on one of the grounds for relief enumerated in clauses (b)(1) through (b)(5), one can't circumvent the timing dictates of Rule 60(c) by characterizing one's motion as a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. That's the -- again, the Liljeberg case. I'll spell it, L-I-L-J-E-B-E-R-G at 486 U.S. 847. The pin cite is 863 and Note 11.

Mr. Davis says in his brief, Your Honor, and he says it both, I believe, in his moving brief and again in his reply that the Second Circuit has never held that a 60(b)(6) motion -- that's his preferred grounds for relief -- it's never held that that kind of motion is untimely if it's made within a year.

Mr. Davis is or may be technically accurate that

the circuit has never so far held, but there are a number of lower court opinions in this circuit that hold even if Rule 60(b)(6) were the appropriate grounds for relief here -- and respectfully, Your Honor, it's not for the reasons set forth in the GUC Trust brief -- there are a number of cases, we cite four of them on page 19 of the GUC Trust's brief, suggesting that where a party sits on its rights for nine months, ten months, periods of time under a year it's still appropriate to deny Rule 60(b)(6) relief.

And then the final thing, Your Honor, that I would say here is that Mr. Davis keeps acting as if there is a demonstrated discovery misconduct here. He keeps saying that our client or GM -- and he refers to GM loosely, Your Honor. You'll note he refers to my client and Mr. Steinberg's client repeatedly and collectively as General Motors. I assure you Mr. Steinberg and I would both submit to the Court that we are not one in the same. As Your Honor noted, I represent creditors of old GM. I represent people who in some circumstances may not be all that differently situated, at least in terms of what happened prior to the bankruptcy than Ms. Phillips herself. And I have a fiduciary duty to them.

And as part of that duty I would like to point out to the Court that in a Rule 60(b)(6) motion -- again, that's Mr. Davis's avenue for preferred relief here -- this circuit

Page 59 1 requires a showing of exceptional circumstances. 2 burden of proof on that. It's not enough to make bald assertions that there has been discovery misconduct. 3 Your Honor said earlier that you didn't believe 4 5 that either of Mr. Davis's opponents were taking issue with 6 the discovery misconduct. And, Your Honor, I'll refer you 7 to the GUC Trust brief because the back end of our brief 8 does, in fact, discuss the exceptional circumstances --9 THE COURT: You're thinking I said what? 10 MS. RUBIN: I'm sorry. Your Honor, I understood 11 you to say that neither of Mr. Davis's opponents had said 12 anything --13 THE COURT: No. What I said I -- was that I was 14 prepared to assume for the purpose of --15 MS. RUBIN: I see. 16 THE COURT: -- the analysis that. I don't think I 17 can decide a disputed issue of fact of that character on today's motion. 18 MS. RUBIN: Well, Your Honor, we would agree with 19 20 -- we would -- we might agree with that except to say, Your 21 Honor, that the burden of proof belongs with Mr. Davis. And 22 Mr. Davis very conveniently for him conflates in some 23 instances facts that this Court may have found with respect to the ignition switch defect, with his theory of -- his 24 25 client's theory of liability on the underlying accident.

and what I would say is, Your Honor, Mr. Davis
came before the Court on August 18th of 2014 -- and, again,
in reference to the no stay pleading he told Your Honor that
it was inappropriate for his client to wait in line because
his client wasn't affected by the ignition switch recall.
He told Your Honor that the recall that he believed impacted
his client's husband's vehicle was the completely different
recall and that there was no Volucus (ph) report. There
were no congressional hearings. There was no public record
that would establish what --

THE COURT: That's the part you quote on page 9 of your brief?

MS. RUBIN: That's correct. And, Your Honor, I would also refer you to that same transcript at page 83.

Mr. Davis continues and reiterates many of those same themes on page 83 of the transcript. The quote on page 9 of our brief is from page 78 of the transcript.

But he told Your Honor that he needed that discovery to pursue Ms. Phillips' fraud claim because it wasn't clear what GM knew and when. Well, if that's the case then Mr. Davis can hardly establish the exceptional circumstances needed for Rule 60(b)(6) relief because, Your Honor, that test as enunciated in the Old Carco decision and many others of this circuit requires three things.

First, it requires supporting evidence that is

highly convincing. And the Second Circuit in the Coe decision cited in our brief makes clear that unsubstantiated allegations are not enough for Rule 60(b) relief. You have to point to actual evidence, affidavits, documents.

And, respectfully, Your Honor, what Mr. Davis has presented the Court with here are a series of discovery requests, but with one exception: He never shows Your Honor how Motors Liquidation Company or Old GM responded to those. And, in fact, the one objection and response that he does provide to the Court shows that Old GM took issue with the relevance of the request that he was positing.

say GM didn't -- Old GM didn't comply with discovery requests. MLC didn't comply with discovery requests. But he hasn't put anything before Your Honor to suggest that that was a knowing failure, a willful failure; that it was, in fact, any failure at all. There could have been disputes between the parties about what discovery requests were even appropriate in the underlying litigation. But Mr. Davis hasn't allowed the Court to make that determination.

The final thing I'll say, Your Honor, is Mr. Davis seems to understand now that Rule 60 is not going to be the panacea (ph) for what ails his client and has submitted in his reply and in argument today that instead it was a due process violation. Again, Your Honor, I fail to see how Mr.

Davis has established that his client's due process rights, if his client is even still a party or party in interest to the settlement, were violated. It's not clear to us how he has satisfied that burden.

And, again, to the question of exceptional circumstances and the supporting evidence, I would refer Your Honor to our brief. We also point out, as Your Honor has, that there's a prong of the exceptional circumstances test that deals with undue hardship to others. For the same reasons that we believe Mr. Davis's client's claim are equitably moot, so, too, would reopening the settlement cause an undue hardship to the existing creditors of the GUC Trust.

I'm sure that Mr. Golden and others who stand in position like his clients would take issue with the characterization that they would be better off, for example, if the settlement were reopened and folks like Ms. Phillips were permitted to further litigate against the trust.

It's our position, Your Honor, as stated in our brief in a footnote on pages 119 to 120 of the threshold issues decision and again page 108 which makes clear that the equitable mootness holding pertains to the pre-closing accident plaintiffs applies equally to Ms. Phillips.

Indeed, Mr. Weintraub, in representing the pre-closing accident plaintiffs at the threshold issues briefing

represented a class of people that included Ms. Phillips.

And then finally, Your Honor, with respect to the Spaulding v Zimmerman case, I certainly will reserve our right to further make a submission to the Court on that case. I'll just say, Your Honor, even on the face of it, on the basis of the very cursory review I was able to do while listening to Mr. Davis's argument I'll say three things about it.

Let's put aside its age for a second and accept that it's still good law, which as Mr. Steinberg noted we don't know. There are three things about that case that make it wholly and opposite here.

One, there's no assignment.

Two, there is proof in this decision that the defendants knew something that the plaintiffs did not.

Respectfully, Your Honor, there's a mismatch in Mr. Davis's theory. Mr. Davis's client, as pointed out by both the GUC Trust and New GM in their briefs, their vehicle at issue was subject to one and only one recall. Mr. Powlege was driving a 2004 Chevrolet Malibu Classic. That is not the same car as the 2004 Chevrolet Malibu. It is a continuation of the 2003 Chevrolet Malibu, which was then discontinued, renamed as the classic. The vehicle that from 2004 on forward became the Chevrolet Malibu was a different car entirely with a different model series designation. I'll refer to

the Court to Exhibits 19 and 20 to my declaration which point that out,

There's no proof here that Old GM or MLC knew something with respect to the specific requests posed to them by Mr. Davis's client that it did not disclose.

And then third, unlike the Spaulding v Zimmerman decision, the motion that Mr. Davis has made here appropriately fits into Rule 60(b)(3), and I don't know what the law of Minnesota is, Your Honor. I'll confess to you I'm not an expert in Minnesota law by any stretch of the imagination. But I do know enough to know that in this circuit Rule 60(b)(3) has a time limit that's absolute. It does not admit of any exception. It does not have a discovery rule. We cite cases in our brief including the Second Circuit's decision in Garvin that make that absolutely clear. Spaulding versus Zimmerman, on the other hand, deals with a 60(b)(6) motion.

And so for all three of those reasons it's not clear to me why this decision, which is obviously not binding precedent on this Court, even should have any instructive impact.

And with that, Your Honor, I'll rest unless Your Honor has any questions for the trust.

THE COURT: No. Thank you.

25 Mr. --

Page 65 1 MS. RUBIN: Thank you. 2 THE COURT: -- Steinberg. 3 MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, it's not often that I 4 can say this, but I'm sure I'm going to be the briefest one 5 here, and maybe it's because I'm last. 6 I did point out that with respect to the 7 settlement agreement that in the highlighted provisions that 8 Mr. Davis showed you that there were other provisions that I 9 would highlight to you. 10 Ms. Rubin went through some of the provisions of 11 the settlement agreement, but other were a couple of others 12 that I would like to be able to just point out to you. 13 One is the absence of any representations under 14 the settlement agreement at all with regard to any 15 substantive other than the parties had the authority to 16 execute the agreement. So there is no representations that 17 someone could say was a fundamental element of the 18 settlement that someone breached, at least as far as a 19 contractual matter. 20 Ms. Rubin pointed out paragraphs 3 and referred to 21 paragraph 4. I will note that -- and I think Your Honor in 22 its colloquy noted that the release provisions of paragraph 23 4 say they're releasing known and unknown claims. And I will call Your Honor's attention to page 5 of Mr. Davis's 24

reply brief that says that the value of the settlement

agreement was completely unknown to Phillips. He basically used the same words that are in the --

THE COURT: Forgive me. What was the second thing you said after known and unknown --

MR. STEINBERG: On page 5 of the reply brief Mr. Davis wrote the value of the settlement agreement was completely unknown to Phillips. So he actually uses the word unknown which was the specific thing that was released in paragraph 4.

Paragraph 6 of the settlement agreement says that the stipulation and settlement contains the entire agreement between the parties as to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior agreements and undertakings between the parties relating thereto.

Well, what -- while that may be boiler plate language, it is important language that everybody puts in the settlement agreement so that the settlement is a self-contained document.

Paragraph 8 says that each person who executes this stipulation and settlement represents that he/she is duly authorized to do so on behalf of the respective parties hereto and that each such party had full knowledge and has consented to this stipulation and settlement.

So there was another provision that basically said that they're voluntarily doing it with full knowledge, and

then in bold at the end of the settlement agreement it says that the undersigned's warrant that they have read the terms of the stipulation and settlement, had the advice of counsel or the opportunity to obtain such advice in connection with reading, understanding and executing the agreement, and had full knowledge of the terms, conditions and effects of this stipulation and settlement.

THE COURT: Pause, please, Mr. Steinberg. What about Mr. Davis's contention that New York Courts ignore provisions of that character and let you blow away settlements notwithstanding language of that character.

MR. STEINBERG: I'm not familiar with that law that he was referring to.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. STEINBERG: The other thing that I would point out to Your Honor on the assignment -- and I think Ms. Rubin highlighted the relevant points. I would just point out that the lead in to the assignment says that the assignment is unconditional and irrevocable.

With regard to the settlement itself, it stands -you know, I think it goes almost without saying that the
settlement was voluntary. And that the one thing that Mr.

Davis kept on saying about what Your Honor has to consider
for the broader aspects of this case, the one thing that he
didn't say, which I think is obviously relevant and

important, is that he was expounding a postulate that would mean that no one would ever settle a case, meaning that I'll settle now for whatever it is that I think I know and if I come up with something or if there's a new fact or there's a new development of the law or something else that I didn't contemplate, then I'm going to ask for more.

And the reason why courts promote settlements is for finality. And that's what parties achieved here, finality of the transaction.

The -- I think Your Honor was clear and correct on the Enron decision not being applicable here. I think when Your Honor reads the Spaulding case you'll see that the element of Spaulding that's most significant, it was a settlement of a minor child and, therefore, there's a different standard when new events take place that may affect the minority of the child. And I think they were citing to the law that relates to the minority of children. So -- and the ability to look past the settlement if a minor had had settled that turned out to be inappropriate for other reasons. So we obviously don't have a minority child here.

If Your Honor believes that further briefing is necessary on this point, then we'll be happy to give it.

Mr. Davis himself said that the case that he was giving to you, while maybe cited by a New Jersey court -- and I'm not

sure for what purpose with approval -- he was clearly saying that there were cases that were criticizing this case as well, including a Fifth Circuit opinion.

THE COURT: Ms. Powlege obviously isn't a minor, but especially with the benefit of the clarification that Ms. Rubin gave me, is part of the consideration that she received, part of the bundle of the consideration that she received in substance or at least in substance in part compensation to her for the lost children or -- so I don't know whether I should be looking at a recovery for a child in terms of what it takes to take care of a child until the child gets older or whether it's for the loss of the child. I don't know exactly how to deal with that without further clarification.

MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, I don't know what the underlying complaint said, but the settlement was the underlying complaint. So whatever were the allegations raised in Texas in 2007, that was the essence of the proof of claim. It was they filed a proof of claim that referenced the litigation and slapped the complaint on in the back. What was settled was that claim. Whatever they were asserting as a basis for a recovery for \$250 million, that was what was settled.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STEINBERG: And there was no pointing out of

Page 70 1 anything else but that. 2 THE COURT: I'm just confused. If I had -- it's 3 hard to talk about such personal tragedies in such antiseptic terms. 4 5 But if you have a child who is injured but not 6 killed in a car wreck and part of an award is for the 7 benefit of the maintenance of the child, the kid's support, 8 the kid's education, the kid's inability to earn money once 9 he or she becomes an adult, I can see that as one kind of 10 claim. And if you're talking about the compensation to a 11 full adult for the loss of minors, that seems to me 12 potentially different. And I don't know how to analyze this 13 Minnesota case in terms of whether it's in one category or 14 the other or both. 15 But I guess if you can respond by a supplemental 16 submission you can clarify that distinction if it applies. 17 MR. STEINBERG: I can, Your Honor, but I think Ms. 18 Rubin has something to add on this. 19 THE COURT: Are you okay with yielding to her for 20 a second? 21 MR. STEINBERG: Yes, I am, Your Honor. 22 MS. RUBIN: Your Honor, certainly I was not 23 involved in representing Motors Liquidation Company at the 24 time of these proceedings, and my understanding is Mr. Davis 25 did not represent Ms. Phillips at the time of these

proceedings either. So I'm just solely going after -- on the basis of documents.

However, Your Honor, Ms. Phillips, then Powlege's, petitions in Galveston County, Texas, in seeking damages she sought damages for physical injury and mental anguish to her husband and her children saying that their injury survived their death through their estates, and then also sued for damages to herself with respect to her own loss of companionship, loss of consortium, mental anguish, and loss of inheritance of assets that each of them would have earned had they survived the accident.

I don't see any of her claims, however, Your

Honor, to be claims that are in respect of what the costs of caring for them, for example, through their reaching the age of majority would be.

Is that responsive to your question, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yeah. I think it does. Go ahead, Mr.

Steinberg.

MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, just one final point, and Ms. Rubin will -- talked about it and it is in her brief and in our brief as well, too. The thrust of the entire papers that Mr. Davis had as to what he thought went wrong was a citation to a recall that didn't apply to her car. And that they cited to the Chevrolet Malibu and not the Chevrolet Malibu Classic. And the recall for the Malibu was

for a totally different part and a totally different type of problem.

The only recall that applied to the Malibu Classic was an ignition switch issue, not a brake failure or an electrical failure, and it wasn't even the same ignition switch type issue that applied to the earlier recalls which were the subject of the factual stipulations.

So when you actually parse through the litany of papers that Mr. Davis has filed in this court, it has inconsistent theories based an obvious mistake of fact. And the only reason why I point that out to Your Honor is I think Your Honor was correct that there is no real order for you to vacate because no one asked you to do anything. But under 60(b)(6) the three part test as to what the Court has to look to is whether he's presented convincing evidence, and he -- the issue is, is that I don't think he's presented any coherent theory, but certainly not convincing evidence that merits as the exceptional circumstances of --

THE COURT: You said the ignition switch issue was a different issue. Is it the same ignition switch that was put --

MR. STEINBERG: No.

THE COURT: -- in the -- the -- I think it was -- at the outset of the April 15th opinion I talked about the models that I understood to be the subject of the main

Page 73 1 ignition switch controversy. This is a different --2 MR. STEINBERG: This --THE COURT: -- ignition switch in a different car? 3 MR. STEINBERG: Yes. The ignition switch that 4 5 involved with the Malibu Classic, the recall was because of 6 -- was caused primarily because of the location of the 7 ignition switch, not because of the torque, which was the underlying part of the original, and that the fix that was 8 9 done in the recall was a totally different fix. It wasn't 10 the replacement of the ignition switch itself. It was to 11 change -- it was a systems issue that changed the insertion 12 for the key, but not the replacement of the switch itself. So it's a different -- different issue at all and 13 14 it was a different basis for the recall. 15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 16 Mr. Davis, I'll take reply, but you want to yield 17 to Mr. Weintraub for a minute. 18 MR. WEINTRAUB: For just one minute, Your Honor. THE COURT: Come to the -- a mic that I can hear 19 20 you better on, please, Mr. Weintraub. 21 MR. WEINTRAUB: Just briefly, Your Honor, I was 22 reading something else, but I thought I heard Ms. Rubin say 23 at one point that I had represented a group of which Ms. 24 Powlege --25 THE COURT: Mr. Davis's clients were one of your

Pg 74 of 142 Page 74 1 guys. 2 MR. WEINTRAUB: Right. And that is not the case to the extent that Ms. Powlege is not claiming an ignition 3 switch defect as defined in the stipulated facts and as 4 5 addressed in the Court's decision. There were no arguments 6 made and no stipulated facts with respect to anything other 7 than the ignition switch as defined in the stipulated facts. 8 THE COURT: Would the corollary of that be and the 9 reason you got up be, other than as -- generally as an officer of the court, are we not talking about res judicata 10 11 on Ms. Powlege? It's just stare decisis. 12 MR. WEINTRAUB: To the extent it is stare decisis, 13 yes, it's not res judicata and I'm not sure that anything in 14 the Court's decision addressed the due process issues with 15 respect to any presale accident claimants other than people 16 who complained of the ignition switch defect as defined in 17 the stipulated facts. 18 THE COURT: Fair enough. Okay. MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, just on that point, 19 20 just very briefly, that is a -- an issue that may come up 21 when the judgment is presented. I conserved all that. 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MS. RUBIN: Your Honor, to --

THE COURT: Pull the mic again close to you --

you, please, Ms. Rubin.

24

MS. RUBIN: I'm sorry. I'm very seldomly the most soft-spoken person in the courtroom or at least soft-spoken.

Your Honor, just to clarify my earlier comments, it's my understanding as the GUC Trust presents in its brief that the vehicle that was being driven by Ms. Phillips' husband, Mr. Powlege, is subject to one recall and one recall only. We have presented Your Honor with evidence as exhibits to my declaration in response to -- to Ms. Phillips' brief demonstrating that when you run the vehicle ID number through both GM's site and the NHTSA site the only vehicle recall that is pertinent to that vehicle is one, as Mr. Steinberg pointed out, dealing with the ignition switch.

It had long been my understanding that to the extent that Mr. Weintraub represents pre-closing accident plaintiffs with ignition switch issues, and Ms. Powlege mentions the ignition switch defect in her underlying lawsuit that she seeks to pursue should her settlement be vacated, that Mr. Weintraub does, in fact, represent Ms. Phillips in that regard. There can be a debate, I guess, about what Ms. Phillips' claims are. That's obviously for Mr. Davis to clarify and not for me. But it had long been my understanding that to the extent that she is alleging claims based on the ignition switch defect, she was, in fact, represented by Mr. Weintraub in the threshold issues briefing and hearing.

Page 76 1 Thank you, Your Honor. 2 MR. WEINTRAUB: Your Honor, I need to respond to 3 that. I'm sorry. THE COURT: I could let you and ultimately, if you 4 5 push me I will let you, Mr. Weintraub. 6 But doesn't this ultimately involve the extent, if 7 any, to which there is a res judicata claim or for that 8 matter a stare decisis claim with respect to an issue that 9 hasn't been put before me, which is whether she's the victim 10 of an ignition switch problem and of the old type, if I can 11 call it that, and isn't today's show all about standing and 12 60(b) relief? 13 MR. WEINTRAUB: That's correct, Your Honor. And I 14 was not the one that wandered into this area during oral 15 argument, but I happen to be sitting here and since I was 16 the attorney referred to by name I need to respond. 17 THE COURT: Let me ask everybody in the room, can 18 I skim the snatches (ph) by giving you guys reservations of rights on an issue that may or may not come up down the 19 20 road? 21 MR. WEINTRAUB: That's fine, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: How about for you, Mr. Steinberg? MR. STEINBERG: That would be fine. 23 24 THE COURT: Or for you, Ms. Rubin? 25 MS. RUBIN: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's get back to your reply,
Mr. Davis.

MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor.

With regard -- I'm going to try to work backwards.

Concerning the ignition switch, the control module and the cruise control defects a couple of things.

Number one, counsel's incorrect. It was discussed in the underlying litigation in multiple depositions, which I have but have not provided to the Court because of the stay discussion we had in August of last year in which no discovery was to be done. So I'm happy to supplement with those depositions from experts, both GM and plaintiff's expert concerning the underlying vehicle, the Malibu, the Malibu Classic, and whether it had a control module applicable or similar to the one that is the subject of multiple recalls or not.

The same with the cruise control. In fact, it did. It is generally true and it was understood at the time that it was generally true that the 2003 Malibu became the Classic. This particular Classic did have these control modules as opposed to a drive by wire system, something I didn't know until I actually got documents from former counsel of Ms. Powlege. So contrary to counsel's representations, I am happy to provide that deposition in which the control module was discussed, certainly the cruise

control.

But setting that aside; that is, what is the underlying vehicle, product defect cases of this kind are circumstantial. The fact that there were defects that result in occurrences of the kind that the Powlege vehicle we know produced, i.e. no brake lights, uncontrolled speed, an inability to brake, if you're going to assume that the --that the driver did not intend to crash the vehicle, then we would draw from all of the documents related to similar makes and models and what those documents and recalls say about the potential for those recalls and the known defects to have been applicable to the subject vehicle in this particular crash on this particular day.

I didn't want to get into the discussion of the underlying wreck simply because we're not there yet. I'm just saying she should have gotten these documents. And it's very difficult to appreciate counsel's argument that --

THE COURT: Well, pause, please because Ms. Rubin, as I understood her argument, especially when she flushed it out orally, was arguing something a little different.

If -- she corrected me on my original statement -nicely corrected me, but corrected me that I said I was
prepared to assume there was a discovery violation. She has
raised the issue, not so fast, Judge. Don't necessarily
assume that.

It may be that whether or not I assume it I have to assume that there's at least an issue of fact on whether there was a discovery violation or not. But she's saying something different. She's saying that in order to get 60(b)(6) relief, or for that matter 60(b)(3) relief, you have to at least put something on the table that suggests that there was a fraud, and she's accusing you -- accusing you also nicely, but saying that you failed to put forward any facts from which the inference of fraud could be inferred and admittedly asking for discovery as to whether or not there was a fraud is insufficient.

And I would like you to respond to that aspect of her argument on two levels: One, whether she's right on the law and, two, whether, assuming she's right on the law, that you have shown facts from which I could draw an inference of fraud on your vehicle as contrasted to anything that might be found with respect to vehicles subject to the April 15th decision.

MR. DAVIS: Sure. First, and it's quick, she's correct on the law. Okay.

Number two, while being right on the law she's incorrect in terms of how she characterizes the documents in -- and this is, Your Honor, respectfully, why I was saying at the time in August I wanted to be able to conduct some discovery was to help me make this motion or certainly make

this issue easier.

But even if we only look to the report that we have and the documents that are now publicly available, we know that there were -- and we in the motion certainly go through all of the instances in which GM, well prior to August 2010, certainly well prior to June 2009, was aware of a number of product defects for cars similar to or have certain components that are identical with this subject vehicle, and that those documents existed for many years preceding June 9th, 2013 -- excuse me -- 2009, and that had been sought through the specific discovery requests that we made.

And, you know, Counsel references the objections that were offered by GM at the time, Old GM at the time.

Without addressing those particular objections or the merits of those objections, I would just respectfully offer to the Court that if a plaintiff is making a product defect claim in which they are assessing -- they are arguing that the car was uncontrolled in terms of speed and they seek documents related to cruise control, that it couldn't brake, and they seek documents related to braking and they then seek documents related to the ignition switch, for those -- for that particular model vehicle and those within its class, and the documents that we know about are not then produced by GM at the time, but then rather than producing those

documents GM takes the affirmative defense that the driver committed murder/suicide, I would just respectfully say that that is pretty extreme.

And, of course, so -- and she's not wrong on the law, but I'm saying that with our particular facts we've demonstrated requests that were really made, and we provided all of those requests for the Court. Certainly, litigants make objections. But there's still an affirmative duty to produce responsive documents, setting aside your objections, so long as those documents are relevant and discoverable.

We know that documents were relevant and discoverable. We know, despite counsel's representation about and the, you know, VIN number, all of that was discussed and I'm happy to provide the Court with those depositions and those expert reports if it's going to ameliorate any concern the Court has about the specifics of the discovery request being applicable to this subject vehicle.

THE COURT: You know, I'm thinking that might be useful, Mr. Davis, because if you and she agree on the law, then either under those cases or in addition Bell Atlantic and Ashcroft, the question that arises to a judge is do I have a showing of evidentiary facts from which I can get into the satisfaction of that requirement.

If you can show me that either by stuff that

Page 82 1 you've already pleaded or stuff that you could plead in 2 reliance on the depositions, and after your opponent has had chance to respond to that, that would help me in doing my 3 job. 4 5 MR. DAVIS: I will absolutely do that, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: It goes without saying that your 7 opponents would have to have the opportunity to reply --8 MR. DAVIS: Absolutely. 9 THE COURT: -- or respond. I don't think I need a 10 three-way back and forth. But I would -- I think that would 11 help me because if I heard her right you haven't yet shown 12 that. And if I heard you right, you disagree with her. 13 MR. DAVIS: Well, I would say that our pleadings 14 are sufficient in terms of the allegations. And she 15 references some transcript testimony. I -- I don't know 16 yet, because I haven't gotten to get real discovery done, 17 what we --THE COURT: The --18 19 MR. DAVIS: Right. 20 THE COURT: But the problem is that there is a zillion cases in the Rule 8 and Rule 9 area that say you 21 22 can't put out a complaint and say I hope to later prove it 23 by discovery. 24 MR. DAVIS: No. 25 THE COURT: You've got to have shown something

Page 83 1 from the get go. 2 I -- I absolutely agree with you, Your MR. DAVIS: Honor. But given that this is a product defect case -- if 3 we're talking about the underlying case it's a product 4 5 defect case based on negligence. Rule 9 doesn't apply, not 6 that -- the underlying case is not a fraud case. 7 underlying case is a negligence case based on a product 8 defect. So the -- those particular rules are not going to 9 be applicable to being -- to saying I was prejudiced in 10 presenting my product defect negligence claim because I 11 didn't get documents that if I had them would have allowed 12 me to prove my claim and disprove your affirmative defense. 13 THE COURT: I hope you didn't misunderstand me. 14 You're asking for relief from a settlement agreement based 15 on an allegation of fraud. And what I need from you is --16 MR. DAVIS: I understand. 17 THE COURT: -- what you have alleged to give me a foundation upon which I can find --18 MR. DAVIS: Okay. 19 20 THE COURT: -- the existence of a fraud. 21 MR. DAVIS: I'm sorry. I did -- I did 22 misunderstand, but now I understand. Thank you, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. DAVIS: And then working back from New GM's

arguments regarding the Second Circuit's, I just want to

Page 84 1 provide the Court the actual cites that we do cite into in 2 our reply brief. 3 First is the Playboy Enterprises case from 2004. It's 2004 Westlaw 626807 and the page cite is at page 4. 4 5 THE COURT: What was the page cite on that 2004 6 Westlaw? 7 MR. DAVIS: Page 4. And that case cites to a much 8 dated case, but the case is directly on point and is citing 9 to this case approvingly. And that case is the Seneca Wire 10 and Manufacturing Company v AB Letch (ph) case, 247 N.Y. 1 11 and it's page cite 7 through 8. 12 THE COURT: What -- I practiced law in New York 13 long enough to know that if it's a 247 New York it may have 14 -- might be long in the -- what year is it? 15 MR. DAVIS: It's 1928, Your Honor, and I 16 respectfully call it mature precedent. I had the 17 unfortunate occasion where I called precedent old and the judge --18 19 THE COURT: Not if it's from the --20 MR. DAVIS: -- in that particular case was born in 21 the same year so --22 THE COURT: -- New York Court of Appeals. If it's not overruled I'll recognize it that it's still --23 24 MR. DAVIS: Well --THE COURT: -- rule authority. I just wanted to 25

get some better context.

MR. DAVIS: So the quote from Playboy Enterprises, which is a 2004 case, is -- and it was affirmed, by the way, by the Second Circuit and that affirmance is 135 Fed. Appx. 479.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Summary opinion.

MR. DAVIS: Correct. Parties -- "A party's manifest" -- and this is quoting from the second restatement of contracts -- "A party's manifestation of ascent -- when a party's manifestation of ascent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the contract is voidable by that recipient."

And that's just exactly what we're saying in the lead up to the settlement agreement; that there was a misrepresentation. And then with regard to it -- it just needs to be a misrepresentation as opposed to --

THE COURT: Well, pause, please, Mr. Davis.

You learn that in the first year of contracts or torts or both. But the question that's the more sophisticated and difficult one for a guy like me is whether that generalized principal applies when you have disclaimed reliance, when you have said in baby talk that you're giving away claims known and unknown, and whether you have stated at least once, perhaps twice in the agreement, that you know

everything you need to know to enter into the agreement.

I would find it more helpful if you called my attention to cases that apply the restatement in a more generalized principal that you articulated to me to situations of the latter category where you have two or three or four of those disclaimers.

MR. DAVIS: Sure. That case is -- well, here's one, Congregation -- and I'm going to really mispronounce this name so I'm just going to spell it, M-I-S-C-H-K-N-O-I-S Leviere Yackoff (ph), Inc. v Board of Trustees, and it's 301 Fed Appx. 14 at page 6, and that's a Second Circuit opinion from 2008. And the quote is simply, "To be sure so ordered settlements have been held to be void on a Rule 60(b)(4) motion where the settlement under the -- in the underlying proceedings were fraught with serious irregularities which indeed amount to a violation of the due process rights of one of the parties.

That is that case, Your Honor. And in -- and that quote I think effectively summarizes our position, which is the underlying proceedings were fraught with irregularities. We can only discover and have good litigation if the party we are engaged in with discovery is adhering to the rules, and we are saying the documents we were seeking were not produced. Certainly, it follows a pattern that was in existence prior to 2014. And we should have had those

documents in order to value the case before it was settled.

And that cite that I provided the Court and is in our reply brief says that when -- when you do not have that, you can void the settlement agreement.

With regard to the timeline and timeliness, I
don't want to get into a discussion of the -- certainly
there's allegations of fraud, but for purposes of this
motion we are just offering in the alternative that we are
saying documents were not produced that should have been.

The original filing that begat all of the filings that came after was actually a petition for a bill of review filed in Texas State Court. So counsel's argument about sitting on this --

THE COURT: Forgive me. I'm not that familiar with Texas civil procedure. What's a bill of review?

MR. DAVIS: It's a -- it's an equitable bill of review. We still have them. Rule 60(b) was designed to replace bills of review. In Texas we still have just a bill of review. But it is essentially seeking the same relief to undo a judgment order or settlement because of usually new -- newly discovered evidence or something, fraud, something to that effect.

But the original petition and bill of review in State Court was filed very shortly after New GM began to make its disclosures regarding the recalls. And so

counsel's suggestion that somehow we sat on our 60(b) motion for nine or ten months and there are cases that say even under 60(b)(6) that that's -- that's not okay, from the get go both New GM and the trust were aware that Phillips was seeking to undo the settlement agreement. And her petition certainly identified that and sought that -- and sought that legal relief.

Lawrence decision from 2001, a Second Circuit opinion. That case is very -- it's very good for our position. The plaintiffs in that case originally sought 60(b)(3) relief and got it. Then some years later, and I think based on the timeline of the opinion it looks like over two, maybe three years later, we brought a new affirmative action concerning that prior settlement and the 60(b) relief.

The Second Circuit in In re: Lawrence completely

-- did not even address the gap in time that was apparent

from the recitation of the facts when it converted their

petition to a 60(b) motion and clearly found for the

plaintiffs based on fraud.

Now it is an opinion that -- I'm very aware of the opinions in the Second Circuit that creates an absolute bar after one year. But In re: Lawrence does not do that. It did find in that particular case sufficient circumstances to not apply that -- or to not take issue with that timeliness

argument.

I will just say that 60(b) as a procedural rule is procedural. It's not substantive. But the rule was designed to replace equitable bills of review and certainly the equity arguments of this motion are what we rely upon. There are a million ways in which the Court could find in favor of the trust, in favor of New GM regarding plaintiff's motions legally.

But there are very real ways and real authority the Court has to find for Phillips and Powlege based on the facts that we're presenting here, based on the authority you have as an equitable court under 105, based on the equitable remedy that we just seek under 60(b), based on the Court's inherent ability to remedy what -- what was been a due process violation that prejudiced Powlege's ability to assess her claim.

And, Your Honor, I'm almost done. I -- one of the undercurrents of the argument that the loan -- Loanacre assignment argument creates is that somehow Loanacre would, in being assigned the lawsuit, somehow have the ability to step into Phillips' shoes today to try to undo the settlement based on our arguments, and that's illegal. You can't do that.

So we can't read the assignment as doing that because that would be, you know, a -- a person cannot sell

in New York and in Texas you cannot sell your right to a tort or a claim of fraud to another or have them finance that case and have them obtain a -- obtain the benefit from that lawsuit. And there are obvious public policy reasons for that, but that sort of assignment argument does get into that and -- and that's illegal.

So I would respectfully suggest that perhaps if the Court's going to rule against Phillips, that may not be the effective -- effective way to go because it's illegal.

You can't do that.

And then I heard counsel say she gave away what she had. The whole argument is about what she didn't know she had. And there is -- there was no way for her to know because -- and you saw this in some of the documents that are part of the record. GM was making the case that there are absolutely zero recalls applicable to this car, any other car like it that could have created the defects that she's complaining of.

Well, they couldn't make -- they could make those statements in 2010, but they simply cannot make those statements today. As much as they might not be aware of the particular make up of the -- of this -- of this subject vehicle, I think everyone can agree that there were -- there's been plenty of recalls for Malibu's that resulted in defects of the nature that Powlege's petition complained of,

certainly of even other cars, the Pontiac's G6 for example, other vehicles within the class that Powlege was seeking discovery of. We didn't get those documents. So how can she know what she's -- what she has and what's she settling if she does not have those documents.

And I'm -- I'm almost done, Your Honor. I -- if
the Court -- and I know that the Court asked what relief
would we actually be seeking, what could you do. I'm
actually going to defer to Mr. Weintraub because I think he
could probably explain with a better specificity than I can
what the Court could actually do in order to provide
Phillips with relief.

THE COURT: Well, I probably know as well as Mr. Weintraub what I can do. I -- you can help me in telling me what you want me to do.

MR. DAVIS: Okay. To void the settlement agreement and if that means that Phillips is ordered to compensate the trust for some amount equivalent to the figure that she resolved her claim for in the settlement agreement, of course, and, I mean, I would hope that we could get some time to --

THE COURT: Are you tendering back a payment on behalf of a person who I'm sure is not one of the one percent in this country of over a million bucks?

MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor. I -- without getting

into how that payment might be made, I can appreciate that the Court, in voiding the settlement agreement, would want to -- or you could say that in the likelihood that there's some subsequent or future settlement or judgment in the future, it would be treated as a credit and if there's not, at that point it would need to be paid. I don't know.

But that the settlement agreement would be void; that Phillips could have her adversarial proceeding, be able to conduct discovery. And I would point out in the practicalities of this, Your Honor, that the trust and/or New GM, whatever entity is going to be required to pay some amount of money in the future, the cap on their exposure is 35 million. After 35 million there is coverage, insurance, that the claim would be subject to that would provide a backstop with respect to what impact is this particular claim going to have on other claimants and all of that.

There is a backstop so that it -- in the event that it's above 35 million, that is the most that any GM -- that the GM trust would be exposed to or any other party would be exposed to because of that umbrella policy of insurance.

But that's really it, Your Honor, that we would be able to avoid that settlement agreement and -- and get an opportunity to litigate her case fairly, get documents and present evidence. And if nothing else -- and if nothing

else comes of this to put an end once and for all to the idea that the wreck could have been anything other than the car malfunctioning, like Mr. Powlege killing his children.

And I -- I emphasize that only because I know that that is my client's supreme personal interest; that she be given the opportunity to demonstrate legally that that -- that affirmative defense is not correct; that there are documents to demonstrate he didn't do it on purpose; and that it was a product defect. And, certainly, that doesn't involve any money.

But that's what we would like from the 60(b).

THE COURT: All right. Does that complete your argument? I do have one question. Have a seat for a second, Mr. Weintraub.

Does that complete your argument, Mr. Davis?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I do have one question. Relevant to something I said before, we're -- I'm not sure whether or not I was too accommodating too quickly.

If you had deposition testimony that you thought could support the requirement under 60(b) doctrine that you present court -- facts to a court indicating the presence of flawed and you didn't already rely on them in the papers you submitted to me, what is the basis upon which I should take them now? You've given your opponents a moving target.

MR. DAVIS: Well, I -- respectfully, Your Honor, having been here for the two days worth of argument in February and certainly having appreciated the Court's April 15th order, the Court laid out what is a fair assumption; that documents were withheld for many years by many people.

THE COURT: That was with respect to something where there was a stipulation entered into by very capable lawyers as to what 24 people knew with respect to a different defect.

Now --

MR. DAVIS: I did not --

THE COURT: -- but to what extent do you have stipulations from your opponents vis-à-vis the failure that you're basing your claim for relief on?

MR. DAVIS: Frankly, Your Honor, our pleading and certainly our motion, we are asserting what is accurate which is that the control module, the cruise control and the particular ignition switch already referenced, that all of those things were present in the vehicle. I, in their response, appreciate that they're disputing that now. But there is -- appreciating there was not going to be any discovery based on the prior, you know, discussion in August of 2014, I -- this is not an evidentiary hearing. If the Court would like this evidence --

THE COURT: Of course it's not an evidentiary

hearing, but the way evidentiary hearings work in the federal courts on contested matters subject to Rule 9014 as an adversary proceedings that go by the federal rules, and specifically Rules 8 and 9, is that you get to an evidentiary hearing if and only if there are material issues of fact and the Court takes allegations as true only if they comply with the obligation to put forth some factual allegations of underlying evidentiary facts from which a Court can make a non-conclusory finding. We learned this -well, we didn't learn it in our first years of law school, but this was long after I went to law school. But it's pretty (indiscernible) or am I missing something? MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, I -- our motion lays out -- I believe that the motion lays out the contentions for the plaintiffs concerning the subject vehicle. I -- when the Court brings up Rule 9, for example, the Court presumes the facts to be true in the plaintiff's complaint. Rule --THE COURT: The non-conclusory allegations. Ιt takes evidentiary facts to be true. This is Ashcroft. Ιt says it in baby talk. MR. DAVIS: I appreciate that, Your Honor. I just -- to the -- well, I didn't know that -- I am happy to provide the documents I previously referenced to demonstrate that I am being correct, that I am correct when I make a representation about the subject vehicle having a control

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So I would hope as an officer of the court that these statements that are based in fact are taken for what they are. I truly didn't know that -- I was -- I did not see this as a motion designed to argue the underlying case, just about whether or not she should get another shot because of the settlement agreement being obtained -
THE COURT: Whether you're not entitled to Rule 60(b) relief based on fraud, either upon an appointment or (indiscernible).

MR. DAVIS: But the fraud that we're complaining of is the litigation and not getting documents in the litigation.

THE COURT: Yeah. I understand that.

MR. DAVIS: Right. And so again, I -- it seems that -- I'm trying to appreciate the Court's discussion about the underlying lawsuit and the subject vehicle from that lawsuit impacting the question of whether or not the discovery requests that had been provided to the Court were not responded to appropriately as they should have been in order for Phillips to value her claim prior to settlement.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Weintraub, did you have something you wanted to add briefly?

MR. WEINTRAUB: Yes, Your Honor. I only wanted to make the point that I think Mr. Davis was deferring to me

Pg 97 of 142 Page 97 The Court had asked whether or not there -- there's an order of judgment that would be the subject of the Rule 60(b) motion and we think that there is. There's an overarching order in the case with respect to settlements. That order was activated or implemented with respect to Powlege at the point in time that she entered into the settlement agreement, and that settlement agreement was entered into pursuant to authority granted by that order. THE COURT: Well, you're surely -- you're not telling me that I should (indiscernible) the authority? MR. WEINTRAUB: Yes, I am, Your Honor. I think --THE COURT: It did say that New GM doesn't have authority to enter into settlements? MR. WEINTRAUB: It doesn't have authority to enter into this settlement agreement because this settlement agreement was based upon --THE COURT: I said New GM. I meant Old GM. MR. WEINTRAUB: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I heard some commentary --THE COURT: Well, I should have -- maybe I should have said the GUC Trust. But you're saying that I should deny Old GM's authority or the GUC Trust's authority to enter into settlements or I should deny it the authority to

enter into settlements only with respect to Ms. Powlege?

MR. WEINTRAUB: Neither, Your Honor.

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What I'm

Page 98 1 saying is that authority should be revoked upon the showings 2 made that there was fraud in connection with the entry into this settlement. 3 THE COURT: Revoked with respect to who and what? 4 5 MR. WEINTRAUB: With respect to the authority --6 revoke the authority of General Motors to enter into this 7 settlement because this settlement was based upon either 8 intentional or negligent fraud. 9 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 10 Given all the new stuff I will allow very brief, I 11 guess it's reply or surreply or whatever we're up to. 12 MS. RUBIN: Thank you so much. 13 Your Honor, there's been a lot of discussion 14 between -- well, it's no longer this morning. I guess this 15 afternoon between you and Mr. Davis about the requirements 16 of Rule 8 and Rule 9. And I want to take a step back 17 because I'm not sure that that's the applicable standard 18 that applies to a Rule 60 motion. 19 Mr. Davis has not interposed an adversary 20 proceeding or a complaint. That's not what's at issue here. 21 It's a Rule 60 motion. And, Your Honor, I want to refer you 22 to the Second Circuit's decision in Coe versus RJM, LLC. The citation is 372 Fed. Appx. 188. 23 24 THE COURT: Another summary opinion? 25 MS. RUBIN: It is a summary order, Your Honor, of

the Second Circuit in 2010. And I mentioned Coe earlier as the basis for my statement that Rule 60(b) motions, in addition to meeting the test that I enunciated earlier, that Coe puts the meat on that bones and says that it can't be unsubstantiated allegations.

Let me tell you a little bit more about the Coe case, Your Honor, if I might.

The Coe case is a Rule 60 motion that was made to the Bankruptcy Court originally as the basis for a motion for reconsideration of a denial of a motion to lift the automatic stay. And the Court didn't say there that Rule 60 motions are governed by Rule 8 or Rule 9 or the plausibility standard in Ashcroft.

Rather, the Court is saying the following, Your
Honor. In reviewing the denial of the motion for
reconsideration under Rule 60, the Second Circuit says as
follows: "As the Bankruptcy Court properly determined,
appellant made only substantiated allegations that she did
not receive the appellee's objections to her claim." And he
goes on to say "her allegations are unsupported by any
affidavits or other evidence. Appellant, therefore, failed
to meet her burden under Rule 60(b)."

THE COURT: Pause, then. You're saying, then, that not even plausible allegations are enough, but you have to come forward with some evidentiary showing either by

Page 100 1 affidavit or documentary evidence --2 MS. RUBIN: Yes, I am, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- or something of that character? 3 4 MS. RUBIN: Yes, I am, Your Honor. And certainly 5 Mr. Davis or Mr. Weintraub hasn't cited any cases to the 6 contrary holding that Rule 60(b) motions are subject to the 7 lesser standard of pleading on Rule 8 and Rule 9. 8 So, Your Honor, I believe that the time for Mr. 9 Davis to have come forward with evidence was in his moving 10 brief. He didn't do that in his moving brief. He didn't do 11 that in his reply. He didn't do that when he came before 12 the Court with a no stay pleading or in his corresponding 13 oral presentation to Your Honor on August 18th. He didn't 14 do that in the complaint that was filed originally in Texas 15 Court and then was removed to Federal Court. 16 Your Honor, there are -- there's a mismatch here 17 between what Mr. Davis is saying. So his allegations in his 18 complaint are as follows: 19 One, here are all the things that my client asked 20 for in discovery requests in the underlying litigation and, 21 two, here are all the things that I think we now know 22 General Motors knew at the time. But there's a fundamental 23 mismatch between those two things and what actually might be 24 missing. 25 And, you know, as someone here quipped this

morning to me, Mr. Davis doesn't connect the dots for his client, for the Court, and certainly not for my client or Mr. Steinberg. You were right to observe this is a constantly moving target. He doesn't say this is the document that was missing. This is the document that was withheld. Let me identify for the Court what I know today that General Motors had in hand prior to my client's settlement with Motors Liquidation Company in August 2010.

Instead he just says, here are the things we asked for. Here are the things we now think GM knew and it's not clear that the things GM is now perceived to know -- which, by the way, are documented by citations to plaintiff's presale consolidated complaint, for example. It's not even by reference to hard evidence in terms of what GM knows. It's a series of -- a litany of media articles, paragraphs and pre-sale consolidated complaint.

But the two things never come together. He doesn't identify, much less provide the Court with the documents or information that he alleges was withheld from his client. Instead, he uses the venire of the ignition switch defect and what the public and the Court now understand was withheld to say there was some sort of discovery misconduct. And that, Your Honor, I would submit to you is not enough to satisfy his client's burden on a Rule 60 motion.

I would encourage Your Honor, for example, to look at paragraph 31 of his moving brief, which I think is a good illustration of this. Okay. The car that Mr. Davis's client's husband was driving is as we've discussed already a 2004 Chevrolet Malibu Classic. In paragraph 31 of the moving brief he says, when did GM know about this potentially fatal flaw concerning the wiring harness. He says, as shown GM knew these facts in 2008-2009 during the height of the 2007 litigation. The citation is to a USA Today article.

He then continues, citing that article, the documents show that in 2009 GM recalled about 8,000 Pontiacs from the 2005 and 2006 model years because the brake lights might not work when the driver stepped on the brake pedal. The company did not recall later model G6's or the Chevrolet Malibu or Saturn Aura until three weeks ago. The cars are nearly identical.

He goes on from there to make the assumption that the cars that are recalled as discussed in this USA Today article are, in fact, identical to the car that his client was driving. But there's no proof of that, Your Honor.

There's no submission of that.

And certainly, as Your Honor pointed out, to the extent that the deposition transcripts that he was referencing earlier would have provided that proof, they

haven't been provided to the Court. They haven't been provided to our client. I don't know as I sit here today whether or not these 2005 and 2006 model year Pontiac G6's, there's any resemblance whatsoever to the 2004 Chevrolet Malibu Classic that is, in fact, at issue.

And so I hate to run too far afield on the merits of this case because, Your Honor, as I submitted to you before and Mr. Steinberg did amply as well, this case should be decided on standing alone. The settlement agreement and the transfer together I would submit establish that the relief that Mr. Davis is asking for from this Court is inappropriate at this juncture as sympathetic and tragic as his client's circumstances are.

But even if we were to overcome the standing threshold, Your Honor, even if we were to overcome the timing issues that are discussed in much greater detail in our brief and in New GM's brief, the law that's applicable here is Rule 60. And even if Mr. Davis is entitled to proceed under Rule 60(b)(6), which we would submit he is not. This is a 60(b)(3) motion. Even if that's the applicable rule, he hasn't met his client's burden of proof and he doesn't get to come into this court and make bald unsubstantiated allegations based on an inflamed public record and say that he gets a do over with the GUC Trust, particularly when, Your Honor, the question of whether he's

an ignition switch plaintiff or not seems to be an open one.

I'll just -- I'll submit to Your Honor that

Exhibit 10 to my declaration and response is the complaint

that Mr. Davis filed in Texas Court. And in that complaint

he identifies the ignition switch defect as one of the

things that he believes led to or possibly led to the

accident that killed Ms. Phillips' husband and four

children.

If Mr. Davis is, in fact, a pre-closing accident plaintiff with ignition switch defect related claims, then he is not only represented by Mr. Weintraub, which as I understand in dispute, but he's also subject to Your Honor's threshold issues decision and he's subject to the equitable mootness holding there. And maybe that's the end of the -- a separate end of the story. We would encourage Your Honor to look at page 10 -- Exhibit 10 to my declaration at page 4.

And then the final thing I want to say, and I've let this go unanswered a number of times. It's an inflammatory accusation, the question of what MLC and Old GM said in litigating the claim. Certainly, Your Honor, I wasn't there at the time. My firm was not there at the time. But I'll just submit to Your Honor Exhibit 11, I believe, to New GM's brief, is the mediation submission of Motors Liquidation Company with Ms. Phillips. And -- I'm

sorry. It's Exhibit 4, I believe. And on page 11 there's a footnote there where Motors Liquidation Company clarifies that it's not proceeding on a theory of murder/suicide.

And so to the extent that that continues to be made a part of the record today, I certainly wanted to clarify for the record that it's not my understanding that at the end of the day the mediation was --

THE COURT: And you're saying that --

MS. RUBIN: -- an allegation.

THE COURT: -- that mediation statement -- you're not saying, but you would say the mediation statement isn't hearsay because it's a statement independently -- simply of its position and it's not asserted for the truth on this event?

MS. RUBIN: That's correct, Your Honor. Again,
you know, I haven't -- not thinking through the panaplea of
evidentiary issues that might arise here, Your Honor, I just
simply wanted to correct the record in terms of the
submissions that were made.

THE COURT: You're saying that when somebody says something to a court as to somebody else and it has independent significance it doesn't matter whether it's true or not. They said they were not relying on it.

MS. RUBIN: They said to the mediator that to the extent that there were previous -- to the extent there were

previous statements made in the course of the litigation for purposes of the mediation and for purposes of resolving the case through a settlement they were no longer relying on that theory.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. RUBIN: They acknowledged that Mr. Powlege, for example, could have had a major health event or could have suffered -- could have inadvertently -- I believe the footnote says could have inadvertently put his foot on one pedal when he meant to press another.

And, obviously, Your Honor, I wasn't there at the time. I just would like to clear the name of those who were involved in the mediation to say that wasn't their theory, at least on submission in writing to the mediation.

Thank you --

THE COURT: All right.

MS. RUBIN: -- Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. For the only matter that must be done today, which is whether I should reopen the record to allow still another opportunity to add evidence to the 60(b) record by introduction of depositions, I am denying that request.

When a Court deals with matters of this character, the Court cannot, consist with appropriate judicial administration, authorize such moving targets and repeated

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efforts to put more material into a record that could have and should have been presented earlier.

As I indicated earlier, if there were facts from those depositions, which putting aside whether plausible allegations are sufficient or more robust evidentiary proof such as by affidavit, deposition testimony is required under 60(b) as to which I will confirm through the cases that Ms. Rubin is correct in her assertion, either way that opportunity existed previously and it -- nothing has been brought to my attention to show that it couldn't have been put in earlier.

So the only remaining issue, then, is how long, assuming it's reasonable, new GM and the GUC Trust desire to respond to the late submission of the Minnesota case, Spaulding, because by reason of its eleventh hour production they're entitled to an opportunity to put in something if they choose.

The fact that I need to provide that opportunity coupled with the fact that both sides brought to my attention decisions that I need to read means that I can't rule today from the bench.

So, Mr. Steinberg, Ms. Rubin, how long do you need to either put in a response on Spaulding or to tell me that you waive your opportunity?

MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, I think today's

Page 108 1 Thursday. We could do it by Tuesday, the close of business 2 on Tuesday. 3 THE COURT: Is that equally true of you, Ms. Rubin? 4 5 MS. RUBIN: Sure. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, if I may, if I had 8 been given an opportunity there was --9 THE COURT: Pull a mic close to you, please. 10 MR. STEINBERG: I'm sorry. 11 If I had been given the opportunity I would have 12 wanted to say something about the Playboy case that was 13 cited first in the reply and on the Lawrence case. May I 14 include that very briefly via paragraph or two in the letter 15 that I file by Tuesday? 16 THE COURT: If they were submitted in the reply, 17 I'm going to give Mr. Davis the choice. 18 Do you want their response in writing or do you 19 want to give them a chance to be heard now? 20 MR. DAVIS: I will defer to counsel. 21 THE COURT: You can do whichever you prefer, Mr. 22 Steinberg. 23 MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor, I think I could do it 24 in two minutes so that it will save you some reading. 25 THE COURT: Okay.

Page 109

MR. STEINBERG: With regard to the Lawrence case, which was the issue about whether the one-year statute of limitation for 60(b)(3) applied, I just wanted to point out to Your Honor that there is a footnote, Footnote 9 of that decision where the Second Circuit said that they -- people have been counting the time period on the wrong start point, and that actually this thing was timely filed within the one year.

So this decision doesn't really stand for any other proposition other than this was a timely filed 60(b)(3) application. So that was -- that was all I had wanted to say on the Lawrence point.

With regard to the Playboy case where there was a reference to the New York law and it was as to what New York law would hold about setting aside a settlement agreement, in that particular case the argument was whether there was a breach of a particular term of the settlement agreement which would justify a vacating it on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation.

The particular term was that the settlement agreement provided that there should be no reference to an injunction that had been executed -- entered into as part of the settlement, so they couldn't introduce the injunction in the context of a later trial.

And the Court was then deciding whether the cross-

Page 110 1 examination of a witness turned out to be the introduction 2 of evidence and the Court said it wasn't, denied 60(b) relief. But it was all in the context of a breach of a 3 4 particular representation or really in this case a covenant 5 in a settlement agreement. And that's obviously not the 6 circumstance here. 7 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, folks. 8 The matter will be submitted and we're adjourned. 9 MR. WEINTRAUB: Your Honor, could I be heard on 10 one -- one last thing, Your Honor? 11 The Court had asked --12 THE COURT: Is it something new that -- all right. 13 Come on up, Mr. Weintraub. 14 MR. WEINTRAUB: It's revisiting something. 15 The assignment of claims, which was something that 16 17 THE COURT: Wait. Is this something -- rearguing 18 something that came up almost literally hours ago? 19 MR. WEINTRAUB: I don't know if it was hours ago, 20 Your Honor, but this seemed the most opportune time rather 21 than to interrupting the flow of everything else that was 22 going on. 23 THE COURT: You realize if I hear what you have to 24 say now I've got to give your opponents a comparable 25 opportunity.

Pg 111 of 142 Page 111 1 MR. WEINTRAUB: I understand, Your Honor. 2 just with respect to submitting it to the Court. I could not find the confidentiality provision in there. So I would 3 like to confer with counsel and see if they can point me to 4 5 the confidentiality provision. I think we could put in the 6 assignment of claim which is part -- which is the agreement 7 that Ms. Powlege signed without the --8 (Pause) 9 MR. WEINTRAUB: May I confer with counsel? 10 THE COURT: No. This is what I want you to do 11 since I can't decide it today anyway, and I don't want to 12 hear more oral argument, and the only issue is whether or 13 not I see a document. 14 I want you to meet and confer with Mr. Steinberg 15 and Ms. Rubin and determine, (a) whether it's relevant; (b) 16 whether it's violative of a confidentiality obligation; and 17 (c) whether they agree to it, its consideration, object to 18 its consideration or agree to its consideration subject to 19 their ability to comment on it. 20 And I want any further submissions on this solely 21 in writing. 22 MR. WEINTRAUB: Understood. Thank you, Your 23 Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. We're adjourned.

MR. STEINBERG: Your Honor -- Your Honor --

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Page 112

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STEINBERG: -- I hate to be the one -- to be the one to stand up for the parties, but there was a letter that we had written to Your Honor with regard to the April 29th letter that was submitted to Judge Ferman and we hoped that the letter that we had submitted by the counsel here was satisfactory to Your Honor.

I will note that there was a short colloquy at the April 24th hearing with regard to that issue. And to the extent that Your Honor has not seen that, we would be prepared to hand up the three pages in the transcript for that as well, too, so you would have the complete issue that related to that.

And Judge Ferman had entered an order on April 16th, the day after your decision, asking for the parties to address the issue that they would otherwise brief in the April 29th letter to be prepared to say that at the April -- address that at the April 24th hearing to the extent they wanted to say something.

And so I have that one page order from Judge

Ferman. If you don't have it and you would like to see it I

could hand it up. I told the other side that I had that. I

just want to make sure, and maybe I'm leaning too far -- too

much the other way, but to make sure that Your Honor has

everything that --

Page 113

THE COURT: I don't have it. And if my endorsed order did not make it clear, it is a matter of concern to me when the District Court hears about the progress of compliance with one of my orders before I do and, in fact, before -- unless I take corrective action without me hearing about it at all.

I mean, when I discovered of the existence of it, so everybody knows something, I asked Judge Ferman's chambers to provide me with a copy of the letter, which it did. But there was no reason why -- by which I needed to contact Judge Ferman to hear about compliance with one of my orders and how it could possibly be that anybody in the world might think it appropriate to communicate with Judge Ferman without copying me on something that talks about compliance of the undertaking that I had required.

Now I understood that at least once and perhaps twice in that letter there was an apology for that. Fine. Apology accepted. But it better not happen again.

MR. STEINBERG: Understood, Your Honor. And I was standing to rise not to sort of to raise an issue that I -that I assumed had -- had hoped we had put to bed because we had all agreed that we would do that, but because I thought that there may be a couple of other things relevant to what Your Honor should see and I wanted to be able to present that. So --

	1 g 11+ 01 1+2
	Page 114
1	THE COURT: I understand and appreciate that.
2	MR. STEINBERG: Okay.
3	THE COURT: My endorsed order should now be deemed
4	to have been complied with.
5	MR. STEINBERG: So
6	THE COURT: Or at least it will be assuming I get
7	something under the time limit that was promised to me.
8	MR. STEINBERG: So I
9	THE COURT: But I also assumed that people
10	understood the import of that order and there will not be
11	further instance instances of that kind of thing.
12	MR. STEEL: Your Honor, if I may for
13	THE COURT: Yes, come up, please.
14	MR. STEEL: sort of for good conscious for the
15	record. It's Howard Steel of
16	THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Steel.
17	MR. STEEL: Brown Rudnick on designated
18	counsel on behalf of the economic loss plaintiffs.
19	Mr. Weisfelner is out of the country. We
20	appreciate Your Honor's acceptance of our letter and I
21	appreciate the opportunity to express our collective regret
22	for the oversight not submitting the joint letter. It won't
23	happen again, Your Honor.
24	THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Steel.
25	MR. STEINBERG: If I could hand this to your

Page 115 1 clerk, Your Honor, the --2 THE COURT: Yes. To my clerk, please, Mr. 3 Steinberg. 4 MR. STEINBERG: And the relevant excerpt is only on pages 33 through 35, but we did give you the full 5 6 transcript. 7 THE COURT: Thank you. 8 All right. Do we have any further business? 9 Hearing none, we're adjourned. 10 COURTCALL OPERATOR: Your Honor, may I disconnect? 11 THE COURT: Yes, you may, Courtcall. COURTCALL OPERATOR: Thank you. 12 (Whereupon, these proceedings concluded at 12:30 p.m.) 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

	Py 110 01 142		
			Page 116
1	INDEX		
2			
3	RULING		
4		PAGE	LINE
5	Motion to reopen the record to allow still		
6	another opportunity to add evidence to the		
7	60(b) record by introduction of depositions	106	18
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			

Page 117 1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 We, Dawn South and Sherri L. Breach, certify that the 4 foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the 5 proceedings. Digitally signed by Dawn South Dawn South DN: cn=Dawn South, o, ou, email=digital1@veritext.com, c=US 6 Date: 2015.05.08 15:01:15 -04'00' 7 8 Dawn South AAERT Certified Electronic Transcriber CET**D-408 9 Sherri L Digitally signed by Sherri L Breach 10 DN: cn=Sherri L Breach, o, ou, email=digital1@veritext.com, c=US Breach Date: 2015.05.08 15:01:51 -04'00' 11 12 Sherri L. Breach 13 AAERT Certified Electronic Reporter & Transcriber CERT*D-397 14 15 Date: May 8, 2015 16 17 18 19 20 Veritext Legal Solutions 21 330 Old Country Road 22 Suite 300 23 Mineola, NY 11501 24 25

[& - aaert] Page 1

&	19 58:6 64:1	64:8,12 65:20 79:5	60 7:22 8:8,22,23
& 3:2,9 4:8,16 6:12	1928 84:15	88:11 103:20 109:3	15:2,9,19 33:13
6:19 117:13	1962 40:14,25	109:11	39:3,5 41:12,19,20
0	1994 55:21 56:1	3,975,000 19:17	44:24 45:3 46:1
	1998 45:14	23:16	51:20 57:11,12,12
09-50026 1:3	2	3.9 23:22,25 29:20	57:15,16,22 58:3,9
1	2 12:23 15:23 50:12	30 10:10	58:24 60:22 61:3,22
1 20:8 45:17 57:14	52:1,19 53:11	300 117:22	64:8,12,17 72:14
84:10	2.7 13:8 28:22,23	301 86:10	76:12 79:5,5 86:13
1,172,000 30:7	33:23 44:5,16	31 102:2,5	87:17 88:1,3,11,15
1,172,625 29:20	20 64:1	33 115:5	88:19 89:2,13 93:11
1,250,000 11:17,19	200 3:4 4:3	330 117:21	93:21 96:9 97:3
1.17 29:25	2001 88:9	340 28:9	98:18,21 99:2,8,11
10 104:3,16,16	2003 63:22 77:19	346 39:1 40:24	99:16,22 100:6
10016 4:19	2004 63:20,21,23	35 92:13,13,18	101:25 103:18,19
10018-1405 3:21	84:3,4,5 85:3 102:5	115:5	103:20 106:21
10036 5:4	103:4	372 98:23	107:7 109:3,11
10036-4003 3:12	2005 102:13 103:3	379 28:4	110:2 116:7
10036-6745 4:11	2006 102:13 103:3	393 48:5	60.02 39:3
1010 4:3	2007 69:18 102:9	397 117:13	620 3:20
10166-0193 3:5	2008 86:12	4	626807 84:4
105 89:12	2008-2009 102:8	4 32:6,7 53:19 65:21	69 57:3
106 116:7	2009 80:6,10 102:12	65:23 66:9 84:4,7	7
108 62:21	2010 2:2 10:6 11:6	86:13 104:17 105:1	7 1:16 84:11
11 48:11 53:1,2	12:18 13:15 30:25	408 117:9	77002 4:4
57:18 104:23 105:1	33:21 45:11 80:6	425 28:4	78 60:17
11501 117:23	90:20 99:1 101:8	437 45:17	8
1185 3:11	2012 56:1	44614 2:3 51:4,17	8 66:19 82:21 84:11
119 62:20	2013 80:10	52:4,9	95:4 98:16 99:12
12 20:22 21:2	2014 20:10 57:4	479 85:5	100:7 117:15
120 62:20	60:2 86:25 94:23	486 57:17	8,000 102:12
12845 20:8	2015 1:16 117:15	5	83 60:14,16
12:30 115:13	208 27:25	5 51:16 57:14 65:24	847 57:18
13 48:11	210 25:17	66:5	863 57:18
135 85:4	24 94:8	55 10:13,24 12:24	
14 86:11	247 84:10,13	23:4,24 43:25 44:4	9
154 45:17	24th 112:9,18	51:5,18 53:13 54:12	9 2:2 60:11,16 82:21
15th 14:14 25:17	250 10:12,14,17,24	54:17 55:1	83:5 95:4,16 98:16
28:1 34:9 42:21	11:24 43:24 51:4,8		99:12 100:7 109:4
45:23 46:2 72:24	52:5 53:12 69:22	6	9014 95:2
79:17 94:4	263 39:1 40:24	6 20:7,22 21:2 57:16	9:47 1:17
16th 112:15	270 4:18	57:22 58:3,9,24	9th 11:6 12:18
18 116:7	29th 112:5,17	60:22 64:17 66:10	13:14 80:10
180 28:9	3	72:14 79:5 86:11	a
188 98:23	3 12:25 15:3 52:17	88:3 103:19	aaert 117:9,13
18th 20:10 57:4	52:18,19 53:8 57:11	6,500 44:12	
60:2 100:13	32.10,17 33.0 37.11		

[ab - answer] Page 2

ab 84:10	add 70:18 96:23	aggregate 10:17	allegations 61:3
abated 9:20	106:20 116:6	11:16,21 13:2,5	69:17 82:14 87:7
ability 10:1 15:18	addition 30:24	23:15 32:5	95:6,8,18 99:5,18
16:2 30:14 37:7	81:21 99:3	aggrieved 35:15	99:20,24 100:17
40:4,7 68:18 89:14	additional 22:2	ago 7:11 102:16	103:23 107:5
89:15,20 111:19	38:9	110:18,19	allege 27:13 28:12
able 34:17,19 39:7	address 24:10 37:23	agree 30:16,22	alleged 14:12 83:17
46:1 47:7 48:1,1	56:18 88:17 112:16	59:19,20 81:20 83:2	alleges 101:19
63:6 65:12 79:24	112:18	90:23 111:17,18	alleging 75:22
92:8,23 113:24	addressed 36:8 74:5	agreed 10:11,24	allot 23:9
absence 65:13	74:14	11:3 25:20 26:25	allow 26:10 40:17
absolute 64:12	addressing 40:20	27:2 43:25 51:5	42:4 98:10 106:20
88:22	80:15	53:13 54:17 113:22	116:5
absolutely 64:16	adhering 86:22	agreement 8:17	allowance 30:2
82:5,8 83:2 90:16	adjourned 110:8	15:17,19 16:2,20	allowed 13:12,24
abudabi 55:12,25	111:24 115:9	17:11 19:11,16,22	17:16 23:1,22 28:15
accept 63:9	adler 4:16	20:3 21:16 22:21	28:21 29:2 31:5,9
acceptance 114:20	administration	24:7,9,25 25:2,2,5	31:11,18 32:5,13
accepted 113:18	106:25	28:17 29:2,4 30:15	34:5 38:8,12 43:22
accepting 48:14	admit 64:13	30:17,18 31:2,14,16	46:13,17,18 50:8
accident 51:9 59:25	admittedly 79:10	32:24,25 33:1,9,14	52:16,25 53:9,10
62:23,25 71:11	adr 10:6 11:1,2	33:16 35:22 36:9,19	54:14 61:20 83:11
74:15 75:14 104:7,9	15:16 35:18 36:24	36:22,25 37:1,12,18	alternative 87:8
accommodating	37:14 42:15 44:15	37:20,22 38:21 39:6	alternatively 2:3
93:19	51:6 54:18	41:6 42:4,8,18	ameliorate 81:16
account 23:16 32:5	adult 51:13,21 70:9	44:20,22,23 45:1,4	amending 39:20
52:24 53:9	70:11	45:4 46:16,22 47:16	americas 3:11
accurate 20:20	advantage 18:23	52:2 53:22 54:15	amount 8:11,12
57:25 94:16 117:4	adversarial 92:8	65:7,11,14,16 66:1	19:7,18 20:14 21:14
accusation 104:20	adversary 95:3	66:6,10,11,17 67:1	21:24 22:19,25 23:2
accused 47:5	98:19	67:5 83:14 85:15,25	23:4,8,9,16,17
accusing 79:7,7	advice 67:3,4	86:1 87:4 88:5	30:11 31:5,18 44:17
achieved 68:8	affect 68:16	91:17,20 92:2,7,23	46:13,17,18,20 51:4
acknowledged	affidavit 100:1	96:7 97:7,7,15,16	51:15,17 52:5,15
54:19 106:6	107:6	103:9 109:15,17,21	53:12 54:12,14,17
acknowledges	affidavits 61:4	110:5 111:6	55:1 86:16 91:18
54:22	99:21	agreements 15:8	92:12
acted 8:19	affirmance 85:4	66:13	amounts 8:10 20:23
acting 58:11	affirmative 81:1,8	agrees 54:22	21:1 38:8 52:15,17
action 88:14 113:5	83:12 88:14 93:7	ahead 20:6 22:16	amply 103:8
activated 97:5	affirmed 85:3	38:17 41:1 71:17	analogous 42:14
acts 33:8	affixing 39:19	ails 61:23	analysis 59:16
actual 18:16 19:20	afield 103:6	aim 9:5	analyze 26:16 70:12
24:20 46:25 61:4	afternoon 98:15	akin 4:8 6:19	aneurysm 42:6
84:1	age 63:9 71:14	alexander 4:21	anguish 71:5,9
adam 11:8	aggrandizing 43:7	allegation 83:15 105:9	answer 52:23 53:3

anticipation 20:10	approved 15:12	100:19 101:9	assuming 22:3
antiseptic 70:4	42:9	110:11 113:8	79:14 107:13 114:6
anybody 18:14,17	approvingly 84:9	asking 7:22 25:9,10	assumption 94:4
19:2,14 22:4 40:18	approvingly 84.9 appx 85:4 86:11	79:10 83:14 103:11	102:18
113:12	98:23	112:15	assure 58:16
anybody's 8:11	april 14:14 25:17	aspect 79:12	atlantic 81:21
anyway 111:11	28:1 34:9 42:21	aspects 67:24	attached 16:16 17:4
apologize 55:7	45:23 46:2 72:24	assert 7:24 8:5	attack 15:9,18 25:1
apology 113:17,18	79:17 94:3 112:4,9	asserted 105:13	30:14 35:21 36:18
apparent 20:23	112:14,17,17,18	asserting 69:22	39:6
88:17	area 76:14 82:21	94:16	attacking 33:2 45:3
appeals 84:22	argue 21:14,17,24	assertion 107:8	attained 45:2
appear 43:7	96:5	assertions 59:3	attempt 9:24 43:18
appearances 6:4	argued 7:10	assess 89:16	44:22
appellant 99:18,21	arguing 14:18 36:2	assessed 27:12	attempted 41:14
appellate 7:14	78:20 80:18	assessing 80:18	attend 11:3
appellee's 99:19	argument 16:7	assets 71:10	attended 13:16
applicable 14:4	25:14 33:3,4,9 34:3	assign 26:4 29:1	attending 13:17
68:11 77:15 78:12	34:6 39:3,12 43:9	assigned 7:25 8:6	attention 12:14
81:17 83:9 90:16	44:21 61:24 63:7	25:1 27:11 28:24	14:13 65:24 86:3
98:17 103:17,21	76:15 78:17,19	35:7 46:15 89:20	107:10,20
application 109:11	79:13 87:12 89:1,18	assignee 26:13 27:5	attorney 3:3,18 4:2
applied 27:14 72:3	89:19 90:5,12 93:13	27:9,15 55:18,22	4:17 5:2 48:7 76:16
72:6 109:3	93:15 94:2 109:16	56:4	attorneys 3:10 4:9
applies 62:23 70:16	111:12	assigning 46:18	august 2:2 11:6
85:22 98:18	arguments 27:8,9	assignment 9:10,11	12:18 13:14 20:10
apply 44:8 71:23	27:15 28:18 37:23	16:12,13,17,18,21	30:25 57:4 60:2
83:5 86:3 88:25	42:17 43:7 74:5	18:12 21:13 24:25	77:10 79:24 80:6
appointment 96:9	83:25 89:5,22	26:6 27:10 28:11,15	94:22 100:13 101:8
appreciate 9:19	arises 81:22	28:25 30:16,19 31:2	aura 102:16
27:1 78:17 92:1	arms 15:24	31:3 33:10,17 34:4	authority 45:25
94:20 95:21 96:16	arrangement 20:1	34:5 35:6 37:22	65:15 84:25 89:9,11
114:1,20,21	arrived 54:15	46:5,6,12,14 63:13	97:8,10,13,14,22,22
appreciated 94:3	arthur 3:14 6:11	67:16,18,18 89:19	97:23 98:1,5,6
appreciating 94:21	article 102:10,11,20	89:24 90:5 110:15	authorize 106:25
approach 12:3	articles 101:15	111:6	authorized 8:9,19
40:21	articulated 86:4	assignor 26:14	66:21
appropriate 40:8	arvay 55:6,20	34:24	automatic 27:10
58:3,9 61:19 106:24	ascent 85:9,10	assigns 29:2	99:11
113:13	ashcroft 81:22	associated 20:14	available 20:17
appropriately 64:8	95:19 99:13	associates 45:18	38:10 80:3
96:20	aside 2:3 42:4,18	assume 7:13 14:16	avenue 3:4,11,20
approval 8:11,14	63:9 78:2 81:9	18:7,14,21 23:16	4:18 58:25
8:17,18 18:14 42:10	107:4 109:15	28:5 59:14 78:7,23	avoid 27:9 44:22
69:1	asked 8:22 49:21	78:25 79:1,2	45:2 92:23
approve 41:24	52:20 54:19 56:16	assumed 113:21	award 70:6
**			
	72:13 91:7 97:1	114:9	

[aware - car] Page 4

aware 10:8 41:11	28:12 35:25 39:14	billion 10:20,21	brings 95:16
41:24 42:20,22 80:6	44:14 46:21 50:9	11:17,21 23:23	broader 67:24
88:4,21 90:21	72:10 75:23 83:5,7	bills 87:18 89:4	brought 12:2 16:13
	83:14 88:12,20	binding 38:24	34:7 35:9 43:6
b	89:10,11,12,13,22	64:20	88:14 107:10,19
b 1:20 7:22 8:8,22	94:22 96:3,9 97:16	bit 14:25 41:13 99:6	brown 5:1 114:17
8:23 15:2,9,19	98:7 103:23	blow 67:10	bryant 4:10
20:22 21:2 33:13		board 86:10	bucks 10:15 13:1
39:3,5 41:12,19,20	basically 18:13 25:18 66:1,24	boiler 66:15	19:17 23:16 30:1
44:24 45:3 46:1	basing 94:14		32:8 91:24
57:11,14,14,16,17	basis 7:2 56:11 63:6	boilerplate 36:22 37:6,15 42:16	
57:22 58:3,9,24	69:22 71:2 73:14	bold 67:1	building 3:19
60:22 61:3 64:8,12			bumbling 55:7 bunch 44:1
64:17 72:14 76:12	93:24 99:2,9 bear 12:19	bones 99:4	
79:5,5 86:13 87:17		born 84:20	bundle 31:22 69:7
88:1,3,11,15,19	bed 113:21	bottom 15:3	bunk 55:6,20
89:2,13 93:11,21	began 87:24	bound 42:24	burden 59:2,21
96:9 97:3 99:2,22	begat 87:10	bowling 1:13	62:4 99:22 101:24
100:6 103:19,20	behalf 6:12,19 66:21 91:23 114:18	brain 41:16	103:21 business 35:13
106:21 107:7 109:3		brake 72:4 78:6,7	
109:11 110:2	belabor 52:13	80:20 102:13,14	108:1 115:8
111:15 116:7	believe 17:6 19:19	braking 80:21	buy 18:24
b.r. 28:4,9	43:14,15 45:22	breach 2:25 109:17	buyer 18:8 19:12
baby 85:23 95:20	50:23 55:14 57:20	110:3 117:3,12	54:25 55:2
back 7:10 26:8 29:6	59:4 62:10 95:14 100:8 104:24 105:1	breached 65:18 brief 7:20 17:7,8	buying 19:2
29:25 30:7 33:25,25	100.8 104.24 103.1	20:8 33:12 39:17,24	С
39:2 45:6,9,10 48:1	believed 32:15 60:6	49:9 55:4,4,13 57:3	c 3:1 6:1 57:15 86:9
49:19 51:25 56:7	believes 68:22	57:19,20 58:5,6	111:17 117:1,1
59:7 69:21 77:1	104:6	59:7,7 60:12,17	call 65:24 76:11
82:10 83:24 91:22	bell 81:21	61:2 62:7,20 64:14	84:16
98:16	belong 51:12	65:25 66:5 71:20,21	called 14:7,10,11
background 41:13	belongs 59:21	75:4,9 84:2 87:3	84:17 86:2
backstop 92:15,17	bench 107:21	98:10 100:10,10	calling 41:19
backwards 77:4	beneficial 48:6	102:2,6 103:17,17	camera 21:11 22:11
bad 33:8	beneficiary 53:5	102:2,0 103:17,17	46:9
badly 6:22	benefit 13:25 34:12	briefest 65:4	cap 10:11,24 12:24
bag 19:13 22:1	38:14 44:21 45:13	briefing 15:7 47:12	13:13 51:5 53:13
bald 59:2 103:22	69:5 70:7 90:3	52:12 53:16 62:25	92:12
bankruptcy 1:1,12	benefited 37:24	68:22 75:25	capable 94:7
1:22 9:15,19,23,25	38:9	briefly 73:21 74:20	capping 10:9 11:2
13:21,22,23 14:6	best 33:24 37:8	96:23 108:14	43:25 46:20
15:16 27:2,22 28:8	better 35:20 62:16	briefs 8:16 39:10,14	caps 51:16 52:15
35:9 36:2 38:2 48:5	73:20 85:1 91:10	39:23 49:8 56:17	car 11:11,13,14,15
48:7,15 54:7,23	113:18	63:18	41:6,17 63:20,24
56:14 58:21 99:9,17	beyond 27:24	bring 12:13 43:25	70:6 71:23 73:3
bar 9:24 88:22	bill 87:11,15,16,18	bringing 14:5,12	80:18 90:16,17 93:3
based 10:4 19:16	87:23	27:23 28:10	102:3,20
23:4 24:1 25:21			

[carco - claims] Page 5

carco 60:23	certain 8:11 9:22	68:17 69:9 71:6	14:4,11,19 15:21
care 40:2 69:11	34:7 42:7 80:8	93:3 104:8	16:4,7,20 17:5,19
caring 71:14	certainly 7:19 14:4	choice 108:17	18:19,20 19:15
caring 71.14 cars 80:7 91:1	14:23 15:25 17:15	choose 107:17	20:16 21:13,14
102:16,19	24:22 27:12 30:21	chooses 7:15	22:19,24 23:2,4,8,9
case 1:3 9:5 10:13	30:23 33:10 34:19	circle 56:7	23:10,22 24:25 25:2
10:13 14:2 15:15	35:12 36:14 38:24	circuit 7:15 15:7	26:4,5,6,10,13 27:4
20:22 25:18 26:20	42:14,18,18 43:15	26:15,25 37:16	27:6,7,8,11,12,13
27:3 28:3,10 31:12	44:14 45:4,15 46:3	42:19 44:23 45:21	27:15 28:15,17,21
34:7,18 36:18 38:19	46:24 47:4,12 48:4	56:3,12 57:21 58:1	28:25 29:2 30:2
38:20,23 39:2,11	48:5 49:15 51:23	58:2,25 60:24 61:1	31:4,5,9,18 32:4,7
40:13,19,20,22 41:2	56:8 63:3 70:22	64:12 69:3 85:4	32:23,25 34:2,5,15
41:5,7,24 44:8,9,12	72:17 77:25 79:25	86:11 88:9,16,22	34:25 35:7,10 37:7
45:13,19 47:10,11	80:4,6 81:7 86:24	99:1,16 109:5	37:10,11,11 38:3
48:16,18 50:10	87:6 88:6 89:4 91:1	circuit's 26:18	39:8 42:5 43:2,5,18
53:14 54:1 55:7,12	93:9 94:3,16 100:4	64:15 83:25 98:22	43:24 44:5,25 46:6
55:14,20,25,25	101:2 102:23	circumstance 110:6	46:17,18,19,20
56:11 57:17 60:21	104:21 105:5	circumstances 30:4	47:25 48:1,16 50:6
63:3,5,11 67:24	certified 117:9,13	49:15 58:19 59:1,8	50:8,8,18,25 51:4,8
68:2,12,24 69:2	certify 117:3	60:22 62:6,8 72:18	51:15,17 52:3,4,8,9
70:13 74:2 83:3,4,5	cet 117:9	88:24 103:13	52:14,15,23 53:4,12
83:6,6,7,7 84:3,7,8	challenging 54:19	circumstantial 78:4	53:14,20,21,25 54:4
84:8,9,9,10,20 85:3	chambers 113:9	circumvent 57:14	54:10,12,14,17,25
86:7,18 87:1 88:10	chance 82:3 108:19	citation 71:23 98:23	54:25 55:3,17,24
88:11,24 90:3,15	change 13:8 45:5	102:9	57:8 60:19 62:10
92:24 96:5 97:4	73:11	citations 101:12	69:19,19,21 70:10
99:7,8 103:7,8	changed 73:11	cite 15:10 20:8 28:3	76:7,8 80:17 83:10
106:3 107:14	chapter 48:10,11	28:4,4,6 38:25	83:12 89:16 90:2
108:12,13 109:1,13	53:1,2	45:17 47:3 57:18	91:19 92:14,16
109:16 110:4	character 9:5 18:22	58:6 64:14 84:1,4,5	94:14 96:21 99:19
case's 20:21	59:17 67:10,11	84:11 87:2	104:21 111:6
cases 53:2 55:6,8	100:3 106:23	cited 15:7 17:7	claimant 9:23 26:9
58:5 64:14 69:2	characterization	25:16 26:24 27:3	27:14 47:22 52:24
78:3 81:21 82:21	55:5 62:16	33:12 39:10 45:13	claimant's 27:6
86:3 88:2 100:5	characterizes 79:22	55:12 56:5 61:2	claimants 10:8
107:7	characterizing	68:25 71:24 100:5	17:19 25:19 26:2
cash 32:14 33:6,21	57:15	108:13	34:10,13,14 35:8,17
38:10	cheaply 18:24	cites 27:22 55:6,21	37:24 38:16 47:22
cashed 33:18	chevrolet 63:20,21	55:21 84:1,7	51:2,22 52:2 74:15
cat 22:1	63:22,24 71:24,25	citing 37:5 55:15	92:16
category 70:13 86:5	102:5,15 103:4	68:17 84:8 102:11	claiming 74:3
cats 19:12	child 68:14,16,20	civil 39:4,4 47:2	claims 7:2,2,4,7 8:6
cause 62:12	69:10,11,12,12 70:5	87:15	8:9,10,20 16:19
caused 44:2 73:6	70:7	claim 2:2 7:24 8:1,2	18:23,24 19:2,12
causes 8:21	children 11:12,13	8:6,12,25 9:11,24	21:13,16 23:14,23
cert 117:13	11:14,15,23 47:6	10:2,3,4,12,23	25:19 29:7,13 31:12
	51:2,10,13 52:11	11:17 13:11,18,21	32:2,5,13 34:23
		ral Solutions	1

[claims - contract] Page 6

25.14.10.26.1.11	-l 20.11.40.6		
35:14,18 36:1,11	closer 20:11 40:6 closest 38:22	complaint 69:16,17 69:20 82:22 95:17	congressional 60:9 connect 101:1
38:1,7,9,12 46:13			
50:20 51:1,9,11,12	closing 62:22,24	98:20 100:14,18	connection 57:6 67:4 98:2
51:16 52:4,13,14,16	75:14 104:9	101:13,16 104:3,4	
52:25 53:10,10,11	code 48:5	complete 93:12,15	conscious 114:14
53:11 55:10,11,18	coe 61:1 98:22 99:1	112:12	consent 8:14,20
56:2 65:23 71:12,13	99:4,6,8	completely 60:7	18:8
75:20,23 85:24	coexist 45:24	66:1,7 88:16	consented 66:23
104:10 110:15	coherent 72:17	compliance 113:4	conserved 74:21
clarification 69:5	collective 114:21	113:11,15	consider 67:23
69:14	collectively 58:15	complied 114:4	consideration 16:3
clarifies 105:2	colloquy 53:22	comply 6:24 61:13	16:4 25:5 28:21
clarify 51:22 70:16	65:22 112:8	61:14 95:7	29:3,19 30:19,24
75:3,21 105:6	come 9:7 12:15	components 80:8	33:6 35:2 69:6,7
class 24:14 63:1	24:16 47:23 68:4	computed 11:16	111:17,18,18
80:23 91:2	73:19 74:20 76:19	concentrate 49:23	consist 106:24
classic 63:20,23	99:25 100:9 101:17	concept 26:12	consolidated
71:25 72:3 73:5	103:22 110:13	concern 34:8,11	101:13,16
77:14,20,20 102:5	114:13	81:16 113:2	consortium 71:9
103:5	comes 93:1	concerning 10:5	constantly 101:4
clause 36:10 52:1	comfortable 47:23	16:2 19:8 26:23	constitutional
clauses 57:14	coming 48:10 51:20	27:8,13 33:10 42:6	42:22 47:18
cleaner 27:4	comment 111:19	42:17 43:8 77:5,13	consultation 56:11
clear 52:19 57:11	commentary 97:19	88:14 95:15 102:7	contact 113:11
60:20 61:2 62:3,21	comments 49:7,9	concerns 41:5	contained 45:15
64:16,19 68:10	75:3	concluded 115:13	66:18
101:11 106:12	committed 81:2	conclusory 95:9,18	contains 66:11
113:2	committee 8:14,20	conditions 67:6	contemplate 68:6
clearly 69:1 88:19	communicate	conduct 28:13	content 36:9
clerk 115:1,2	113:13	35:13 47:14 79:24	contention 16:8
client 17:11 21:5,25		92:9	24:2 54:4 67:9
43:13 44:14 49:13	71:9	conducted 13:22	contentions 95:14
50:4 52:22 53:16,17	company 1:7 3:3	conducting 34:14	contents 19:8 24:20
54:5 56:8,13 57:7	6:4,16 32:15 61:8	35:4	contested 10:4
58:13,14,15 60:4,5	70:23 84:10 101:8	confer 111:4,9,14	13:12,18 28:17 50:6
61:23 62:2 63:17	102:15 104:25	conference 13:17	95:2
64:5 100:19 101:2,2	105:2	confess 64:9	context 85:1 109:24
101:20 102:20	comparable 110:24	confidential 21:21	110:3
103:2	compared 51:17	22:20,21 23:9	continuation 63:21
client's 25:1 57:2	compensate 91:18	confidentiality	continue 30:11
59:25 60:7 62:1,10	compensation 69:9	24:10,21 111:3,5,16	56:15
93:5 101:7,24 102:4	70:10	confirm 107:7	continues 17:14
103:13,21	complain 33:8	confirmed 53:1	60:15 102:11 105:4
clients 14:11 18:5	complained 74:16	conflates 59:22	continuing 37:21
20:1 62:15 73:25	90:25	confused 18:1 70:2	contract 48:18
close 74:24 108:1,9	complaining 90:18	congregation 86:8	85:13
	96:11		

[contracts - davis] Page 7

contracts 85:9,19	counsels 45:12	50:17,20,24 51:20	courtroom 56:10
contractual 65:19	count 39:22	52:7 54:23 56:19	75:2
contrary 77:23	counting 109:6	57:5,7,11 58:2,17	courts 7:14 42:24
100:6	country 91:24	58:24 59:9,13,16,23	56:25 67:9 68:7
contrasted 79:16	114:19 117:21	60:2,11 61:6,10,20	95:2
control 77:5,6,14,17	county 71:4	63:4 64:1,20,24	covenant 110:4
77:20,25 78:1 80:20	couple 12:2 65:11	65:2 66:3 67:8,14	coverage 92:13
94:17,17 95:25	77:6 113:23	68:25 69:4,24 70:2	craft 42:24
controversy 73:1	coupled 107:19	70:19 71:17 72:9,14	crash 78:8,13
convenient 33:4	course 6:10 7:13	72:19,23 73:3,15,19	created 90:17
conveniently 59:22	8:25 9:15,18 13:14	73:25 74:8,10,18,22	creates 88:22 89:19
converse 19:20	22:1,12 26:19 28:23	74:24 76:4,17,22,24	credit 92:5
converted 44:17	43:13 44:9,10 46:19	77:1,9 78:18 80:17	creditor 32:7
88:18	81:4 91:20 94:25	81:7,14,16,19 82:6	creditors 8:14,20
convincing 61:1	106:1	82:9,18,20,25 83:13	18:18,19 38:7 58:18
72:15,17	court 1:1,12 6:2,9	83:17,20,23 84:1,5	62:12
copies 16:14,21	6:14,17,21,24 8:10	84:12,19,22,22,25	criticizing 69:2
21:9 39:9	8:13,16,24 9:1,2,25	85:18 87:2,12,14,24	cross 109:25
copy 10:7 12:2	10:5,7,14,17,20,22	89:6,10,12 91:7,7	cruise 77:6,17,25
16:13 113:9	11:9,16,19,22,25	91:11,13,22 92:2	80:20 94:17
copying 113:14	12:4,13,19,21 13:1	93:12,17,22,22 94:4	crutcher 3:2
core 33:9	13:3,6,23,23 14:7	94:6,12,24,25 95:6	cumbersome 15:1
corollary 74:8	15:1,6,11,12,15,20	95:9,16,16,18 96:2	cursory 63:6
corporate 43:21	15:23 16:8,18,24	96:8,14,19,22 97:1	d
correct 10:21 11:20	17:3,10,12,15,21,24	97:9,12,17,20 98:4	d 6:1 12:7 116:1
11:24 15:13 28:6	18:4,9,21 19:1,10	98:9,24 99:9,11,14	117:9,13
39:16,21 50:23	19:17 20:4,6,9,10	99:17,23 100:3,12	damages 71:4,5,8
51:24 60:13 68:10	20:11,13,19,22 21:6	100:15,15 101:2,6	dan 6:18
72:12 76:13 79:20	21:22 22:12,13,16	101:18,21 103:1,11	daniel 4:13
85:7 93:7 95:24,24	23:11,14 24:2,13	103:22 104:4 105:8	date 9:24 12:17
105:15,18 107:8	25:8,14,16,20,22	105:10,20,21 106:5	117:15
corrected 78:21,22	26:11,24,25 27:1,16	106:16,18,23,24	dated 11:5 41:2
78:22	27:19,21,22 28:2,5	108:3,6,9,16,21,25	84:8
corrective 113:5	29:1,5,10,12,15,18	109:25 110:2,7,11	davidson 3:15 6:12
correspond 51:1,2	29:21,24 30:6,20	110:12,17,23 111:2	davis 4:1,6 6:7,7,9
corresponding	31:10,16,21,25 32:4	111:10,24 112:1	6:22 9:7,8 10:16,19
100:12	32:10,17,20 33:12	113:1,3 114:1,3,6,9	10:21,23 11:11,18
costs 71:13	34:21,23 35:5,6,13	114:13,16,24 115:2	11:20,23 12:1,8,15
counsel 19:25 20:13	36:6,16,23 37:3	115:7,11	12:16,20,23 13:2,5
21:1 31:15 39:9	38:5,17,23,23,24	court's 10:25 25:17	13:7 14:7,23 15:13
42:1 67:3 77:23	39:10,13,16,19,22	27:2 28:10 34:8	16:10,20 17:2,9,14
80:13 90:11 108:20	40:1,5,10,17,23,25	41:23 42:15 45:23	18:16,25 19:3,10,14
111:4,9 112:6	41:12,22 42:3,7,9	74:5,14 89:13 90:8	20:9,13,18,20 22:22
114:18	42:22 44:3 45:5,8	94:3 96:16	23:3,12,18,21 24:3
counsel's 77:7,23	45:13,16,25 46:2,8	courtcall 115:10,11	24:17 25:12,15,25
78:17 81:12 87:12	46:11,22,25 48:10	115:12	26:11,19 27:18,20
88:1	48:20,23 49:3 50:14		27:25 28:3,6 29:8

[davis - dispositive] Page 8

29:11,17,19,23 30:5	debate 75:19	defines 52:3	dips 34:21
30:9 31:14,20,24	debt 32:15	demand 26:5	directly 84:8
32:3,9,12,19,22	debtor 1:9 10:10	demonstrate 44:6	disagree 54:8 56:24
34:22 35:1 36:6,14	11:6 13:25 18:19	93:6,8 95:23	82:12
36:17 38:5,15,18,19	27:13 35:3 48:9,9	demonstrated 44:2	disagreed 56:3
39:11,15,18,21,24	debtors 18:18	47:9 58:12 81:6	disallowed 25:18
40:18,21 41:1,2	deceased 11:8 51:1	demonstrates 42:21	disclaimed 85:22
48:20,22 49:2,12,21	decide 7:15 14:8,10	demonstrating 75:9	disclaimers 86:6
49:24 50:3 51:12,19	46:1,1 59:17 111:11	denial 30:4 99:10	disclose 23:21 42:2
51:23 52:20 53:23	decided 26:15 103:9	99:15	42:11 48:9 64:5
54:18 55:5,14,20	deciding 109:25	denied 110:2	disclosed 18:13
56:5,22 57:1,5,19	decision 14:15 22:3	deny 58:9 97:22,23	20:13 23:18
57:25 58:11 59:21	26:12,15,21 27:2	denying 106:21	disclosing 22:22
59:22 60:1,15,21	30:14 40:24 55:21	dependent 30:15	23:7
61:5,12,19,21 62:1	60:23 61:2 62:21	deposition 77:24	disclosure 18:7,12
64:7 65:8 66:6	63:14 64:7,15,19	93:20 102:24 107:6	18:17 19:23 20:1
67:23 68:24 70:24	68:11 74:5,14 79:18	depositions 77:8,12	22:2 36:12 48:17
71:22 72:9 73:16	88:9 98:22 104:13	81:15 82:2 106:21	disclosures 87:25
75:21 77:2,3 79:19	109:5,9 112:15	107:4 116:7	disconnect 115:10
81:20 82:5,8,13,19	decisions 27:23	described 17:17	discontinued 63:22
82:24 83:2,16,19,21	107:20	deserve 48:14	discover 86:21
83:24 84:7,15,20,24	decisis 74:11,12	designated 114:17	discoverable 81:10
85:2,7,18 86:7	76:8	designation 63:25	81:12
87:16 91:16,25	declaration 64:1	designed 87:17 89:4	discovered 41:9
93:15,16 94:1,11,15	75:8 104:3,16	96:5	87:21 113:7
95:13,21 96:11,15	deemed 21:11 53:14	desire 55:10 107:13	discovery 9:16,20
96:25 98:15,19	114:3	despite 81:12	13:22,24 14:1,18
100:5,9,17 101:1	defect 44:3 47:10	destruction 43:17	34:1 47:2 58:12
103:11,18 104:4,9	59:24 74:4,16 75:16	detail 103:16	59:3,6 60:19 61:6
108:17,20	75:23 78:3 80:17	determination	61:13,14,18 64:14
davis's 54:4 56:8,13	83:3,5,8,10 93:9	61:20	77:11 78:23 79:3,10
58:25 59:5,11 62:10	94:9 101:21 104:5	determine 111:15	79:25 80:11 81:17
63:7,16,17 64:5	104:10	determined 99:17	82:16,23 86:22 91:3
65:24 67:9 73:25	defects 14:3 77:6	development 68:5	92:9 94:22 96:19
102:3	78:4,11 80:7 90:17	dictates 57:15	100:20 101:23
dawn 2:25 117:3,8	90:25	difference 18:4	discuss 59:8
day 46:25 78:13	defendant 16:5 41:7	22:18	discussed 15:25
105:7 112:15	defendant's 41:7	different 23:10	77:7,25 81:14 102:4
days 10:10 34:6	defendants 42:1,10	31:25 32:1,11 60:7	102:19 103:16
94:2	42:11 44:11 63:15	63:24,25 68:15	discussing 36:8
deal 45:7 69:13	defense 42:1 81:1	70:12 72:1,1,20	discussion 12:3
dealing 35:14 75:12	83:12 93:7	73:1,3,9,13,13,14	14:17,25 25:9 29:9
deals 62:9 64:17	defenses 27:12	78:20 79:4 94:9	77:10 78:14 87:6
106:23	defer 91:9 108:20	differently 58:19	94:22 96:16 98:13
death 10:8 35:8,17	deferring 96:25	difficult 78:17	dismiss 20:23 21:4
35:24 51:9 52:10,11	defined 53:11 54:12	85:21	dispositive 35:6
71:7	74:4,7,16		41:19
106:23 death 10:8 35:8,17 35:24 51:9 52:10,11	defer 91:9 108:20 deferring 96:25 defined 53:11 54:12	differently 58:19 difficult 78:17 85:21	94:22 96:16 98 dismiss 20:23 dispositive 35:

disprove 83:12	don't 110:19	effectively 86:19	87:16 89:4,12,12
dispute 21:21 46:5	doris 2:1	effects 67:6	104:13
48:19 104:12	dots 101:1	effectuated 48:12	equitably 62:11
disputed 59:17	double 34:21	efforts 107:1	equity 89:5
disputes 61:17	doubting 30:22	eighth 3:20	equivalent 91:18
disputing 94:20	dover 8:3 16:9 19:1	either 23:12 26:4	especially 6:23 69:5
distinction 70:16	20:15 21:16,17,19	59:5 71:1 81:21,25	78:19
distribution 53:6	22:4,10 23:17 28:11	85:10 96:9 98:7	esq 3:7,14,15,23 4:6
distributions 52:21	28:24 29:6,25 30:21	99:25 107:8,23	4:13,14,21 5:6
52:24 53:9	31:1 33:17,18,19,22	electrical 72:5	essence 69:18
district 1:2 20:21	45:6,6,10 50:4,7	electronic 117:9,13	essentially 26:3
26:23 28:4 55:8,21	54:25 55:2	element 65:17	30:20 31:7 41:22
55:25 56:12 113:3	draw 78:9 79:15	68:13	50:5 87:19
divide 19:17 24:15	drive 77:21	eleventh 107:15	establish 15:8 55:22
division 24:15,23	driven 75:5	emphasize 93:4	60:10,21 103:10
docket 17:6 20:8	driver 78:8 81:1	encourage 102:1	established 62:1
doctrine 93:21	102:14	104:15	estate 23:15 34:23
document 12:22	driving 63:19 102:4	endorsed 113:1	38:13
17:2,3,12 19:8	102:21	114:3	estates 71:7
23:18 25:10 28:25	due 30:4 42:22 47:1	energy 49:23	evaluate 41:8
53:25 66:18 101:5,5	47:18 61:24 62:1	engage 24:15	evaluating 41:12
111:13	74:14 86:16 89:14	engaged 26:2 86:22	event 27:5 30:10
documentary 100:1	duly 66:21	enron 25:16 26:12	92:17 105:14 106:7
documentation	dunn 3:2 6:16	26:21,23 27:3,3,22	events 68:15
44:6	duped 35:22 36:7	28:4,7,7 68:11	eventually 33:18
documented 101:12	duty 42:11 58:22,23	enter 86:1 97:13,14	everybody 66:16
documents 9:17,22	81:8	97:23,24 98:6	76:17 113:8
10:1 14:2 16:6	e	entered 8:8 14:9	evidence 16:19 17:5
20:24 24:18 34:1	e 1:20,20,21 3:1,1	54:24 94:7 97:6,8	17:18 38:3 43:17
37:9 38:2 43:4,19	6:1,1 45:17 57:17	109:22 112:14	44:1,11 53:20,24
43:21 46:7,9,12,14	57:17 116:1 117:1	entering 36:8	55:24 60:25 61:4
47:3,8 48:2,18 50:1	earlier 30:2 40:2,3	enterprises 84:3	62:6 72:15,17 75:7
50:10,11 56:11 61:4	49:7 51:7 59:4 72:6	85:2	87:21 92:25 94:24
71:2 77:22 78:9,10	75:3 99:1,3 102:25	entire 46:23 66:11	99:21 100:1,9
78:16 79:22 80:3,9	107:2,3,11	71:21	101:14 106:20
80:19,21,22,24 81:1	earn 70:8	entirely 63:24	110:2 116:6
81:9,10,11 83:11	earned 71:10	entitled 34:2 46:4	evident 57:1
86:23 87:1,9 90:14		48:19 52:22 53:5	evidentiary 81:23
01 2 7 02 24 02 0	easier 33.13 VO.1		
91:3,5 92:24 93:8	easier 35:13 80:1 easily 45:24	96:8 103:18 107:16	94:23,25 95:1,5,8
91:3,5 92:24 93:8 94:5 95:23 96:12	easily 45:24	entity 92:11	94:23,25 95:1,5,8 95:19 99:25 105:17
94:5 95:23 96:12 101:19 102:12	easily 45:24 economic 5:2 46:3	entity 92:11 entry 98:2	95:19 99:25 105:17 107:5
94:5 95:23 96:12 101:19 102:12 doing 20:25 22:4	easily 45:24 economic 5:2 46:3 114:18	entity 92:11 entry 98:2 enumerated 57:13	95:19 99:25 105:17 107:5 exactly 37:1 38:14
94:5 95:23 96:12 101:19 102:12 doing 20:25 22:4 43:3 66:25 82:3	easily 45:24 economic 5:2 46:3 114:18 education 70:8	entity 92:11 entry 98:2 enumerated 57:13 enunciated 60:23	95:19 99:25 105:17 107:5 exactly 37:1 38:14 39:5 69:13 85:14
94:5 95:23 96:12 101:19 102:12 doing 20:25 22:4 43:3 66:25 82:3 89:24	easily 45:24 economic 5:2 46:3 114:18 education 70:8 effect 10:25 26:16	entity 92:11 entry 98:2 enumerated 57:13 enunciated 60:23 99:3	95:19 99:25 105:17 107:5 exactly 37:1 38:14 39:5 69:13 85:14 examination 110:1
94:5 95:23 96:12 101:19 102:12 doing 20:25 22:4 43:3 66:25 82:3 89:24 dollar 23:17	easily 45:24 economic 5:2 46:3 114:18 education 70:8 effect 10:25 26:16 87:22	entity 92:11 entry 98:2 enumerated 57:13 enunciated 60:23 99:3 equally 62:23 108:3	95:19 99:25 105:17 107:5 exactly 37:1 38:14 39:5 69:13 85:14 examination 110:1 example 35:8 62:16
94:5 95:23 96:12 101:19 102:12 doing 20:25 22:4 43:3 66:25 82:3 89:24	easily 45:24 economic 5:2 46:3 114:18 education 70:8 effect 10:25 26:16	entity 92:11 entry 98:2 enumerated 57:13 enunciated 60:23 99:3	95:19 99:25 105:17 107:5 exactly 37:1 38:14 39:5 69:13 85:14 examination 110:1

[exception - fraud] Page 10

exception 61:7	42:7,8 45:20 59:8	feel 6:22 47:23	flawed 93:23
64:13	59:17 61:9,17 68:4	feld 4:8 6:19	flip 7:20
exceptional 59:1,8	72:10 75:18,24	felt 35:20	flop 7:20
60:21 62:5,8 72:18	77:17 78:4 79:2	ferman 112:5,14,21	flow 110:21
excerpt 115:4	95:6 96:3 102:20	113:11,14	flushed 78:19
exchange 19:6	103:5 104:9 107:18	ferman's 113:8	focus 8:23 14:21
31:17 36:3	107:19 113:4	fiduciary 58:22	28:11
exchanged 33:21	facts 38:20,24,25	fifth 45:21 69:3	folks 6:21 62:17
excuse 18:19 21:2	47:16 49:20 59:23	figure 13:9 21:5	110:7
39:3 80:10	74:4,6,7,17 79:9,15	91:19	follow 23:11 45:19
execute 65:16	81:5,23 88:18 89:11	figures 24:22	following 52:3
executed 15:5	93:22 95:8,17,19	file 9:23 40:19	99:14
109:22	102:8 107:3	43:16 108:15	follows 86:24 99:17
executes 66:19	factual 41:13 72:7	filed 2:1 9:19 10:12	100:18
executing 54:4 67:5	95:7	17:6 20:22 24:19	foot 106:9
exercise 24:15	fail 56:12 61:25	39:16 43:24 46:22	footnote 25:17
exhibit 12:7 17:7	failed 42:1 79:8	51:4 52:2,15 53:17	26:24 27:25 62:20
36:25 104:3,16,23	99:21	53:17 54:1 56:25	105:2 106:9 109:4,4
105:1	failure 9:25 43:12	57:6 69:19 72:9	foregoing 117:4
exhibits 64:1 75:8	61:16,16,17 72:4,5	87:12,24 100:14	forgive 7:21 14:7
exist 9:17	94:13	104:4 109:7,10	38:5 66:3 87:14
existed 45:11 80:9	fair 74:18 94:4	filing 12:7 13:21	form 42:15 52:25
107:9	fairly 34:2 39:7	87:10	former 77:22
existence 83:20	92:24	filings 87:10	forth 52:25 53:10
86:25 113:7	fairness 38:15	final 53:12 58:10	58:4 82:10 95:7
existing 62:12	faith 15:23 16:1	61:21 71:19 104:18	forward 63:23 79:8
expect 30:23 33:23	falls 8:13	finality 68:8,9	99:25 100:9
45:8	false 36:12	finally 63:2	found 39:11 59:23
expert 64:10 77:13	familiar 67:12	finance 90:2	79:17 88:19
81:15	87:14	financial 35:15	foundation 83:18
experts 77:12	families 35:15	find 38:22 50:14	four 7:1 10:18 11:9
explain 7:23 91:10	family 7:5 31:19	56:4 83:18 86:2	11:11,14,24 13:1,3
exposed 92:19,20	32:16 44:18	88:24 89:6,10 111:3	13:13 29:7 50:20,25
exposure 22:10	far 58:1 65:18	finding 95:9	51:1,10 52:11 58:6
92:12	103:6 112:23	fine 25:12,25 30:11	86:6 104:7
expounding 68:1	fast 78:24	76:21,23 113:17	fourth 49:1
express 114:21	fatal 102:7	firm 16:9 104:22	fox 55:13
extent 17:9 74:3,12	favor 89:7,7	first 6:5 9:7 10:3	frankly 9:5 21:3,12
75:14,22 76:6 94:12	favorably 25:16	49:11 50:3 60:25	31:15 47:20 94:15
102:24 105:4,25,25	26:24	79:19 84:3 85:19	fraud 8:24 9:1,2
112:10,18	february 7:11 10:6	95:10 108:13	26:3 34:16 55:10,19
extreme 81:3	94:3	fits 64:8	57:2,8 60:19 79:7,9
f	fed 85:4 86:11	five 13:4	79:11,16 83:6,15,20
f 1:20 117:1	98:23	fix 73:8,9	87:7,21 88:20 90:2
face 63:5	federal 39:5 41:21	fixed 38:8	96:9,11 98:2,8
fact 9:22 32:13	95:2,3 100:15	flaw 102:7	109:18
33:16,20 36:13,19			
		•	

[fraudulent - hereto] Page 11

Traught 86:15.20 given 9:21 15:15 37:9,12 48:2 49:7 freeman 4:16 117:12 53:15 66:22,25 67:6 70:11 115:5 108:8,31 108:8,31 108:8,33.5 18:22 20:15 22:4,10 23:17 34:24 50:4,7 54:25 55:2 19:4 23:15 24:18 85:23 28:7 28:7 200d 6:2,15,18 9:8 15:23 16:1 63:10 23:17 34:24 50:4,7 54:25 55:2 19:4 23:15 24:18 85:23 28:13 31:12 33:4,20 38:1.6 43:15,18,21 28:13 31:12 33:4,20 38:1.6 43:15,18,21 55:28 53:24 54:2,24 62:18 63:4 68:22 61:31,13 63:18 64:3 58:13,13 58:18 60:20 61:8,10 62:18 63:4 68:22 69:13 111:20 77:12 80:5,14,14,25 14:11 115:8 81:187:24 88:4 89:7 90:15 92:11,14 29:19 97:12,17,17 101:10,11,14 102:6 102:8,12 104:20 107:13 20:29 general 3:10 6:3,12 33:23 52:25 34:1 33:13 6:3,12 33:23 52:20 58:20 103:24 32:23 32:2,6 50:8 50:215 103:3 36:91:1 30:15 91:25 96:12 30:23 31:0,12,21 66:17 59:125 96:12 30:23 31:10,12,21 30:15 91:25 96:12 30:23 31:10,12,21 30:15 91:25 96:12 30:23 31:10,12,21 30:15 91:25 96:12 30:23 31:10,12,21 30:15 91:25 96:12 30:23 31:10,12,21 36:33 33:17 108:17 30:89 19 92:11,16 94:21 108:17 04:21 108:18 04:21 108:18 04:21 108:18 04	6 11 4 27 7	1155	110.22	110 00 114 05
Fraught 86:15,20 freeman 4:16 mil 17:12 53:15 66:22,25 67:670:11 fils 17:12 53:15 66:22,25 67:670:11 gives 40:2 giving 16:6 21:8 40:18 68:24 76:18 85:23 gm 8:9,19 14:2 19:2 19:4 23:15 24:18 28:13 31:12 33:4,20 28:17 34:24 50:4,7 54:25 55:2 19:4 23:15 24:18 28:13 31:12 33:4,20 28:11 120 29:13 111:20 13:18 114:23 29:14 29:24,5,12 29:4,5,12 29:4,5,12 29:4,5,12 29:4 23:15 24:18 29:24,5,12 29:4 23:15 24:18 29:24,5,12 29:4 23:15 24:19 29:22 23:10 54:7,14 55:15 58:6 99:20 102:15 103:3 galveston 71:4 gap 88:17 garvin 64:15 gather 39:20 general 31:0 6:3,12 31:2 32:2,6 50:8 52:16 54:7,14 55:15 58:6 100:22 10:17 generalized 85:22 86:4 generally 22:6 74:9 77:18.19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 3:10.12,21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 3:10.12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:21 88:69 90:8 91:9 91:11 69:21 10:29 68:23 83:17 108:17 69:21 10:29	fraudulent 27:7	115:5	110:22	112:22 114:25
Freeman 4:16 full 17:12 53:15 66:22.25 67:6 70:11 17:12 53:15 66:22.25 67:6 70:11 17:15 58:13.35 18:22 20:15 22:4,10 23:17 34:24 50:4,7 54:25 55:2 fund 7:5 8:3,3,5 fund 8:52.4 76:18 85:23 gm 8:9,19 14:2 19:2 19:4 23:15 24:18 423:15 24:18 65:17 100:22 133:1,2 33:4,20 65:17 100:22 38:1,6 43:15,18,21 47:5 53:6 58:13,13 53:23 54:21,24 62:18 63:4 68:22 62:18 63:4 68:22 62:18 63:4 68:22 62:18 63:4 68:22 62:18 101:20 17:12 80:5,14,14,25 14:11 115:8 future 35:8,8,22 92:4,5,12 92:19 97:12,17,17 101:10,11,14 102:6 102:8,12 104:20 107:13 gm's 14:12 17:7 31:19,21 33:8 43:7 47:3 56:14 75:10 83:24 97:22 103:17 general 31:0 6:3,12 32:2,26 50:8 52:16 54:7,14 55:15 58:15 98:6 100:22 104:19 gentlemen 21:7 general 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3: 26:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:9 23:18 27:21 29:29 23:18 27:21 29:29 23:18 27:21 29:29 23:18 27:21 29:29 23:18 27:21 29:29 23:18 27:21 29:29 23:18 27:21 29:29 23:18 27:21 29:29 23:18 27:21 29:29 23:18 27:21 29:29 23:18 27:21 29:92 29:10 54:17 108:17 68:21 66:22 51:0 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:21 66:22 51:0 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:21 66:22 51:0 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:21 66:22 51:0 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:21 66:22 51:0 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:21 66:22 51:0 68:22 83:317 108:17 68:21 66:22 51:0 68:22 83:317 108:17 68:21 66:22 51:0 68:22 83:317 108:17 68:21 66:22 51:0 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:21 66:22 51:0 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:22 65:10 68:22 83:317 108:17 68:22 65:10 6		0		
Till 17:12 53:15 66:22,25 67:6 70:11 gives 40:2 giving 16:6 21:8 40:18 68:24 76:18 85:23 31:7 34:24 50:47 54:25 55:2 19:4 23:15 24:18 85:23 114:14 20:25 177 100:22 19:4 23:15 24:18 28:13 31:12 33:4,20 38:1,6 43:15,18,21 47:5 53:6 58:13,13 53:23 54:21,24 62:18 63:4 68:22 62:18 63:4 68:22 62:18 63:4 68:22 62:18 63:4 68:22 13:11:20 77:12 80:5,14,14,25 114:11 115:8 81:18 82:4 88:4 89:19 97:12,11,18 92:19 97:12,17 78:16 82:16 47:24 89:19 97:12,17 78:16 82:16 79:19 97:12,17 78:10 88:17 78:10 82:10 78:10 82:20 78:10 82:10 77:11,24 81:14 79:22		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
66:22,25 67:6 70:11 115:5 fund 7:5 8:3,3,5 fund 7:5 8:3,3,5 fil:2 20:15 22:4;10 23:17 34:24 50:4,7 54:25 55:2 gm 8:9,19 14:2 19:2 19:4 23:15 24:18 85:23 gm 8:9,19 14:2 19:2 19:4 23:15 24:18 good win 3:17 65:17 100:22 further 17:18 53:17 38:1,6 43:15,18,21 47:5 53:6 58:13,13 53:23 54:21,24 58:18 60:20 61:8,13 62:18 81:10 102:2 further 17:18 53:17 58:18 60:20 61:8,13 62:18 81:10 102:2 further 17:18 53:8,22 92:4,5,12 92:4,5,12 92:19 97:12,17,17 fol:10,11,14 102:6 102:8,12 104:20 general 3:10 6:3,12 31:22 32:2,6 50:8 52:16 54:7,14 55:15 58:15 98:6 100:22 10:7 generalized 85:22 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 2:3 18:27:21 29:29 23:18 27:21 29:62 50:20 30:2 38:10 10.2:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 69:41 108:17 69:40 108:17		,		1 2 2
Tib:5				
fund 7:5 8:3,3,5 40:18 68:24 76:18 15:23 16:163:10 happens 38:16 18:22 20:15 22:4,10 23:17 34:24 50:47 54:25 55:2 19:4 23:15 24:18 20:23:17 34:24 50:47 54:25 55:2 19:4 23:15 24:18 20:24:11:14:14 77:11,24 81:14 77:11,24 81:14 77:11,24 81:14 95:22 77:11,24 81:14 95:22 hard 21:9 38:19 77:11,24 81:14 95:22 hard 21:9 38:19 77:11,24 81:14 95:22 hard 21:9 38:19 77:11,24 81:14 95:29 hard 21:9 38:19 77:11,24 81:14 95:22 hard 21:9 38:19 77:11,24 81:14 95:22 hard 21:9 38:19 77:11,24 81:14 95:22 hard 21:9 38:19 70:3 101:14 pare 21:14	· ·			
18:22 20:15 22:4,10 23:17 34:24 50:4,7 54:25 55:2 19:4 23:15 24:18 28:13 31:12 33:4,20 38:1,6 43:15,18,21 47:5 53:6 58:13,13 53:23 54:21,24 62:18 63:4 68:22 69:13 111:20 77:12 80:5,14,14,25 114:11 115:8 81:1 87:24 88:4 89:7 90:15 92:11,18 92:4,5,12 10:28,12 10:20 107:13 29:88:17 29:45,512				
23:17 34:24 50:4.7 54:25 55:2 19:4 23:15 24:18 28:13 31:12 33:4;20 56:17 100:22 38:1,6 43:15,18.2 47:5 53:6 58:13,13 53:23 54:21,24 62:18 63:4 68:22 69:13 111:20 77:12 80:5,14,14,25 81:1 87:24 88:4 80:7 90:15 92:11,16 92:19 97:12,17,17 101:10,11,14 102:6 102:8,12 104:20 107:13 29:19 97:12,17,17 29:5 102:15 103:3 29:19 97:12,17,17 29:19 97:12,17,17 31:19,21 33:8 43:7 47:3 56:14 75:10 83:24 97:22 103:17 29:19 58:15 98:10 23:2,6 50:8 52:16 54:7,14 55:15 58:15 98:6 100:22 101:7 20:6 102:18 20:6 50:18 109:18 20:6 55:16 67:21 82:6 99:20 102:18 20:15 91:25 96:12 20:80 3:2 6:16 20:2 13:2 23:2,6 50:8 30:2 31:10,12,21 20:80 3:2 6:16 20:2 13:2 23:2,6 50:8 23:17 30:15 91:25 96:12 20:80 3:2 6:16 20:2 33:12 0:2 59:2 92:11,16 20:2 33:12 0:2 59:2 92:11,16 20:2 33:12 0:2 59:2 92:11,16 20:2 33:110,12,21 20:2 13:1 33:15 91:25 96:12 20:8 91:9 92:11,16 20:2 110 22:6 25:10 20:2 62:10 9:2 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 20:2 11.10 22:6 25:10 20:2 62:10 9:2 11.16 20:2 11.10 22:6 25:10 20:2 62:10 9:2 11.16 20:2 13 20:2 66:2 20:10 22:10		40:18 68:24 76:18	15:23 16:1 63:10	
54:25 55:2	18:22 20:15 22:4,10		86:21 88:10 102:2	110
fundamental 7:17 65:17 100:22 38:1,6 43:15,18,21 47:5 53:6 58:13,13 53:23 54:21,24 60:18 63:4 68:22 60:18 63:4 68:22 60:13 111:20 77:12 80:5,14,14,25 114:11 115:8 81:1 87:24 88:4 89:7 90:15 92:11,18 92:19 97:12,17,17 101:10,11,14 102:6 102:8,12 104:20 107:13 109:18 109:18 111:2 113:11 109:18 111:2 113:11 109:18 113:3 113	23:17 34:24 50:4,7	gm 8:9,19 14:2 19:2	114:14	77:11,24 81:14
65:17 100:22 further 17:18 53:17 38:1,6 43:15,18,21 47:5 53:6 58:13,13 53:23 54:21,24 62:18 63:4 68:22 66:13,13 63:18 64:3 77:12 80:5,14,14,25 grade 24:14 hardship 62:9,12 harms 102:7 harms	54:25 55:2	19:4 23:15 24:18	goodwin 3:17	95:22
Further 17:18 53:17	fundamental 7:17	28:13 31:12 33:4,20	gotcha 29:11	hard 21:9 38:19
53:23 54:21,24 62:18 63:4 68:22 62:18 63:4 68:24 62:18 63:4 68:25 62:18 63:4 68:25 62:18 63:4 68:25 62:18 63:4 68:25 62:18 63:4 68:25 62:18 63:4 68:25 62:18 63:4 68:25 61:13,13 63:18 64:3 62:18 61:2 61:3 41:10 103:16 62:13 40:22 62:13 40:22 62:13 40:22 62:13 40:22 62:13 40:22 62:13 40:22 62:14 4:14 62:13 41:10 103:16 62:13 40:22 62:13 40:22 62:13 40:22 62:13 40:22 62:13 40:22 62:13 40:22 62:13 40:22 62:13 40:22 62	65:17 100:22	38:1,6 43:15,18,21	gotten 18:7,14	70:3 101:14
62:18 63:4 68:22 69:13 111:20 77:12 80:5,14,14,25 114:11 115:8 future 35:8,8,22 92:4,5,12 g 6:1 57:17 116:3 g6 91:1 g6's 102:15 103:3 galveston 71:4 gap 88:17 garvin 64:15 gather 39:20 general 3:10 6:3,12 31:22 32:2,6 50:8 52:16 54:7,14 55:15 58:15 98:6 100:22 101:7 generalized 85:22 86:4 generally 22:6 74:9 77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 61:13,13 63:18 64:3 77:12 80:5,14,14,25 81:1 87:24 88:4 89:7 90:15 92:11,18 92:19 97:12,17,17 101:10,11,14 102:6 102:8,12 104:20 107:13 gross 29:19 grounds 15:19 46:2 57:13,22 58:3 110:9 grounds 15:19 46:2 57:13,22 58:3 110:91 grounds 15:19 46:2 57:13,22 58:3 110:9 109:18 group 73:23 gruman 4:17 gue 17:8 20:7,22 30:7 38:11 47:12 52:7 53:5,7 57:1 58:5,6 59:7 62:12 63:17 75:4 97:21,22 103:24 107:13 guess 8: 31 4:23,24 70:15 75:19 98:11 98:14 gump 4:8 6:19 harness 102:7 hate 103:6 112:2 hauer 4:8 6:19 head 8:21 heath 106:7 hear 18:10 40:5 49:4 73:19 110:23 111:12 113:11 heard 23:7 34:7,8 73:22 82:11,12 109:18 group 73:23 gruman 4:17 gue 17:8 20:7,22 30:7 38:11 47:12 52:7 53:5,7 57:1 58:5,6 59:7 62:12 63:17 75:4 97:21,22 103:2 4107:13 guess 8:3 14:23,24 70:15 75:19 98:11 98:14 19:23 21:6 22:13 23:12 26:9 28:25 52:1 61:22 65:4 68:6 71: 177:4 78:7 81:15 83:8 86:8,9 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 90:8 32:10 47:2 103:16 103:16 green 1:13 gross 29:19 grounds 15:19 46:2 57:13,22 58:3 110:9 109:18 group 73:23 gruman 4:17 gue 17:8 20:7,22 30:7 38:11 47:12 103:2 4 107:13 guess 8: 31 14:23,17 103:2 4 107:13 guess 8: 31 4:23,24 10:9 10:9 10:9 10:10:10,11,14 102:6 103:16 green 1:13 109:18 group 73:23 111:12 113:11 10:9 head 8:21 heath 106:7 hear 18:0 40:2 head 8:21 heath 103:6 119:6 103:16 green 1:13 109:18 group 73:23 110:9 12:19 70:10 12:19 70:10 13:19 13:10 13:10 13:10 13:10	further 17:18 53:17	47:5 53:6 58:13,13	78:16 82:16	hardship 62:9,12
69:13 111:20	53:23 54:21,24	58:18 60:20 61:8,10	governed 99:12	harm 22:2
114:11 115:8	62:18 63:4 68:22	61:13,13 63:18 64:3	grade 24:14	harness 102:7
Read S:21 Section Since Sinc	69:13 111:20	77:12 80:5,14,14,25	granted 97:8	hate 103:6 112:2
92:4,5,12 g 92:19 97:12,17,17 101:10,11,14 102:6 102:8,12 104:20 107:13 g6 91:1 g6's 102:15 103:3 galveston 71:4 gap 88:17 garvin 64:15 gather 39:20 general 3:10 6:3,12 31:22 32:2,6 50:8 52:16 54:7,14 55:15 58:15 98:6 100:22 101:7 generalized 85:22 86:4 generally 22:6 74:9 77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 99:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17	114:11 115:8	81:1 87:24 88:4	grasp 43:2	hauer 4:8 6:19
g 6:1 57:17 116:3 g6 91:1 g6's 102:15 103:3 galveston 71:4 gap 88:17 garvin 64:15 gather 39:20 general 3:10 6:3,12 31:22 32:2,6 50:8 52:16 54:7,14 55:15 58:15 98:6 100:22 101:7 generalized 85:22 86:4 generally 22:6 74:9 77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17	future 35:8,8,22	89:7 90:15 92:11,18	great 25:15 44:5	head 8:21
102:8,12 104:20 107:13 102:8,12 104:20 107:13 1	92:4,5,12	92:19 97:12,17,17	greater 26:13 41:10	health 106:7
102:8,12 104:20 107:13 107:14 107:14 107:15 1	g	101:10,11,14 102:6	103:16	hear 18:10 40:5
107:13 gm's 14:12 17:7 31:19,21 33:8 43:7 47:3 56:14 75:10 83:24 97:22 103:17 104:24 go 20:6 22:16 29:6 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 38:18 8:4 90:9 95:3 104:19 gentlemen 21:7 gentlemen 21:7 gentlemen 21:7 gentlemen 21:7 gertlemen 12:1 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3: 2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:24 82:19 69:00 15:10 107:13 grounds 15:19 46:2 57:13,22 58:3 109:18 group 73:23 gruman 4:17 guc 17:8 20:7,22 30:7 38:11 47:12 52:7 53:5,7 57:1 58:5,6 59:7 62:12 63:17 75:4 97:21,22 103:24 107:13 guess 8:3 14:23,24 70:15 75:19 98:11 98:14 gump 4:8 6:19 guy 85:21 gusp 4:8 6:19 guy 85:21 gusp 39:13 74:1 76:18 68:13 help 8:7 9:1,6 14:22 23:12 26:9 28:25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:24 80:17 68:24 83:18 86:8,9 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 90:817 70:10 22:6 25:10 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 90:80 17:7 90:10 17:		102:8,12 104:20	green 1:13	49:4 73:19 110:23
g6's 102:15 103:3 galveston 71:4 gap 88:17 garvin 64:15 gather 39:20 general 3:10 6:3,12 31:22 32:2,6 50:8 52:16 54:7,14 55:15 58:15 98:6 100:22 101:7 generalized 85:22 86:4 generally 22:6 74:9 77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3: 2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17		107:13	gross 29:19	111:12 113:11
galveston 71:4 gap 88:17 garvin 64:15 gather 39:20 general 3:10 6:3,12 31:22 32:2,6 50:8 52:16 54:7,14 55:15 58:15 98:6 100:22 101:7 generalized 85:22 86:4 generally 22:6 74:9 77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 31:19,21 33:8 43:7 47:3 56:14 75:10 83:24 97:22 103:17 104:24 go 20:6 22:16 29:6 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 38:13,17 41:1 43:17 54:3 71:17 80:4 83:18 84 90:9 95:3 104:19 goes 55:16 67:21 82:6 99:20 102:18 going 12:16 15:18 19:23 21:6 22:13 23:12 26:9 28:25 34:17 35:16,21 38:1 38:9 40:17 45:6,7 48:13 49:8 51:25 52:1 61:22 65:4 68:6 71:1 77:4 78:7 81:15 83:8 86:8,9 90:11 97:18 108:19 90:11 97:18 108:19 90:11 97:18 108:19 110:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 112:18 113:5 115:9 hearings 60:9 95:1 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 10:10:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 12:10:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 12:10:10 21:9 57:4 75:25	S	gm's 14:12 17:7	grounds 15:19 46:2	heard 23:7 34:7,8
gap 88:17 4/:3 56:14 75:10 109:18 90:11 97:18 108:19 garvin 64:15 83:24 97:22 103:17 104:24 group 73:23 plant 110:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 110:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 110:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 110:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 110:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 112:18 113:5 115:9 hearings 60:9 95:1 hearings 60:9 95	S	31:19,21 33:8 43:7	57:13,22 58:3	73:22 82:11,12
garvin 64:15 83:24 97:22 103:17 group 73:23 110:9 hearing 2:1 20:10 general 39:20 go 20:6 22:16 29:6 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:11 47:12 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 94:23 95:		47:3 56:14 75:10	109:18	90:11 97:18 108:19
gather 39:20 general 3:10 6:3,12 31:22 32:2,6 50:8 52:16 54:7,14 55:15 58:15 98:6 100:22 101:7 generalized 85:22 86:4 generally 22:6 74:9 77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 104:24 go 20:6 22:16 29:6 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 38:13,17 41:1 43:17 54:3 71:17 80:4 83:1 88:4 90:9 95:3 104:19 goes 55:16 67:21 82:6 99:20 102:18 going 12:16 15:18 19:23 21:6 22:13 23:12 26:9 28:25 34:17 35:16,21 38:1 38:9 40:17 45:6,7 48:13 49:8 51:25 52:1 61:22 65:4 68:6 71:1 77:4 78:7 81:15 83:8 86:8,9 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 90: 17:8 20:7,22 30:7 38:11 47:12 52:7 53:5,7 57:1 58:5,6 59:7 62:12 63:17 75:4 97:21,22 103:24 107:13 guess 8:3 14:23,24 70:15 75:19 98:11 98:14 gump 4:8 6:19 guy 85:21 guys 39:13 74:1 76:18 hearing 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 112:18 113:5 115:9 hearings 60:9 95:1 hearings 2:1 20:10 21:9 57:4 75:25 94:23 95:1,5 112:9 112:18 113:5 115:9 hearings 60:9 95:1 hearings 60:9 95:		83:24 97:22 103:17	group 73:23	110:9
general 3:10 6:3,12 31:22 32:2,6 50:8 52:16 54:7,14 55:15 58:15 98:6 100:22 101:7 generalized 85:22 86:4 generally 22:6 74:9 77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 generalized 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 38:13,17 41:1 43:17 54:3 71:17 80:4 83:1 88:4 90:9 95:3 104:19 goes 55:16 67:21 82:6 99:20 102:18 19:23 21:6 22:13 23:12 26:9 28:25 34:17 35:16,21 38:1 38:9 40:17 45:6,7 48:13 49:8 51:25 52:1 61:22 65:4 68:6 71:1 77:4 78:7 81:15 83:8 86:8,9 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 94:21 108:17		104:24	gruman 4:17	hearing 2:1 20:10
31:22 32:2,6 50:8 52:16 54:7,14 55:15 58:15 98:6 100:22 101:7 generalized 85:22 86:4 generally 22:6 74:9 77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:25,25 34:1 30:7 33:14 47:12 52:7 53:5,7 57:1 58:5,6 59:7 62:12 63:17 75:4 97:21,22 103:24 107:13 guess 8:3 14:23,24 70:15 75:19 98:11 98:14 gump 4:8 6:19 guy 85:21 gusy 39:13 74:1 76:18 h 3:7 4:21 86:9 haldenstein 4:16 hand 12:6 19:23 21:10 22:6 25:10 hereto 15:6 66:22		go 20:6 22:16 29:6	guc 17:8 20:7,22	21:9 57:4 75:25
52:16 54:7,14 55:15 38:13,17 41:1 43:17 52:7 53:5,7 57:1 112:18 113:5 115:9 58:15 98:6 100:22 54:3 71:17 80:4 83:1 88:4 90:9 95:3 58:5,6 59:7 62:12 hearings 60:9 95:1 generalized 85:22 86:4 generally 22:6 74:9 goes 55:16 67:21 goes 55:16 67:21 guess 8:3 14:23,24 hearings 60:9 95:1 77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 going 12:16 15:18 gump 4:8 6:19 height 102:9 getting 16:11 24:11 38:9 40:17 45:6,7 48:13 49:8 51:25 gusy 85:21 gusy 85:21 held 57:21,23 58:1 gibson 3:2 6:16 48:13 49:8 51:25 52:1 61:22 65:4 h h:3:7 4:21 86:9 help 8:7 9:1,6 14:22 23:12 26:9 28:25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:67 71:1 77:4 78:7 81:15 83:8 86:8,9 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 hand 12:6 19:23 21:10 22:6 25:10 hereof 66:12 68:23 83:17 108:17 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 21:10 22:6 25:10 hereto 15:6 66:22		30:7 33:25,25 34:1	30:7 38:11 47:12	94:23 95:1,5 112:9
52:16 54:7,14 53:15 58:15 98:6 100:22 101:7 generalized 85:22 86:4 generally 22:6 74:9 77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 54:3 71:17 80:4 83:1 88:4 90:9 95:3 104:19 goes 55:16 67:21 82:6 99:20 102:18 going 12:16 15:18 19:23 21:6 22:13 23:12 26:9 28:25 34:17 35:16,21 38:1 38:9 40:17 45:6,7 48:13 49:8 51:25 52:1 61:22 65:4 68:6 71:1 77:4 78:7 81:15 83:8 86:8,9 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 94:21 108:17	*	38:13,17 41:1 43:17	52:7 53:5,7 57:1	112:18 113:5 115:9
101:7 generalized 85:22 86:4 generally 22:6 74:9 77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:1 88:4 90:9 95:3 104:19 goes 55:16 67:21 goes 55:16 67:21 guess 8:3 14:23,24 neavily 42:7 nedge 7:5 8:4 18:22 34:24 neight 102:9 neight		54:3 71:17 80:4	58:5,6 59:7 62:12	hearings 60:9 95:1
generalized 85:22 86:4 generally 22:6 74:9 77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 103:24 107:13 guess 8:3 14:23,24 70:15 75:19 98:11 98:14 70:15 75:19 98:11 98:14 gump 4:8 6:19 guy 85:21 guys 39:13 74:1 76:18 hearsay 105:12 heavily 42:7 hedge 7:5 8:4 18:22 34:24 height 102:9 held 57:21,23 58:1 86:13 help 8:7 9:1,6 14:22 23:12 48:11 79:25 82:3,11 91:14 helpful 86:2 hereof 66:12 hereto 15:6 66:22		83:1 88:4 90:9 95:3	63:17 75:4 97:21,22	hears 113:3
generalized 85:22 goes 55:16 67:21 guess 8:3 14:23,24 heavily 42:7 generally 22:6 74:9 77:18,19 98:14		104:19	103:24 107:13	hearsay 105:12
generally 22:6 74:9 77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 82:6 99:20 102:18 going 12:16 15:18 198:11 98:14 gump 4:8 6:19 gump 4:8 6:19 guy 85:21 guys 39:13 74:1 76:18 hedge 7:5 8:4 18:22 34:24 height 102:9 held 57:21,23 58:1 86:13 help 8:7 9:1,6 14:22 23:12 48:11 79:25 help 8:14 gump 4:8 6:19 guys 39:13 74:1 76:18 Bis on 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 h 3:7 4:21 86:9 haldenstein 4:16 hand 12:6 19:23 21:10 22:6 25:10 help 8:7 9:1,6 14:22 22:13 23:12 48:11 79:25 82:3,11 91:14 helpful 86:2 hereof 66:12 hereto 15:6 66:22	C	goes 55:16 67:21	guess 8:3 14:23,24	_
generally 22:6 74:9 77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 going 12:16 15:18 19:23 21:6 22:13 23:12 26:9 28:25 34:17 35:16,21 38:1 38:9 40:17 45:6,7 48:13 49:8 51:25 52:1 61:22 65:4 68:6 71:1 77:4 78:7 81:15 83:8 86:8,9 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 94:21 108:17			•	
77:18,19 gentlemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 34:17 35:16,21 38:1 guys 39:13 74:1 gibson 3:2 6:16 38:9 40:17 45:6,7 48:13 49:8 51:25 h give 17:1 21:9 22:9 68:6 71:1 77:4 78:7 h h h 3:7 4:21 86:9 82:3,11 91:14 helpful 86:2 82:3,11 91:14 helpful 86:2 hereof 66:12 hand 12:6 19:23 21:10 22:6 25:10 hereof 66:12 hereof 66:22	· ·	going 12:16 15:18	98:14	
gentiemen 21:7 gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 23:12 26:9 28:25 34:17 35:16,21 38:1 38:9 40:17 45:6,7 48:13 49:8 51:25 52:1 61:22 65:4 68:6 71:1 77:4 78:7 81:15 83:8 86:8,9 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 94:21 108:17	· ·	0 0		height 102:9
gerber 1:21 getting 16:11 24:11 30:15 91:25 96:12 34:17 35:16,21 38:1 guys 39:13 74:1 gibson 3:2 6:16 48:13 49:8 51:25 h give 17:1 21:9 22:9 52:1 61:22 65:4 h h 3:7 4:21 86:9 86:13 aldenstein 4:16 haldenstein 4:16 hereof 66:12 band 12:6 19:23 12:10 22:6 25:10 hereof 66:12				
38:9 40:17 45:6,7 48:13 49:8 51:25 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 38:9 40:17 45:6,7 48:13 49:8 51:25 52:1 61:22 65:4 68:6 71:1 77:4 78:7 81:15 83:8 86:8,9 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 94:21 108:17	S		0 •	· ·
30:15 91:25 96:12 gibson 3:2 6:16 give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 48:13 49:8 51:25 52:1 61:22 65:4 68:6 71:1 77:4 78:7 81:15 83:8 86:8,9 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 94:21 108:17 48:13 49:8 51:25 h 3:7 4:21 86:9 haldenstein 4:16 hand 12:6 19:23 21:10 22:6 25:10 23:12 48:11 79:25 82:3,11 91:14 helpful 86:2 hereof 66:12 hereto 15:6 66:22		· ·		
give 17:1 21:9 22:9 23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 52:1 61:22 65:4 68:6 71:1 77:4 78:7 81:15 83:8 86:8,9 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 94:21 108:17 68:23 83:17 108:17 82:3,11 91:14 helpful 86:2 hereof 66:12 hereto 15:6 66:22		·		-
23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 68:671:1 77:4 78:7 81:15 83:8 86:8,9 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 94:21 108:17 h 3:7 4:21 86:9 haldenstein 4:16 hand 12:6 19:23 21:10 22:6 25:10 hereto 15:6 66:22	C			
23:18 27:21 29:6,25 30:2 31:10,12,21 68:23 83:17 108:17 81:15 83:8 86:8,9 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 hand 12:6 19:23 21:10 22:6 25:10 hereto 15:6 66:22				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
68:23 83:17 108:17 90:8 91:9 92:11,16 and 12:6 19:23 21:10 22:6 25:10 hereto 15:6 66:22				_
08:23 83:17 108:17		· ·		
108:19 110:24 64:17 101:7 112:11		,		
X/ '4 / I 10 1 /'	108:19 110:24			

[herz - insurance] Page 12

herz 4:16
highlight 12:10
65:9
highlighted 12:2,5
12:11,12,22 16:14
17:10 24:12 41:3
65:7 67:17
highly 61:1
hold 35:20,25 36:1
58:2 109:15
holder 51:3 55:2
holders 4:9 6:20
holding 15:14 35:23
35:25 43:19 56:5
62:22 100:6 104:14
holdings 45:15
hon 1:21
honor 6:7,15,18 9:8
10:16 11:18,20 12:8
12:9,17 13:20 14:24
15:13 16:12,22,23
16:25 17:2 18:6,16
19:3,14,19,24 20:5
20:7,18 21:3 22:15
22:18 23:20 24:17
25:6,13,25 26:19
29:14 30:9 31:15
32:3 34:6,22 36:14
36:23 37:4 39:11,15
39:21,25 40:8,12,21
41:2 42:16 46:3
47:21,24 49:6,11,12
49:17,21 50:2,9,11
50:21 51:6,15,19,25
52:12,20,23 53:16
54:8,16,19,21 55:1
55:4,12 56:7,15,17
56:21,23 57:19 58:4
58:10,14,17 59:4,6
59:10,19,21 60:1,3
60:6,13,18,23 61:5
61:7,12,15,21,25
62:7,7,19 63:2,5,16
64:9,22,23 65:3,21
67:16,23 68:10,12
68:22 69:15 70:17
70:21,22 71:3,13,16

71:19 72:11,12
73:18,21 74:19,23
75:3,7 76:1,2,13,21
76:25 77:3 79:23
82:5 83:3,22 84:15
86:18 89:17 91:6,25
92:10,22 93:16 94:1
94:15 95:13,21
96:24 97:11,18,25
98:13,21,25 99:7,15
100:2,4,8,13,16
101:23 102:1,21,23
103:7,15,25 104:2
104:15,21,23
105:15,17 106:11
106:17 107:25
108:7,23 109:4
110:9,10,20 111:1
111:23,25,25 112:4
112:7,10,24 113:19
113:24 114:12,23 115:1,10
honor's 28:1 30:14
42:19 49:7 53:3
54:18 65:24 104:12
114:20
honored 26:6
hope 13:23 51:23
82:22 83:13 91:20
96:2
hoped 112:5 113:21
horrors 36:7
hour 48:21 107:15
hours 110:18,19
houston 4:4
howard 5:6 114:15
huh 20:19
hundred 13:3 29:21
husband 11:8 43:14
51:10 52:11 71:6
75:6 102:4 104:7
husband's 60:7
hyperbole 49:19
hypothetically 35:5

1
i.e. 78:6
idea 93:2
identical 41:20 80:8
102:17,20
identified 12:17
41:16 88:6
identifies 46:19
104:5
identify 24:23 101:6
101:18
ignition 59:24 60:5
72:4,5,19,20 73:1,3
73:4,7,10 74:3,7,16
75:12,15,16,23
76:10 77:5 80:22
94:18 101:20 104:1
104:5,10
ignore 67:9
ii 22:4,10 23:17
27:3 28:7
illegal 89:22 90:6,9
illustration 102:3
imagination 64:11
imagine 13:20
35:16
impact 49:25,25
52:21 53:18 64:21
92:15
impacted 60:6
_
impacting 96:18 implemented 97:5
_
implicate 32:23 implied 30:3
_
import 114:10
important 9:12
15:2 19:11 66:16
68:1
inability 41:23 70:8
78:7
inadvertently 106:8
106:9
inapplicable 8:25
inappropriate 60:4
68:19 103:12 include 108:14

included 20:24 63:1 including 54:10 55:10,18 64:14 69:3 incompetence 43:21 inconsistent 72:10 incorrect 77:7 79:22 incredibly 48:6 incremental 22:2 independent 44:24 105:22 independently 105:12 indicated 107:3 indicating 93:22 indiscernible 8:12 8:13,22 17:1,20 21:9,20,22 22:4,12 95:12 96:10 97:10 individually 13:7 **induced** 85:10 **inference** 79:9,15 **inferred** 79:10 **inflamed** 103:23 inflammatory 104:20 information 13:18 20:16 23:5 24:1 42:11 101:19 inherent 89:14 inheritance 71:10 injunction 109:22 109:23 injured 70:5 injuries 41:9 **injury** 41:16,25 71:5,6 insertion 73:11 inspection 46:9 **instance** 114:11 instances 59:23 80:5 114:11 instructive 64:21 insufficient 79:11 insulting 38:18 **insurance** 92:13,21

[insure - letter] Page 13

insure 36:3	•	king 3:9 6:12	55:23 66:16,16
insures 34:13	j	knew 19:4,20 42:2	67:11
insuring 38:15	j 3:14 57:17	46:20 48:1 60:20	late 107:14
intelligence 38:18	jersey 45:14,16	63:15 64:3 94:8	laundering 25:23
intend 78:8	68:25	100:22 101:10	law 4:1 6:24,25
intent 56:23	job 82:4	102:8	36:18 45:19 49:20
intentional 36:20	jobs 39:14	know 9:17 12:13	55:9 56:10,12 57:11
98:8	join 41:14	14:2 15:24 19:1,15	63:10 64:9,10 67:12
intentionally 37:18	joined 41:14	19:15 21:4 28:19,21	68:5,17 79:14,14,20
interest 54:9 55:17	joint 114:22	31:6 33:1 34:19	79:21 81:5,20 84:12
62:2 93:5	josh 4:6 6:7	35:14,16,23 36:23	95:10,11 103:17
interposed 98:19	judge 1:22 25:16	37:13,24,25 42:15	109:14,15
interrupted 24:3	26:7,12,16,17,22	43:22,24 44:9,19	lawrence 88:9,16
interrupting 110:21	27:22 28:6 55:23	47:25 48:4 52:12	88:23 108:13 109:1
introduce 109:23	56:1 78:24 81:22	57:9 63:11 64:8,11	109:12
introduction	84:18 112:5,14,20	64:11 67:21 68:3	lawsuit 9:13 10:3
106:21 110:1 116:7	113:8,11,13	69:10,13,15 70:12	11:5 16:4 28:20,20
invested 38:12	judgment 74:21	77:22 78:6 80:4,13	30:17 31:1,3 33:6
investment 30:24	87:20 92:4 97:2	80:24 81:11,12,13	41:5 43:16,23 44:7
investors 31:9	judicata 74:10,13 76:7	81:19 82:15 84:13	47:9 48:17 52:9,10
involve 7:10 76:6		85:25 86:1 89:25	75:17 89:20 90:4
93:10	judicial 8:18 14:9 14:20 106:24	90:12,13 91:4,7,13	96:17,18
involved 70:23 73:5	juncture 103:12	92:6 93:4 94:22	lawyer 41:7 49:14
106:13	june 80:6,10	95:22 96:4 100:21	lawyers 14:12 94:8
involvement 8:10	jurisdiction 21:23	100:25 101:6,11	lays 95:13,14
8:16 15:20 37:3	justified 85:12	102:6 103:2 105:16	lead 32:24 35:16
41:23 42:14	justify 109:18	110:19	67:18 85:15
irregularities 86:15		knowing 61:16	leading 9:11,21
86:20	k	knowledge 42:5	16:1 28:14,16 33:8
irrevocable 67:19	k 45:17 86:9	44:14 66:22,25 67:6	33:14 37:17 47:15
issue 16:1 21:12,16	kb 26:15,21 28:3	known 19:9 36:11	leaning 112:23
33:10,11 35:6 45:21	keep 30:7 49:9	65:23 66:4 78:11	learn 85:19 95:10
47:21 49:18 52:20	keeps 58:11,12	85:24	learned 95:9
55:5 56:18 59:5,17	kept 67:23	knows 30:22 101:14	led 14:1 43:15,16
61:10 62:15 63:18	kernan 45:17	113:8	104:6,6
72:4,6,16,19,20	key 73:12	1	legal 21:12 88:7
73:11,13 74:20 76:8	kid's 24:14 70:7,8,8	1 2:25 57:17,17	117:20
76:19 78:24 79:2	kids 6:23 7:4 11:9	116:3 117:3,12	legally 89:8 93:6
80:1 88:25 98:20	11:11	lack 23:5 24:1 35:2	lends 43:10
103:5 107:12 109:2	killed 32:15 51:9	37:9 43:4	length 9:21 15:24
111:12 112:9,12,16	70:6 104:7	ladies 21:7	lesser 44:17 48:14
113:20	killing 93:3	laid 94:4	100:7
issued 36:24	kind 9:6 13:18	lamar 4:3	letch 84:10
issues 7:18 62:21,25	18:14 21:19 26:10	language 18:16	letter 10:9,25 11:2
74:14 75:15,24 95:5	30:2 36:22 41:13	36:22 37:5,6,6,15	20:9,12,16,25 21:4
103:16 104:13	57:23 70:9 78:3,5	39:5 42:16,17,19	43:25 108:14 112:3
105:17	114:11	53:19 54:13 55:16	112:5,6,17 113:9,17
		ral Solutions	

[letter - misconduct] Page 14

114:20,22	location 73:6	103:5	mentioned 10:5
levels 8:10 79:13	long 29:9 40:12,15	malibu's 90:24	42:16 99:1
leviere 86:10	45:20 75:13,21	managed 8:4	mentions 75:16
liability 59:25	81:10 84:13,14	manager 8:5	merit 43:23 44:20
lie 55:18 56:2	95:11 107:12,22	manifest 85:8	47:9
lied 14:12	longacre 8:3,4	manifestation 85:9	merits 26:9 27:6,8
lieu 8:15	17:11 19:1 21:19	85:10	27:11 30:16 44:6
lift 18:9 99:10	22:3,3,10,21,25	manufacturing	56:5 72:18 80:15
lights 78:6 102:13		84:10	103:6
likelihood 44:2 92:3	23:22 24:8,21 28:11	market 33:7 34:16	met 103:21
	longer 98:14 106:3 look 12:23 16:13		mic 20:11 40:6
liljeberg 57:17 limit 15:18 54:13		35:12,19 36:5 markets 35:24	
	17:21 26:7 50:1,10		73:19 74:24 108:9
64:12 114:7	68:18 72:15 80:2	massive 43:12	microphone 16:24 18:10
limitation 109:3	102:1 104:16	master 20:15 50:4,7	
line 60:4 116:4	looked 38:19	54:25 55:2	military 41:14,15
liquidated 22:24	looking 7:6 12:21	material 36:12	million 10:12,13,14
28:15 29:2 31:5	69:10	85:11 95:5 107:1	10:17,24,24 12:24
34:5	looks 88:13	matter 1:5 21:23	13:1,3,8 23:4,22,24
liquidation 1:7 3:3	loosely 58:13 loses 33:7	38:10 56:10 65:19 66:12 76:8 79:5	23:25 28:22,23
6:3,16 61:8 70:23			29:20,21,25 32:6,7
101:8 104:25 105:2	loss 5:2 6:23 18:22	105:22 106:18	33:23 43:24,25 44:4
liquidity 35:4	44:17 46:3 69:12	110:8 113:2	44:5,16 51:5,6,8,16
lisa 3:7 6:15	70:11 71:8,9,9	matters 7:9,10	51:18 52:5 53:13,13
listed 50:25 52:15	114:18	37:13 95:2 106:23	54:12,17 55:1 69:22
52:15	lost 69:9	mature 84:16	89:6 91:24 92:13,13
listening 63:7	lot 25:8 48:6 98:13	mean 15:24 29:9	92:18
litany 72:8 101:15	lower 23:4 58:2	30:20 31:7,11 35:16	mimics 39:5
literally 110:18	lying 26:8	42:21 44:24 47:3	mind 40:9
litigant 13:19,25 42:25	m	48:7,18 68:2 91:20 113:7	mineola 117:23 minn 39:1 40:24
1-1-5	m 39:1 86:9		
litigant's 47:1	madison 4:18	meaning 52:14 54:25 68:2	minnesota 38:23,24 40:25 64:9,10 70:13
litigants 35:9 81:7	mafia 25:23		107:14
litigate 30:12 62:18 92:24	main 72:25	means 91:17 107:20 meant 97:17 106:10	minor 41:5,23 42:8
	maintain 24:21	meat 99:4	52:11 68:14,18 69:4
litigating 104:21 litigation 9:15,20	32:15	media 101:15	minority 68:16,17
14:4 16:4 37:13	maintenance 70:7	mediation 11:4,4	68:20
50:6 61:19 69:20	major 106:7	47:4 104:24 105:7	minors 70:11
77:8 86:21 96:12,13	majority 71:15	105:10,11 106:2,13	minute 73:17,18
100:20 102:9 106:1	maker 22:3	105:10,11 106:2,15	minute /3:17,18 minutes 48:23
little 14:25 16:9,10	making 27:21 35:13	mediator 105:24	108:24
41:13 78:20 99:6	57:10 80:17 90:15	meet 15:19 99:22	mirrors 36:25
llc 3:10 98:22	malfunctioning	111:14	misapprehension
llp 3:9,17 4:8,16	93:3	meeting 99:3	50:23
loan 89:18	malibu 63:20,21,22	mental 71:5,9	misconduct 58:12
loanacre 89:18,19	63:24 71:24,25,25	mention 53:19	59:3,6 101:23
10anacit 07.10,17	72:3 73:5 77:13,14	111CHUUH 33.17	37.3,0 101.23
	77:19 102:5,16		
	Veriteyt I ed		

[mismatch - offered] Page 15

mismatch 63:16	41:13,19,20 46:1,23	48:10,10,11,11	note 51:15 57:18
100:16,23	51:20 56:24,25	56:19 76:2,16 82:9	58:14 65:21 112:8
mispronounce 86:8	57:10,11,12,12,15	83:15 86:1 92:6	noted 58:18 63:10
misrepresentation	57:16,22,23 58:24	107:18,20,22	65:22
28:13 34:16 36:20	59:18 64:7,17 79:25	needed 60:18,22	notice 54:24
36:21 37:17 45:2	80:4 86:14 87:8	113:10	notwithstanding
85:11,16,17 109:19	88:1,19 89:5 94:16	needle 23:6	67:11
misrepresentations	95:13,14 96:5 97:3	needs 47:16 85:17	number 20:8 50:18
25:3 33:14 37:19	98:18,21 99:8,9,10	negatory 36:13	51:4 52:4 58:1,5
47:15	99:15 101:25	negligence 83:5,7	75:10 77:7 79:21
misrepresented	103:20 116:5	83:10	80:7 81:13 104:19
37:18	motions 89:8 99:2	negligent 98:8	numbers 24:15
missed 8:15	99:12 100:6	negotiate 35:12	50:25
missing 7:6 95:12	motor's 6:3	37:7	numerous 9:16
100:24 101:5	motors 1:7 3:3,10	negotiated 33:19	ny 3:5,12,21 4:11
mistake 72:10	6:13,16 54:7 58:16	negotiates 35:14	4:19 5:4 117:23
mistaken 7:16	61:8 70:23 98:6	negotiating 44:13	
11:10	100:22 101:7,8	44:15	0
misunderstand	104:25 105:2	negotiations 15:24	o 1:20 6:1 86:9
51:23 83:13,22	move 9:23 25:14	neither 59:11 97:25	117:1
mlc 61:14 64:3	53:20	never 30:18 31:1	object 111:17
104:20	moving 57:3,20	43:13,13,14 46:24	objection 12:6
model 63:25 80:23	93:25 100:9,10	48:17,17 57:21,23	17:24 22:8 61:9
102:13,15 103:3	101:4 102:2,6	58:1 61:7 101:17	objections 12:10
models 72:25 78:10	106:25	new 1:2,14,14 3:5	80:13,15,16 81:8,9
modified 15:5	multiple 34:7 77:8	3:12,19,21 4:11,19	99:19
modify 8:8 45:5	77:16	5:4 6:12 17:7 26:23	obligation 95:7
module 77:5,14,25	murder 81:2 105:3	36:19 37:16 45:14	111:16
94:17 96:1	murderer 47:5	45:16 53:6 55:9,14	obligations 20:2
modules 77:21	muster 14:14	55:22 63:18 67:9	observe 101:3
mom 11:24		68:4,5,15,25 83:24	obtain 30:10 67:4
moment 17:1,14	n	84:12,13,22 87:20	90:3,3
50:22 56:15	n 3:1 6:1 39:1,1	87:24 88:4,14 89:7	obtained 11:4 25:3
money 7:5 16:9,10	45:17,17 86:9 116:1	90:1 92:11 97:12,17	31:1 39:6 96:7
19:6 70:8 92:12	116:3 117:1	98:10 103:17	obvious 72:10 90:4
93:10	n.y. 84:10	104:24 107:13	obviously 6:24
months 58:8,8 88:2	name 76:16 86:9	109:14,14 110:12	12:10 64:19 67:25
moot 62:11	106:12	newfound 42:5	68:20 69:4 75:20
mootness 37:23	naomi 4:14	newly 87:21	106:11 110:5
62:22 104:14	nature 16:1 34:4	nhtsa 75:10	occasion 84:17
morning 6:2,15,18	43:10 90:25	nicely 78:22 79:8	occurred 33:20
9:8 49:8,23 56:22	nearby 18:10	nine 13:3,13,13	48:17
98:14 101:1	nearly 102:17	58:7 88:2	occurrences 78:5
moss 4:14	necessarily 78:24	nj 45:17	october 57:4
mother 11:7 51:14	necessary 23:2	non 36:12 95:9,18	offended 47:21
motion 2:1,3 17:5	68:23	nope 35:7	offer 19:3 80:16
20:22 21:2,4 39:24	need 8:7,8 14:1,21	nope 33./	offered 80:14
20.22 21.2,4 39.24	14:21 23:12 24:4,4		
	Varitant I ad	pal Solutions	

[offering - person's] Page 16

offering 87:8	opportune 110:20	oversight 114:22	81:5 83:8 84:20
officer 74:10 96:2	opportunity 40:3	owned 14:11	88:24 90:22 92:15
offices 4:1	40:13,19 41:8 67:4	owner 55:2	94:18 109:16,17,20
oh 11:22 16:16	82:7 92:24 93:6	р	110:4
17:24	106:20 107:9,16,18		particularly 103:25
okay 6:3,9,14,21	107:24 108:8,11	/ ·	parties 7:21 11:3
10:22 11:22,25	110:25 114:21	p.m. 115:13 page 12:17,23,25	15:6,20 17:4 52:7
12:20 24:13 25:14	116:6	1 .	54:2 61:18 65:15
27:18 28:2 29:19,22	opposed 28:16	15:3,23 20:7 40:10	66:12,14,21 68:8
32:10,19 38:19 43:8	34:10 35:15 37:22	50:12 52:1,17 53:11	85:7 86:17 112:3,15
48:22 56:21 69:24	77:21 85:17	58:6 60:11,14,16,16 60:17 62:21 65:24	party 18:3 26:5,5
70:19 74:18,22 77:1	opposing 39:9		31:18 58:7 62:2,2
79:20 83:19,23 88:3	opposite 38:14	66:5 84:4,4,5,7,11	66:22 85:12 86:21
91:16 96:22 102:3	63:12	86:11 104:16,16 105:1 112:20 116:4	92:19
106:18 108:6,25	oprah 18:10		party's 85:7,9,10
111:24 114:2	oral 76:14 100:13	pages 62:20 112:11 115:5	pass 14:14
old 8:9,19 14:12	111:12		path 14:25
23:15 31:12,19,21	orally 78:20	paid 23:10,17,22	pattern 86:24
38:6 58:18 60:23	order 7:21 8:7,8	24:8 26:6 92:6	pause 17:23 26:11
61:8,10,13 64:3	10:5,7,11,25 14:9	panacea 61:23	50:14,16,21 67:8
76:10 80:14 84:17	14:20 15:17 25:18	panaplea 105:16	78:18 85:18 99:23
97:17,22 104:20	34:9 36:24 37:14	paper 16:16	111:8
117:21	42:21 44:15 45:6,23	papers 7:1,12 56:24	pay 45:6,9,10 92:11
older 11:13 41:15	46:2 54:23 72:12	56:25 71:22 72:9	payment 22:20,23
69:12	79:4 87:1,20 91:11	93:23	23:7,21 24:8,11
once 48:24 56:14	94:4 96:21 97:2,4,5	parade 36:7	91:22 92:1
70:8 85:25 93:1	97:8 98:25 112:14	paragraph 18:7,13	pedal 102:14
113:16	112:20 113:2 114:3	52:18 53:8,19 54:21	106:10
one's 57:15	114:10	57:3 65:21,22 66:9	people 18:23 24:14
ongoing 9:14,20	ordered 42:15	66:10,19 102:2,5 108:14	35:15 36:6,7 37:13
open 22:12,13	46:10 86:12 91:17		48:13 58:18 63:1
104:1	ordering 15:16	paragraphs 52:19 65:20 101:15	74:15 94:5,8 109:5
openly 54:2	orders 113:4,12		114:9
operator 115:10,12	original 26:9 27:14	parent 49:14 park 3:4 4:10 45:18	people's 18:24
opinion 15:14 19:3	39:17,24 73:8 78:21	park 5.4 4.10 45.18 parroting 21:1	perceived 101:11
25:17,20 26:1,7,22	87:10,23	parrotting 21.1	percent 91:24
27:1 28:1,7 45:21	originally 88:11	parse 72:8 part 10:6 11:3	percentage 19:15
69:3 72:24 85:6	99:9 100:14	30:18 58:23 60:11	23:1 24:16
86:11 88:9,13,21	osh 4:1	69:6,7,8 70:6 72:1	percentages 29:10
98:24	outset 72:24	72:14 73:8 90:15	period 109:6
opinions 15:8 58:2	outside 13:22	105:5 109:22 111:6	periods 58:8
88:22	overarching 97:4	participating 4:9	permit 22:10
opponent 82:2	overcome 103:14	particular 10:23	permitted 62:18
opponents 7:17	103:15	14:2 15:15 16:23	person 66:19 75:2
12:5 14:18 21:15	overrule 22:8	37:4 38:20 39:2	89:25 91:23
32:17 59:5,11 82:7	overruled 40:14	49:24 55:5,6 77:20	person's 30:14
93:25 94:13 110:24	84:23	78:13,13 80:15,23	
	T7 T	78:13,13 80:13,23	

plans 53:1 plate 66:15 plausibility 99:12 plausible 99:24	positing 61:11 position 9:17 13:16 14:20 16:6 17:19	prejudiced 10:1 47:14 83:9 89:15
plausibility 99:12	*	
-		prejudices 47:19
Piddsioie >>.2.	43:1 47:4,6,7,23	premise 38:12
107:4	56:13 62:15,19	premised 57:13
	86:19 88:10 105:13	preparation 39:14
1 2 2		prepared 14:16
	*	56:16 59:14 78:23
*	1 2	112:11,17
_		preparing 39:12
1	*	prepetition 7:4
,	-	31:12
_		presale 74:15
	-	presence 93:22
16:24 17:1 20:11		present 18:8 27:11
26:11 49:1 67:8	_	29:1 92:25 93:22
73:20 74:25 78:18	10:11 11:8,23 13:7	94:19 113:24
85:18 108:9 114:13	,	presentation
115:2	19:6 20:14 22:19	100:13
plenty 45:19 90:24	23:3 28:19,24 31:7	presented 21:7 61:6
		72:15,16 74:21 75:7
1 2	37:25 43:1	107:2
17:12 19:5,11,21	powledge's 10:12	presenting 17:3
	11:12 28:12 34:7	83:10 89:11
23:23 25:6,13 30:10	powlege 44:25 45:9	presents 75:4
31:6 33:19,19 38:17	45:23 47:5 51:2,3	press 106:10
38:20 41:3 46:23	51:22 54:9 63:19	presumes 95:16
47:5 51:24,25 58:23	69:4 73:24 74:3,11	pretty 81:3 95:12
61:4 62:7 64:2 65:6	75:6,15 77:23 78:5	previous 105:25
65:12 67:15,17	89:10 91:2 93:3	106:1
68:23 71:19 72:11	97:6,24 106:6 111:7	previously 15:11
73:23 74:19 84:8	powlege's 44:22	17:4 95:23 107:9
88:8 92:6,9 96:25	48:16 51:13 52:9	price 19:20
97:6 109:3,6,12	71:3 89:15 90:25	primarily 73:6
111:4	practicalities 92:10	principal 26:14
pointed 51:12 63:17	practiced 84:12	54:12 55:16 85:22
65:20 75:12 102:23	pre 62:22,24 75:14	86:4
pointing 19:25	101:12,16 104:9	principals 56:6
69:25	preamble 15:24	prior 9:14 14:3,5
points 7:20 67:17	precedent 64:20	20:21 32:25 34:2
policy 90:4 92:20	84:16,17	51:13 54:6 56:14
pontiac 103:3	preceding 80:10	58:20 66:13 80:5,6
pontiac's 91:1	prefer 108:21	86:25 88:15 94:22
pontiacs 102:12	preferred 57:22	96:21 101:7
portions 12:3 16:14	58:25	private 19:22,25
posed 64:4	prejudice 42:23	probably 9:9 45:7
	47:17	91:10,13
	26:11 49:1 67:8 73:20 74:25 78:18 85:18 108:9 114:13 115:2 plenty	plead 82:1 pleaded 82:1 pleading 57:6 60:3 94:15 100:7,12 pleadings 19:5,9 20:24 82:13 please 6:2,4 9:7 16:24 17:1 20:11 26:11 49:1 67:8 73:20 74:25 78:18 85:18 108:9 114:13 115:2 plenty 45:19 90:24 plight 56:8 point 15:2,22 16:22 17:12 19:5,11,21 21:3 22:22,24 23:3 23:23 25:6,13 30:10 31:6 33:19,19 38:17 38:20 41:3 46:23 47:5 51:24,25 58:23 61:4 62:7 64:2 65:6 65:12 67:15,17 68:23 71:19 72:11 73:23 74:19 84:8 88:8 92:6,9 96:25 97:6 109:3,6,12 111:4 pointed 51:12 63:17 65:20 75:12 102:23 pontiac 103:3 pontiac's 91:1 pontiacs 102:12 portions 12:3 16:14 posed 64:4 possible 18:24 possibly 36:3 41:17 104:6 113:12 potential 41:25 78:11 potentially 41:10 42:3 70:12 102:7 powledge 3:18 4:2 6:6 9:13,16,22 10:11 11:8,23 13:7 13:16,20 14:5 15:25 19:6 20:14 22:19 23:3 28:19,24 31:7 13:16,20 14:5 15:25 19:6 20:14 22:19 23:3 28:19,24 31:7 13:12 28:12 34:7 powledge's 10:12 11:12 28:12 34:7 powledge's 10:12 11:12 28:12 34:7 powledge's 44:25 45:9 45:23 47:5 51:2,3 51:22 54:9 63:19 69:4 73:24 74:3,11 75:6,24 106:6 111:7 powledge's 44:22 48:16 51:13 52:9 71:3 89:15 90:25 practicalities 92:10 practiced 84:12 precedent 64:20 84:16,17 preceding 80:10 prefer 108:21 preferred 57:22 58:25 prejudice 42:23

[problem - record] Page 18

problem 72:2 76:10	prospective 18:18	purposes 12:3 87:7	reading 17:25 50:9
82:20	18:20	106:2,2	67:5 73:22 108:24
procedural 89:2,3	protect 18:22 21:22	pursuant 52:25	reads 37:12 68:12
procedure 47:2	protection 48:15	97:8	real 43:23 72:12
87:15	prove 43:4,18 44:3	pursue 57:8 60:19	82:16 89:9,9
procedures 10:6	47:11,14 48:18	75:17	realize 110:23
11:2,3 36:24 51:6	82:22 83:12	push 76:5	really 43:17 44:2,5
54:18	provide 10:1,9	put 48:13 61:15	81:6 86:8 92:22
proceed 42:5	15:10 16:3 31:17	63:9 72:21 76:9	109:9 110:4
103:19	33:13 38:2 61:10	79:6,8 82:22 93:1	rearguing 110:17
proceeding 14:9	77:24 81:14 84:1	95:7 106:9 107:1,11	reason 24:6 43:9
22:13 92:8 98:20	91:11 92:14 95:23	107:16,23 111:5	47:7 68:7 72:11
105:3	101:18 107:18	113:21	74:9 107:15 113:10
proceedings 70:24	113:9	puts 66:16 99:4	reasonable 107:13
71:1 86:15,20 95:3	provided 9:22 21:1	putting 107:4	reasons 16:6 45:22
115:13 117:5	25:4 30:25 33:5	q	48:7 58:4 62:10
process 30:4 35:18	36:11,24 41:8 44:10	quacks 27:17	64:18 68:20 90:4
38:15 42:23 47:1,18	45:23 46:25 77:9	question 15:3 19:4	recall 60:5,6,8
61:25 62:1 74:14	81:6 87:2 96:19	23:10 29:24 33:15	63:19 71:23,25 72:3
86:16 89:15	102:25 103:1,2	53:3 54:20 56:17	73:5,9,14 75:6,7,11
procter 3:17	109:21	62:5 71:16 81:22	102:15
produce 30:11 81:9	provides 45:8	85:20 93:13,17	recalled 102:12,19
produced 9:18	providing 35:4 38:2	96:18 103:25	recalls 72:6 77:16
43:22 78:6 80:24	provision 18:21	104:20	78:10,11 87:25
86:24 87:9	19:23 39:4 48:5	questions 9:4 49:9	90:16,24
producing 14:3	66:24 111:3,5	56:16 64:23	receipt 53:9
46:10 47:8 80:25	provisions 24:9,12	quick 79:19	receive 52:22,24
product 44:3 47:10	41:4 48:6 65:7,8,10	quickly 93:19	53:6,7 99:19
78:3 80:7,17 83:3,4	65:22 67:10	quipped 100:25	received 19:6 20:15
83:7,10 93:9	public 19:24 46:14	quite 22:8 57:1	21:5 69:7,8
production 107:15	53:24 60:9 90:4	quote 60:11,16 85:2	recipient 85:12,13
profoundly 49:13	101:21 103:23	86:12,19	recitation 88:18
progress 113:3	publicly 17:6 80:3	quoting 85:8	recite 55:13
prohibit 46:10	pull 20:11 40:5		reclamation 54:11
promised 114:7	74:24 108:9	r	recognize 84:23
promote 68:7	purchase 23:1	r 1:20 3:1 6:1 45:17	recognizing 55:1
prong 62:8	26:10	57:17 116:3 117:1	reconsideration
pronunciation 55:7	purchaser 19:22	raise 7:17 113:20	99:10,16
proof 52:8,8 59:2	27:5	raised 69:18 78:24	record 12:2 19:24
59:21 63:14 64:3	purchasers 18:18	rate 22:20,23 23:1,7	29:8,16,17 40:23
69:18,19 102:21,25	18:20 34:19	23:21 24:8,11,23	45:12 46:14 50:23
103:21 107:5	purely 56:10,10	reach 35:10	51:23,24 53:24 54:1
proofs 52:3,14	purpose 14:16	reached 41:6	60:9 90:15 103:24
53:12	18:21 43:8,11,14	reaching 34:3 71:14	105:5,6,18 106:19
properly 99:17	59:14 69:1 93:8	read 7:1 18:6 40:13	106:21 107:1
proposition 26:2	purposefully 43:20	52:19 67:2 89:24	114:15 116:5,7
55:9 109:10		107:20	117:4
		ral Solutions	

[recover - rhetoric] Page 19

recover 7:7	relevance 21:24	98:11 100:11	respect 20:15 51:8
recovery 8:1 69:10	61:11	108:13,16	52:10 59:23 63:2
69:22	relevant 21:12	report 60:8 80:2	64:4 65:6 71:8,13
reduced 22:19 23:3	67:17,25 81:10,11	reporter 117:13	74:6,15 76:8 79:17
23:8,24,25 46:21	93:17 111:15	reports 81:15	92:15 94:6,8 97:4,5
reduction 50:7	113:23 115:4	represent 51:21	97:24 98:4,5 111:2
reductions 23:25	reliance 82:2 85:23	58:18,18 70:25	respectfully 20:18
refer 24:8 54:2 59:6	relief 2:1 7:3 30:10	75:18	30:13 42:13 50:9
60:14 62:6 63:25	33:13 34:10,12	representation	54:8 56:23 58:4
98:21	37:25 45:9,23 57:13	81:12 95:25 110:4	61:5 63:16 79:23
reference 27:21	57:22 58:3,9,25	representations	80:16 81:2 84:16
52:9 53:18,23 60:3	60:22 61:3 76:12	65:13,16 77:24	90:7 94:1
101:14 109:14,21	79:5,5 83:14 87:19	represented 38:7,11	respective 66:21
referenced 51:7,11	88:7,11,15 91:7,12	63:1 73:23 75:24	respond 40:3,4,8
69:20 94:18 95:23	94:14 96:9 103:11	104:11	70:15 76:2,16 79:12
references 36:23	110:3	representing 62:24	82:3,9 107:14
80:13 82:15	relies 42:7	70:23	responded 61:8
referencing 102:25	rely 89:5 93:23	represents 28:20	96:20
referred 28:8 65:20	relying 85:12	31:2 66:20 75:14	response 21:2 30:13
76:16	105:23 106:3	request 8:23 25:11	40:19 61:9 75:8
referring 26:20,22	remainder 12:22	25:12 61:11 81:17	94:20 104:3 107:23
55:15 67:13	remaining 51:11,16	106:22	108:18
refers 52:4 58:13,14	107:12	requests 9:16 61:7	responsive 71:16
reflect 17:14,16	remains 35:3	61:14,14,18 64:4	81:9
reg 1:3	remedy 29:5 30:3	80:11 81:6,7 96:19	rest 56:16 64:22
regard 7:16 24:20	89:13,14	100:20	restatement 85:8
65:14 67:20 75:19	remiss 49:11	require 36:18 37:17	86:3
77:4 85:16 87:5	removal 20:21,24	44:13	result 15:17 31:4
109:1,13 112:4,9	removed 100:15	required 6:24 10:9	34:16 39:7 41:17
regarding 35:1 37:6	renamed 63:22	33:13 44:15 47:13	43:20 78:5
38:21 83:25 87:25	renewal 45:18	92:11 107:6 113:15	
89:7	reopen 106:19	requirement 81:24	90:24
regret 114:21	116:5	93:21	results 22:2 42:23
reiterates 60:15	reopened 62:17	requirements 6:25	retained 56:13
rejected 26:16	reopening 62:11	98:15	return 30:23
related 14:3 48:12	repeat 48:25	requires 59:1 60:24	reverse 28:19 30:16
78:9 80:20,21,22	repeated 106:25	60:25	reversed 26:17,21
104:10 112:13	repeatedly 58:15	res 74:10,13 76:7	56:5
relates 68:17	replace 87:18 89:4	resemblance 103:4	review 49:8 63:6
relating 66:14	replacement 73:10	reservations 76:18	87:11,15,17,18,19
relationship 51:13	73:12	reserve 40:15 63:3	87:23 89:4
release 16:3 36:13	replevin 54:11	resolution 12:24,24	reviewing 99:15
37:6 53:18 65:22	replies 39:17	resolve 13:17 33:16	revisiting 110:14
released 7:8 66:8	reply 39:19,19,24	resolved 23:15	revoke 98:6
releasing 28:20	55:4 57:21 61:24	35:18 91:19	revoked 98:1,4
36:11 65:23	65:25 66:5 73:16 77:1 82:7 84:2 87:2	resolving 2:2 50:18	rhetoric 49:19
		ral Solutions	

[ride - settlement] Page 20

[Hac Settlement]			1 450 20
ride 36:1	rudnick 5:1 114:17	says 15:23 18:13	sell 18:23 35:19
rides 38:1	rule 41:21 51:20	36:10 44:8,23 45:5	36:1 89:25 90:1
right 6:17 16:12	55:13 57:11,12,15	46:15 52:2,18 53:8	seller 19:22 54:10
17:15,22 20:4 21:6	57:16 58:2,9,24	55:8 57:19,20 65:25	54:22,24
21:15 23:20 24:6	60:22 61:3,22 64:8	66:10,19 67:1,18	selling 31:18 32:23
25:1 27:10 31:1	64:12,14 82:21,21	87:3 95:20 99:4,16	34:15
33:7 35:21 36:10	83:5 84:25 86:13	101:9 102:6,8	seneca 84:9
40:17 47:1 49:4	87:17 89:2,3 90:8	105:20 106:9	sense 46:25
55:15 63:4 67:14	95:2,16,17 96:8	scale 49:19	sent 10:24
73:15 74:2 79:13,14	97:2 98:16,16,18,21	schmidt 4:21	separate 44:25
79:21 82:11,12,19	99:2,8,11,12,12,16	school 95:10,11	50:20,25 104:15
90:1 93:12 96:15	99:22 100:6,7,7	scott 3:15 6:11	series 50:19 61:6
98:9 101:3 106:5,16	101:25 103:18,19	scratch 8:21 13:9	63:25 101:15
110:7,12 115:8	103:21 107:21	seat 93:13	serious 41:16 42:3
rights 8:5 26:13	ruled 7:11	seats 6:2	86:15
40:15 46:15,16 54:9	rules 31:17 39:4,4,5	second 7:15 8:1	set 2:3 31:5 42:3
54:10 55:17 58:7	47:2,2 83:8 86:22	12:16,19 15:7 37:16	52:25 53:10 58:4
62:1 76:19 86:16	95:3,4	42:19 44:23 50:14	setting 42:17 78:2
rise 113:20	ruling 25:9	56:3 57:21 61:1	81:9 109:15
risk 21:18 22:1,9,14	rulings 7:13	63:9 64:15 66:3	settle 8:9,20 35:10
35:1	run 75:9 103:6	70:20 83:25 85:4,8	68:2,3
rjm 98:22	S	86:11 88:9,16,22	settled 8:12 16:3,10
road 34:18 76:20	s 3:1 5:6 6:1 86:9,9	93:14 98:22 99:1,16	19:15 37:11 44:11
117:21	sale 9:11 16:20	109:5	52:14,16 68:19
robert 1:21	24:25 46:6 48:5,11	secondary 33:7	69:21,23 87:1
robust 107:5	53:22 101:13,16	34:15 35:12,19,23	settlement 2:2 8:17
room 24:14 76:17	sample 36:25	36:4	8:17 11:5,5,6 12:1
rothschild 55:13	sat 88:1	securities 53:6	12:18,25 13:17 15:4
rough 13:8	satisfaction 81:24	see 7:9 12:23 13:9	15:8,16,18,21 16:2
rubin 3:7 6:15,15	satisfactory 112:7	17:16 27:23 36:7	19:6,16,18 25:1,2,5
6:17 16:22,24,25	satisfied 53:14 62:4	40:13 42:19 50:25	28:12,14,16 29:1,3
17:20 18:1 20:5,6,7	satisfy 101:24	54:13 57:2 59:15	30:15,17,18 31:2,4
20:12 21:8 22:7	saturn 102:16	61:25 68:12 70:9	31:7,10,14,16 32:24
38:7 40:1,4,5,7,11	save 108:24	71:12 96:5 111:4,13	32:24 33:1,5,6,8,14
49:5,6 50:19,21	saw 7:19 90:14	112:21 113:24	33:16 34:3 35:10,22
56:20,21 59:10,15	saying 8:19 9:25	seek 80:19,21,21	36:9,18,21,25 37:1
59:19 60:13 65:1,10	14:19 19:11 24:24	89:13	37:12,17,19,22
65:20 67:16 69:6	27:20,24 31:25	seeking 9:16 34:9	38:21 39:6 41:6,24
70:18,22 71:20	32:12,18,20 33:10	34:12 48:15 51:21	42:4,8,18 43:3
73:22 74:23,25 75:1	37:24 38:8,14 56:23	71:4 86:23 87:19	44:20,21,23 45:1,4
76:24,25 78:18	58:12 67:21,23 69:1	88:5 91:2,8	45:4 46:16,17 47:15
98:12,25 100:2,4	71:6 78:16 79:3,4,8	seeks 75:17	49:22 50:1,12,12,17
105:9,15,24 106:6	79:23 81:5 82:6	seen 17:13 53:21	51:11 52:2,18,21
106:17 107:8,22	83:9 85:14 86:23	112:10	53:8 54:15 62:3,11
108:4,5 111:15	87:9 97:21 98:1	seldomly 75:1	62:17 65:7,11,14,18
rubin's 7:20	99:14,23 100:17	self 66:17	65:25 66:6,10,11,17 66:17,20,23 67:1,3
	105:8,11,20		00.17,20,23 07:1,3

[settlement - street] Page 21

			C
67:7,20,22 68:14,18	significant 68:13	sound 47:12	statements 90:20,21
69:16 75:17 83:14	significantly 34:17	sounds 30:6	96:3 106:1
85:15 86:14 87:4,20	silent 31:14	south 2:25 117:3,8	states 1:1
88:5,15 89:22 91:16	similar 38:25 55:23	southern 1:2 20:21	statute 109:2
91:19 92:2,4,7,23	55:24 77:15 78:9	26:23 55:8,21,25	stay 22:13 57:6,7
96:7,21 97:7,7,15	80:7	spalding 3:9 6:12	60:3 77:10 99:11
97:15 98:3,7,7	similarly 55:20	spaulding 38:21	100:12
101:8 103:9 106:3	simply 50:10 78:15	40:24 44:8 45:13,20	steel 5:6 114:12,14
109:15,17,20,23	86:12 90:20 105:12	45:21 63:3 64:6,16	114:15,16,17,24
110:5	105:18	68:12,13 107:15,23	steinberg 3:14 6:11
settlements 46:21	simultaneously	speak 17:13	6:11,14 12:9 16:16
67:11 68:7 86:13	40:18	speaker 85:6	17:13,25 18:2,6,9
97:4,13,23,24	singular 8:2	speaks 57:10	18:12 19:19 21:8
settling 91:4	sit 6:5 103:2	specific 52:16 55:9	22:7 40:1,11,12
seven 5:3	site 75:10,10	64:4 66:8 80:11	58:16 63:10 65:2,3
seventy 13:3,13	sits 58:7	specifically 47:18	66:5 67:8,12,15
29:21	sitting 76:15 87:13	54:20 95:4	69:15,25 70:17,21
shade 13:1	situated 58:20	specificity 91:10	71:18,19 72:22 73:2
sheindlin 28:5	situations 86:5	specifics 81:16	73:4 74:19 75:12
sheindlin's 26:16	six 13:13	speed 78:6 80:19	76:22,23 101:3
sherri 2:25 117:3	skim 76:18	spell 57:17 86:9	103:8 107:22,25
117:12	slapped 69:20	spend 9:9	108:7,10,22,23
shifted 35:3	snatches 76:18	spent 25:8	109:1 111:14,25
shoes 89:21	soft 75:2,2	spirited 14:13	112:2 113:19 114:2
short 112:8	sold 7:5,7,25 16:8	spoken 75:2,2	114:5,8,25 115:3,4
shortly 87:24	17:19 21:15,25	square 5:3	steinberg's 53:17
shot 96:6	22:25 25:19 31:8	stand 55:8 61:12	58:15
show 12:5 24:7,7	32:4,20	62:14 109:9 112:3	step 42:24 89:21
76:11 81:25 102:12	sole 55:2	standard 15:20	98:16
107:10	solely 71:1 111:20	68:15 98:17 99:13	stepchildren 11:7
showed 65:8	solution 42:24	100:7	stepped 102:14
showing 59:1 81:23	solutions 117:20	standing 7:18,24	stipulated 74:4,6,7
99:25	somebody 7:8 23:10	8:5 24:4 33:11	74:17
showings 98:1	105:20,21	55:22 56:6,10 76:11	stipulates 54:23
shown 79:15 82:11	somebody's 12:7	103:9,14 113:20	stipulation 2:2
82:25 102:8	sophisticated 85:21	stands 26:1 67:20	12:11 15:4 46:22
shows 34:8 61:7,10	sorry 27:25 47:21	stare 74:11,12 76:8	50:17 66:11,20,23
sic 13:14 30:1 54:11	49:13 52:19 57:4	start 24:3 109:6	67:3,7 94:7
side 13:10 112:22	59:10 75:1 76:3	started 23:23	stipulations 72:7
sided 9:6	83:21 97:18 105:1	starting 7:18	94:13
sides 9:5 107:19	108:10	state 37:16 87:12,24	stock 31:10,12,22
sign 37:2	sort 26:2,10 35:10	stated 7:12 19:5	stoppage 54:11
signed 13:14 15:5	37:21 90:5 101:22	30:10 62:19 85:24	story 104:15
37:14 111:7	113:20 114:14	statement 36:13	strategies 21:20,21
significance 41:25	sought 71:5 80:11	47:4 49:24 78:21	strauss 4:8 6:19
41:25 105:22	88:6,6,11	99:2 105:10,11,12	street 7:14
	37 '	1014	1

[stretch - think] Page 22

-			
stretch 64:10	sufficient 15:19	sympathies 49:16	105:18
strongly 25:20	36:21 37:19 55:17	system 77:21	test 60:23 62:9
stuff 48:12 81:25	56:2 82:14 88:24	systems 73:11	72:14 99:3
82:1 98:10	107:5	t	testimony 82:15
style 18:10	suggest 15:9 30:13	t 117:1,1	93:20 107:6
subject 21:23 37:14	42:13 61:15 90:7	table 27:24 79:6	texas 20:21 52:10
40:4,7 49:9 51:5	suggesting 30:20	take 7:14 12:4,6	69:18 71:4 87:12,15
53:22 54:17 63:19	58:7	22:11 47:7 62:15	87:18 90:1 100:14
66:12 72:7,25 75:6	suggestion 88:1	68:15 69:11 73:16	104:4
77:15 78:12 79:17	suggests 28:11 79:6	88:25 93:24 98:16	thank 6:14,21 9:8
80:8 81:17 90:22	suicide 81:2 105:3	113:5	22:17 49:3,6 64:24
92:14 95:2,15,25	suite 4:3 117:22	taken 96:3	65:1 73:15 76:1,25
96:17 97:2 100:6	summarizes 86:19	takes 15:25 45:21	77:3 83:22 98:9,12
104:12,13 111:18	summary 85:6	55:5 69:11 81:1	106:15 110:7
submission 21:11	98:24,25	95:6,19	111:22 114:24
63:4 70:16 102:22	supersedes 66:13	talk 9:10 24:4,4	115:7,12
104:24 106:14	supplement 77:11	47:17 48:4,20 49:21	themes 60:15
107:14	supplemental 70:15	70:3 85:23 95:20	theories 72:10
submissions 17:4	support 16:7 70:7 93:21	talked 19:7 26:20	theory 59:24,25 63:17 72:17 105:3
52:6 57:2 105:19 111:20		46:7 71:20 72:24	
submit 17:10 40:18	supporting 60:25 62:6	talking 9:9 16:18	106:4,13 thereto 66:14
46:8 58:16 101:23	supports 17:18	21:10 24:11 27:17	thing 15:22 19:21
103:10,19 104:2,23	supreme 38:23,23	29:10,12 37:5,21	50:3 56:21 58:10
submits 57:12	40:25 45:13,16	44:20 47:17 70:10	61:21 66:3,8 67:15
submitted 9:16 40:2	57:11 93:5	74:10 83:4	67:22,24 104:18
52:8 61:23 93:24	sure 10:7 16:25	talks 27:17 37:3	109:7 110:10
103:7 108:16 110:8	18:2 20:12 23:13	53:17 113:14	114:11
112:5,6	33:18,20 62:14 65:4	tapping 38:9	things 12:10 14:14
submitting 111:2	69:1 74:13 79:19	target 93:25 101:4	26:24 40:14 43:11
114:22	86:7,12 91:23 93:18	targets 106:25	48:25 60:24 63:7,11
subsequent 27:4,5	98:17 108:5 112:23	technically 57:25 tell 18:4 29:18	77:6 94:19 100:19
92:4	112:24	32:10 35:7 48:24	100:21,23 101:9,10
subsequently 28:8	surely 97:9	99:6 107:23	101:11,17 104:6
33:17 34:15 35:9	surreply 98:11	telling 91:14 97:10	113:23
substance 31:17	survived 11:13 71:6	tells 35:11	think 9:10 10:14,19
69:8,8	71:11	ten 48:23 58:8 88:2	12:13 15:22 21:12
substantially 10:1	switch 59:24 60:5	tend 16:7	22:18,20,22,25 23:6
substantiated 99:18	72:4,6,19,20 73:1,3	tended 43:4	23:20 24:6,24 25:6
substantive 65:15	73:4,7,10,12 74:4,7	tendering 91:22	25:22 26:1 27:3
89:3	74:16 75:12,15,16	tens 38:6	30:9 33:3 37:23
sued 71:7	75:23 76:10 77:5	tenth 24:14	44:12 45:12 46:5,23
sues 21:19	80:22 94:18 101:21	term 109:17,20	47:1 49:14 56:19
suffered 49:14	104:1,5,10	terms 7:23 37:4	59:16 65:21 67:16
106:8	sympathetic 56:8	53:1 58:20 67:2,6	67:21,25 68:3,10,11
suffering 41:10	103:12	69:11 70:4,13 79:22	68:16 70:17 71:17
		80:19 82:14 101:14	72:12,16,23 82:9,10

	49:22,25 50:4 53:20	51:13 55:6 63:14	51:19 67:5 70:24
109:7,10	17:10 26:4 46:19	39:17,23 43:11	understanding 8:2
timely 8:23 14:20	transfer 16:19 17:5	29:21 31:22 34:6	111:1 114:1
88:25	transcripts 102:24	18:5 21:21 24:15	101:22 104:12
timeliness 87:5 88:8	112:11 115:6 117:4	11:23 13:13 14:5	83:16,22 96:14
88:13	60:14,16,17 82:15	two 9:14 11:11,14	53:25 56:13 61:22
timeline 9:11 87:5	transcript 22:5 57:3	twice 85:25 113:17	32:17 39:13 48:8
109:6 110:20 114:7	117:13	33:17 68:19 110:1	21:18 26:8 27:16
104:22,23 106:12	transcriber 117:9	turned 32:14 33:5	7:24 8:4,18 9:1
91:21 97:6 100:8,22	transcribed 2:25	turn 12:14,16 26:4	understand 7:2,21
80:14,25 88:17	transactions 34:14	tuesday 108:1,2,15	undersigned's 67:2
77:18 79:24 80:14	33:20 35:4 68:9	39:6 43:2 96:16	26:17
64:12 70:24,25	26:8 30:21 32:16,22	20:3 30:6 32:10	underpinning
49:1,2 51:24 58:8	transaction 19:8	trying 7:21 14:24	undermining 16:5
40:8 41:15 42:12	tragic 103:12	89:21	undermined 38:1
25:4,8 36:17 37:8	tragedy 49:13	try 49:8,18 77:4	undermine 35:23
10:10 20:25 22:11	tragedies 70:3	truth 105:13	95:8 96:5,17 100:20
time 9:9,20,21	trading 21:20,21	trustees 86:10	83:4,6,7 86:14,20
thursday 108:1	traders 38:11	40:7 58:6 97:22	77:8,13 78:3,15
thrust 71:21	tradeoff 48:8	trust's 17:8 20:8	69:17 73:8 75:16
104:13	toys 26:15,21 28:3	103:24 107:13	59:25 61:19 69:16
	72:1,1 73:9	92:10,19 97:21	35:2 43:10,23 47:11
75:24 103:15			29:3 30:17 34:24
threshold 62:20,25	totally 8:15 38:6,12	88:4 89:7 91:18	26:8,12 27:6,6,12
112:11	total 29:19	63:18 64:23 75:4	underlying 14:4
88:13 102:16	torts 10.9 83.20 toss 36:21	58:5 59:7 62:13,18	89:18
72:14 82:10 86:6	torts 10:9 85:20	52:8 53:5,7 57:1	undercurrents
60:24 63:7,11 64:18	55:10,18 56:2 90:2	45:1,10,11 47:12	80:19
39:23 51:10,16	torque 73.7 tort 10:4 35:17,24	34:11 36:4 38:11	uncontrolled 78:6
three 7:11 11:10	torque 73:7	30:7,11 33:21,25	67:19
thread 23:6	top 13:8	trust 19:5 20:22	unconditional
thousands 38:6	60:6,18 112:22	truly 96:4	unclean 25:19
29:22	told 48:24 57:6 60:3	108:3 117:4	unanswered 104:19
thousand 13:4	76:11 107:25	95:6,17,19 105:22	umbrella 92:20
113:22	today's 33:24 59:18	true 26:25 77:18,19	ultimately 76:4,6
71:22 73:22 93:20	103:2103:3106:19	triggered 11:2	ultimate 8:16
thought 17:17 23:14 27:24 29:15	101:6 102:10,19 103:2 105:5 106:19	tried 37:23	uh 20:19
	61:24 89:21 90:21	treatment 31:19 trial 109:24	u.s. 1:12,22 57:18
third 26:5,5,15,17 26:25 48:25 64:6		treated 92:5	u 116:3
105:16	today 7:9 14:8,10 14:11 47:11 53:21	transit 54:11	u
thinking 59:9 81:19	title 54:9 55:17	54:24 55:16	types 31:23
113:13	103:16	transferring 54:5,9	type 72:1,6 76:10
108:23 111:5	56:16,17 57:15		
102:2 107:25	timing 8:24 24:5	transferred 50:7 52:23 53:4 54:14	108:14,24 tx 4:4
100:21 101:10	34:7 104:19	103:10	100:23 101:17
91:9 96:25 97:3,11	10:17 11:24 23:1	55:10,18,24 56:2	88:13 94:2 100:21
	10 15 11 01 00 1	10 10 0 1 - - 6 0	00 10 01 0 100 01

75:4,13,22 105:6	usually 9:4 87:20	void 33:15,16 37:19	33:12 81:5 102:4
understands 54:22	v	86:13 87:4 91:16	weeks 7:11 102:16
understood 24:2		92:7	weintraub 3:23 6:8
59:10 72:25 77:18	v 38:21 45:17 63:3	voidable 85:13	6:9 7:10,13 22:15
78:19 111:22	64:6 84:10 86:10	voided 47:16	22:16,17 23:11,13
113:16,19 114:10	vacate 7:22 8:8	voiding 92:2	23:20 24:6,13,24
undertaking 113:15	72:13	volucus 60:8	29:14 49:12 62:24
undertakings 66:13	vacated 75:18	voluntarily 66:25	73:17,18,20,21 74:2
undervalued 47:25	vacating 109:18	voluntary 67:22	74:12 75:14,18,24
undo 30:21 44:22	valuation 32:25		76:2,5,13,21 91:9
87:20 88:5 89:21	value 9:24 10:2	W	91:14 93:14 96:22
undue 62:9,12	16:2 28:19 33:23	wait 60:4 110:17	96:24 97:11,14,18
unfortunate 84:17	34:2 35:2,2,21 36:2	waive 30:1 107:24	97:25 98:5 100:5
unidentified 85:6	38:3 39:7 43:2,18	walks 27:16	
unilateral 37:5	44:6 45:11 65:25	wandered 76:14	104:11 110:9,13,14
	66:6 87:1 96:21	want 16:22 17:11	110:19 111:1,9,22
unimaginable	valued 16:5 33:24	17:21 21:14,17,24	weisfelner 114:19
49:15 56:9	37:11	22:6,9 24:21 33:21	went 11:4 46:3
unintended 37:18	valuing 37:9	33:23 34:19 43:7	65:10 71:22 95:11
unintentional 36:20	variety 16:6 45:22	45:7 51:22 57:7	westlaw 84:4,6
unique 42:23	various 8:9	73:16 78:14 83:25	whatsoever 103:4
unit 4:9 6:19	varying 8:10	87:6 91:15 92:2	whichever 108:21
united 1:1	vehicle 43:12,17	98:16,21 104:18	whitewashed 28:14
units 38:11 53:7	45:3 60:7 63:18,23	108:18,19 111:10	whitewashing
unknown 25:4	75:5,9,11,11 77:13	111:11,14,20	25:18,24
36:11 65:23 66:1,4	78:3,5,8,12 79:16	112:23	wholesale 54:16
66:7,8 85:24	80:9,23 81:18 90:23	wanted 19:21 79:24	wholly 63:12
unliquidated 28:17	94:19 95:15,25	84:25 96:23,24	willful 61:16
50:6 53:12	96:17	105:5,18 108:12	william 3:23 6:8
unreasonable 32:16	vehicles 79:17 91:2	109:3,12 112:19	willing 26:7 30:1
32:18	venire 101:20	113:24	42:3
unsecured 10:4	venitext 117:20	wants 17:9 18:24	winfrey 18:10
13:12,12 32:2,7,13	version 17:10	24:7,8 40:15 45:25	wire 77:21 84:9
50:8 52:16 54:14	versus 40:24 55:13	ward 55:23 56:1	wiring 102:7
unsecureds 31:12	64:16 98:22	waru 33.23 30.1 warrant 67:2	wish 36:14
31:22,22		warrants 28:24	withdraw 25:12
unsubstantiated	victim 76:9		withdrawing 25:10
61:2 99:5 103:23	view 26:18 42:14	31:8,8,11,13,23	withheld 94:5 101:6
unsupported 99:20	vin 81:13	33:5,18,24 35:19,25	101:19,22
untimely 57:23	violated 62:3	36:4 44:16 45:11	witness 14:13 110:1
unvalued 34:17	violating 19:25	washington 45:18	wold 4:16
upside 38:6	violation 21:15	way 11:9 22:13	woman 11:12
urban 45:18	42:23 47:18 61:25	24:25 32:23 34:20	word 25:22 66:8
usa 102:9,19	78:23 79:3 86:16	38:22 82:10 85:3	words 19:10 66:2
use 8:1	89:15	90:9,13 95:1 101:12	work 28:18 77:4
useful 81:20	violations 14:18	107:8 112:24	95:1 102:14
uses 66:7 101:20	violative 111:16	ways 89:6,9	working 83:24
uses 00.7 101.20	vis 22:9,9 23:15,15	we've 12:17 15:25	WOLKING 03.2T
	94:13,13	19:7 29:9 30:9	
	X7 ' T		•

[world - à] Page 25

[world u]	
world 113:13	à
worth 33:23 44:16	à 22:9 23:15 94:13
94:2	a 22.7 23.13 74.13
wreck 41:6,17 43:8	
43:10 44:2 70:6	
78:15 93:2	
writing 15:5 106:14	
108:18 111:21	
written 40:19 52:17	
112:4	
wrong 7:13 71:22	
81:4 109:6	
wrongful 10:8 26:3	
27:7 35:8,17,24	
51:9 52:10	
wrongly 8:19	
wrote 21:3 66:6	
X	
x 1:4,10 46:17 116:1	-
<u>y</u>	
yackoff 86:10	
yeah 20:6 27:16	
50:21 71:17 96:14	
year 56:3 57:24	
58:8 77:10 84:14,21	
85:19 88:23 103:3	
109:2,8	
years 9:14 14:5	
80:9 88:12,14 94:5	
95:10 102:13	
yield 73:16	
yielding 70:19	
york 1:2,14,14 3:5	
3:12,19,21 4:11,19	
5:4 26:23 36:19	
37:16 55:9,14,22	
67:9 84:12,13,22	
90:1 109:14,14	
Z	
zero 90:16	
zillion 82:21	
zimmerman 38:21	
40:24 63:3 64:6,16	
·	